The Flag of Palestine Versus the Flag of Islam: Delineating Boundaries Within Islamist Terrorism

“Hamas is ISIS,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserted following the October 7th Hamas attacks. This statement quickly gained traction, becoming a trending hashtag on social media, appearing on leaflets dropped over Gaza by Israel, and informing speeches by U.S. and French leaders. Following unprecedented national trauma and ahead of a controversial military campaign, equating Hamas with ISIS—a group widely discredited and countered through an 86-country coalition—served both strategic and emotional purposes for Israel. The comparison facilitated Israel’s bids for international defense aid and legitimacy while offering a coping mechanism for Hamas’ atrocities. 

Although analysts have highlighted the inaccuracies and pitfalls of this comparison, a coherent framework for distinguishing Hamas from ISIS has yet to emerge. Understanding the key differences between the two groups—particularly Hamas’s national focus versus ISIS’s transnational agenda—is critical for developing more sound public discourse and counterterrorism policy. Colloquially, this distinction can centralize evidence-based analysis, dialogue, and self-education among polarized interlocutors debating Israel’s war in Gaza. For policymakers aiming to counter Hamas, this distinction can highlight the need for a counterterrorism approach tailored to Hamas’ multifaceted nature rather than co-opted from the anti-ISIS campaign. Without nuance, colloquial and policymaking spheres forgo reason and logic for strategic simplification and emotion. 

Leveraging Global Analogies

Israeli leaders have long drawn parallels between their Islamist adversaries and those of the United States to foster greater support for their counterterrorism goals. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stated, “Acts of terror against Israeli citizens are no different from bin Laden’s terror against American citizens.” This discourse blurred distinctions between anti-Israel Islamism and global jihadism. More than twenty years later, in the wake of their watershed attack, Israeli leaders continue to perpetuate misunderstandings and oversimplifications of Islamist threats by equating Hamas and ISIS.

Strategically, this comparison aims to validate Israel’s international military support and expand its global legitimacy. Israel is dependent on foreign defense aid. All of the Israeli Air Force’s manned aircraft are French and American-made and the U.S.-based RTX Corporation supplies the bulk of the Iron Dome’s Tamir missile components. Given the staunch French and U.S. resources devoted to countering ISIS, equating Hamas with ISIS fuels a strategic campaign to secure Israel’s international defense resources. Additionally, Israel makes the comparison to bid for the international legitimacy attained by the anti-ISIS campaign. A unanimous 2015 UN resolution “unequivocally” condemning ISIS and an open letter issued by 120 worldwide Muslim figures invalidating the group’s Islamic claims evidence a virtually global consensus on defeating ISIS. As Israel grows entrenched in a military campaign sparking international outcry and stands accused of genocide in the International Court of Justice, it pursues much-needed credibility through comparisons to a credible counterterrorism campaign.  

Emotionally, comparing ISIS and Hamas provides a framework for processing national trauma. On October 7th, Hamas channeled large-scale political grievances into indiscriminate carnage. Social historian Lloyd DeMause once remarked that “terrorists are containers into which one can project one’s unconscious hostility.” In the aftermath of October 7th, Israel’s container overflowed as intimate stories of murder, sexual abuse, and abduction annexed the Israeli consciousnesses. Rhetorically morphing Hamas into a larger, global enemy allowed Israeli leaders to expand the target of their nation’s grief. Furthermore, amid unprecedented pain, a precedent can provide solidarity and mitigate isolation. With a similar modus operandi of sexual violence and hostage-taking, ISIS seemed to provide that precedent. 

However, overlooking critical differences between ISIS and Hamas degrades logical discourse surrounding Israel’s war in Gaza and undermines counterterrorism policymaking best suited to deteriorating Hamas’ unique resilience. While countering ISIS relied on military force and airstrikes, countering Hamas requires holistically combatting the group’s domestic appeal and adaptability. 

A Fundamental Divide: Nationalism versus Global Jihad

Contrary to Israel’s repeated conflation of Islamist terrorist organizations, anti-Israel Islamist terrorist groups and global jihadist movements like al-Qaeda and ISIS critically differ in their Islamist ideology, mainstream political engagement, and attitudes toward Shias. A fundamental divergence in their goals is at the heart of the Hamas-ISIS comparison. Hamas is a nationalist organization with a singular focus: the establishment of a Palestinian state. In contrast, ISIS is a transnational movement seeking to establish a global Islamic caliphate that transcends national borders. This difference underpins their respective ideologies, strategies, and alliances.  

Recentering the national-transnational distinction can inculcate the public and policymakers with more precise conceptions of Islamist terrorism. In colloquial circles, this can encourage informed popular discourse to counter domestic polarization surrounding the Israel-Hamas war. For U.S. and Israeli policymakers, this distinction can yield a multi-pronged counterterrorism strategy designed to dismantle Hamas, rather than narrowly amassing support for Israel’s anti-Hamas military campaign. 

Hamas: Nationalism and the Flag of Palestine

Hamas originated from the Muslim Brotherhood during the First Intifada in late 1987, blending Palestinian nationalism with the Brotherhood’s grassroots political Islam model. Hamas is willing to participate in mainstream politics and aligns with Shia powers in the region insofar as it advances the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Hamas pursues Islam’s integration into existing political and societal institutions. Despite its notoriety for militant operations, Hamas governs Gaza and provides essential social services, including education, healthcare, and childcare. Hamas has also engaged with the electoral process, defeating Fatah—the Palestinian nationalist party—in the 2006 elections and becoming Gaza’s governing force. Hamas’ involvement in mainstream societal and political processes serves the organization’s nationalistic goals: it seeks to dominate, not overthrow, a system because its ideal nation-state exists within that system. 

