The Kurdish Question: What’s Behind Erdogan’s Policy U-Turn?
At the end of a parliamentary session in early October this year, Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli—a key ally of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)—shook hands with lawmakers from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party (Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, formerly known as the HDP) in Turkey’s parliament. This shocking political gesture was soon followed by a speech from President Erdoğan, who endorsed Bahçeli’s move and declared, “We must strengthen peace and brotherhood in the new era.” Weeks later, Bahçeli made an even more surprising proposal: the state would grant parole to Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), if the PKK disbanded and ended its campaign of violence.
A day after Bahçeli’s proposal, however, the PKK carried out an attack on Turkish Aerospace Industries, a state-run defense company in Ankara. In a retaliatory response, the Turkish government cracked down on Kurdish politicians and intensified attacks on northern Syria and Iraq. On November 26, 2024, in a 24-hour government crackdown, 230 people were detained including Kurdish politicians, journalists, and activists. The crackdowns ousted democratically elected Kurdish mayors from the southeast who were accused of ties to Kurdish militants and replaced by state-appointed trustees.
A Contradictory but Calculated Approach
Offering Öcalan’s release is a calculated move to leverage his influence over the PKK and affiliated Kurdish groups, potentially dismantling the regional Kurdish militant network and securing Turkey’s southern border. At the same time, the crackdown on Kurdish politicians serves to maintain the government’s nationalist credentials and manage its alliance with the ultranationalist MHP, a key partner in President Erdoğan’s ruling coalition. Dismissing Kurdish mayors under allegations of ties to militants allows the government to project strength and maintain control in the southeast, ensuring that it does not alienate its nationalist voter base, which vehemently opposes any concessions to the Kurdish political movement.
Additionally, and perhaps more significantly for Erdoğan’s long-standing focus on consolidating power, securing Kurdish support could be crucial if he aims to amend constitutional term limits and potentially run again in the 2028 election—an outcome that MHP leader Bahçeli and Daily Sabah, a government mouthpiece news agency, have suggested.
Turkey, Syria, and the Kurds
Turkey views the People’s Defense Units (YPG), the dominant force within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as merely an extension of the PKK, designated by Turkey as a Kurdish terrorist group. The YPG and PKK share a common ideological foundation rooted in Öcalan’s teachings, which advocate for Kurdish autonomy and decentralized governance. For Ankara, YPG’s control of northern Syria represents a direct challenge to Turkish sovereignty, as it could embolden Kurdish separatists within Turkey’s borders and inspire renewed calls for autonomy in its southeast. Additionally, the YPG’s proximity to Turkey provides the PKK with a potential logistical and operational base just across the border, allowing for the transfer of fighters, weapons, and resources to fuel its insurgency. The establishment of a de-facto Kurdish-led autonomous region in northern Syria—often referred to as Rojava, “Western Kurdistan”—poses political and territorial challenges to Turkey’s centralized state model, potentially motivating Kurdish populations within Turkey to pursue similar ambitions. Turkey’s concerns about strengthened Kurdish ambitions have driven its incursions into northern Syria since 2016, which were aimed at disrupting Kurdish control and creating buffer zones. As the Turkish National Security Council stated in 2018, these actions aimed to prevent the formation of a “terrorism corridor and the formation of a terrorism army on Turkey’s border.”
The PKK’s core has shifted to Syria, and Ankara likely realized that neither Assad nor Russia would be willing to come to the negotiating table for a political solution. There has been speculation that Turkey gave tacit approval to Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA) to launch their advance. If Turkey did indeed give the rebels the green light, Ankara likely concluded the only way to negotiate with Assad would be to force Assad to the table from a position of weakness, or force him to leave the table entirely.
Now that the Assad regime has fallen, Turkey’s replacement of Russian and Iranian influence in Syria will make it easier for Turkey to conduct operations against the Kurds through the SNA. Turkey has already backed the SNA in previous operations, such as the 2018 capture of Afrin, and will continue this support in future offensives against the Kurds. Last week, while HTS seized regime-held territory, the SNA attacked SDF-held areas, capturing Tel Rifaat, a strategically critical city west of the Euphrates. On December 9, the SNA took control of formerly SDF-held Manbij, another key city, with Turkish drones providing support. Anadolu Ajansı, a Turkish state-run news agency, reported that the SNA “liberated” the city from the “terrorist [SDF/PKK] stronghold.”