The group’s alliance with Iran underscores its pragmatic nationalism. Despite being a Sunni organization, Hamas accepts substantial financial and military support from Shia-majority Iran. For decades, Iran has provided critical funding, intelligence, weapons, and training to Hamas. This partnership is not ideological but strategic, advancing Hamas’s nationalist agenda.

Reports estimate that Iran provides Hamas with $70 to $100 million annually. Yahye Sinwar attested to this relationship, calling Iran “the largest backer financially and militarily” of the Hamas military wing. Iran reportedly helped Hamas plot the October 7th attack, with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps greenlighting the operation days before. Although Iran’s involvement in the attack is contested, Hamas’ general alignment with Iran is clear. 

ISIS: Global Jihad & the Flag of Islam 

In contrast to Hamas, ISIS is a transnational organization with a global agenda. Rooted in Salafist ideology, the group rejects nationalism, dismisses mainstream political systems in favor of divine law, and vehemently opposes Shias. ISIS envisions a unified Islamic caliphate that transcends geographic borders—condemning nation-states as incompatible with its pan-Islamist ideology. ISIS deems national flags, including the Palestinian one, “idols fluttering in the skies of dar al-kufr.” Islam, rather, binds ISIS’s multinational ranks. Discourse equating Hamas with ISIS fails to grasp ISIS’s unrelenting pan-Islamist agenda, Hamas’ nationalist fervor, and the mutual exclusivity of the two pursuits. While Hamas envisions a Palestinian state integrated into the international system with representatives at the United Nations and Arab League, ISIS aspires for a global caliphate—a physical manifestation of God’s will on Earth existing outside the international order.

For ISIS, political leadership by humans is inherently illegitimate. It insists that it violates the sanctity of God, who it considers the true sovereign. As such, ISIS centralizes the (elusive and often self-serving) pursuit of Sharia. While Hamas also advocates for Sharia, it does not do so as strictly as ISIS. Hamas’ participation in the 2006 elections, for example, would be considered a departure from divine sovereignty. In a 2015 video, ISIS asserted that Sharia would be implemented in Gaza “in spite” of Hamas, not through it.  

Another key distinction lies in ISIS’s unwavering sectarianism. While Hamas accepts Iran’s support, ISIS labels the state rafidah, a derogatory term for Shias. Shia opposition is central to ISIS’s ideology and strategy. ISIS’s propaganda magazine Dabiq uses anti-Shia rhetoric to craft a strong Sunni identity united against a Shia out-group. 

Shias are also a frequent target of ISIS violence. Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the “godfather of ISIS,” envisioned anti-Shia violence sparking a sectarian civil war and awakening inattentive Sunnis. While Hamas’ relationship with Iran represents a pragmatic alliance with a regional hegemon in service of its nationalistic objectives, ISIS’s attitude toward Iran is part of its broader goal to divide the world into a sect of Sunnis deemed true believers, and everyone else. 

The divergences between ISIS and Hamas are also evident in their interactions. ISIS outwardly condemns Hamas for allying with Iran and its Shia proxies and for its national aspirations. Notably, ISIS did not praise Hamas’ October 7th attacks, even as other global jihadist organizations did. Hamas, in turn, suppresses pro-ISIS activists in Gaza. In short, Hamas is not ISIS.

Sharpening the Focus

Some proponents of the ISIS-Hamas comparison justify it by identifying a common “rage,” “ideological zeal,” and “relish in bloodshed” between the groups. By this standard, though, one could equate all Islamist terrorists (and non-Islamist terrorists, for that matter), thereby eroding the typologies necessary for appreciating the diversity of Islamist threats. Goal scope, as opposed to fervor or general socio-cultural habitat, yields a greater analytical value for understanding and countering Islamist terrorist organizations.

In both colloquial and policymaking circles, refocusing analysis on the national-transnational distinction centers logic, rather than heuristics, when discussing Islamist terrorism. The distinction is key for generating more informed public discourse. First, appreciating the ISIS-Hamas distinction requires changing the discourse’s currency from self-serving argumentation to evidence-based reasoning. Second, the distinction interrupts the synthesis of two separate and controversial issues—global jihad and the Israel-Palestine conflict—into a topic too contested for dialogue. Lastly, it draws attention to the nuance of Islamist terrorism, encouraging self-education on the issue or humility in conversation. Together, these effects may mitigate the domestic polarization that has unsettled university campuses, precipitated a rise in ethnically and religiously motivated hate crimes, and challenged the principles of debate in higher education. 

For U.S. and Israeli policymakers, a sober acknowledgment of the Hamas-ISIS distinction can entice counter-terrorism policy rooted in precision rather than generalization and emotion. Likening Hamas to ISIS implies a need for the military campaigns, the leadership decapitation, and the transnational tactics used to counter ISIS. Yet, these approaches do not fully address Hamas’ complexities. Disentangling Hamas from ISIS illuminates Hamas’ dual governing-militant identity, reliance on nationalism for rhetorical power, and preference for self-interest over puritanical Sunni doctrine. Countering Hamas, therefore, necessitates a holistic strategy aiming to undermine its kaleidoscopic nature, perceived legitimacy among Palestinians, and pragmatic regional alliance network integrating diverse military, diplomatic, social, and economic tools. Clear-eyed policies based on a precise conception of Israel’s adversary, rather than relying on misinformation and simplifications to rally global support, provide a more effective path forward in countering Hamas.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Anadolu Agency