Capturing Tel Rifaat and Manbij is strategically important for Turkey as they serve as critical transit hubs in Syria’s northern transportation network, linking key areas such as Aleppo, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor. These connections facilitate the movement of goods, forces, and supplies, making control over these areas vital for regional influence. Additionally, securing Manbij enhances Turkey’s control over the Euphrates River, a significant natural barrier and an essential water source. This strategy is part of Turkey’s broader objective to establish a “safe zone” along its southern border, which Ankara claims is necessary both to house refugees and to prevent cross-border activities by Kurdish groups it considers a threat. The primary advantage for Turkey, however, would be advancing its plan to push the SDF eastward, bringing the strategic city of Kobane within Erdoğan’s reach.
Kobane has long been a target for Erdoğan. The city holds significant symbolic and strategic importance, as it is a vital link connecting Kurdish-controlled areas to the east, like Qamishli, and to the west, such as Afrin. If Kobane were to fall under Turkish control, it would sever this vital connection, fragmenting Kurdish territorial unity and disrupting SDF’s military and administrative structure—thus facilitating the destruction of the “terror corridor.” Kobane is also a symbol of Kurdish resistance, particularly for its role in the 2014–2015 victory over ISIS, which elevated Kurdish forces as a unified and powerful entity.
For Turkey, capturing Kobane would enhance its security by securing its southern border and further suppress Kurdish aspirations for autonomy. Additionally, Turkey could reshape the region’s demographics by resettling Syrian Arab refugees in Kurdish-majority areas, diluting Kurdish influence and strengthening Turkish control over northern Syria. Beyond that, controlling Kobane would significantly bolster Turkey’s influence in shaping Syria’s post-conflict order.
With Syria’s situation still fluid, weakening SDF control in northeastern Syria could pressure them into a political settlement, likely shaped by UN Security Council Resolution 2254. For Turkey, such a settlement is crucial to addressing pressing issues, including the Syrian refugee crisis, which has fueled nationalist backlash and strained its economy. Turkey is particularly concerned with preventing the establishment of an independent Kurdish region in northern Syria. To this end, Turkey may use the SNA to pressure the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) into submission, severely diminishing ties between the YPG, PYD, and the PKK, thereby securing its southern border and diminishing the prospect of Kurdish independence. If these objectives are achieved, the most substantial Kurdish challenge to Turkey’s security may arise domestically. A potential deal with Öcalan could then become a decisive component in neutralizing the broader Kurdish push for autonomy, addressing internal tensions, and reshaping the region’s Kurdish dynamics to Turkey’s advantage.
Because Öcalan Said So…?
Öcalan’s guidance, even from prison, carries immense weight. Öcalan has a cult-like base of followers. Some consider him the Kurdish Nelson Mandela. To many Kurds across the region, Öcalan represents a beacon of progress, democracy, and freedom. If Öcalan were to issue a directive—such as calling for the disbandment of the PKK and a cessation of armed struggle—there is a strong likelihood that his followers would heed his call, as they have done in the past (e.g., 1993, 1999, 2013–15). In a recent interview with Al-Monitor, Ilham Ahmad, the de facto foreign minister of the AANES, stated, “Anything Öcalan says is of vital importance, and we believe that everything he says will be for the benefit of Rojava— and for all Kurds.”
Despite Öcalan’s influence, skepticism among Turkey’s Kurds remains profound, rooted in a century of state-led efforts to assimilate and suppress Kurdish identity. Even more so considering that the current round of peace talks is being conducted by a state far more entrenched in nationalist principles than in previous negotiations.
After three failed rounds of peace talks, Kurds have grown wary, recognizing that promises often go unfulfilled and that the state rarely takes substantive steps to expand freedoms or grant greater rights to the Kurdish population. Even when cultural rights, such as the allowance of private Kurdish-language schools, were granted, many of these schools were shut down after 2015 as the government reverted to more repressive policies.
Despite Öcalan’s influence over the PKK and the broader Kurdish community—which may be sufficient in bringing the parties to the negotiation table—it is far from certain that the PKK or the Kurdish people are willing to surrender their demands without significant concessions. This uncertainty is compounded by an increasingly nationalistic, paranoid, and polarized Turkish society, which shows little willingness to embrace non-Turkish identities within its national framework.
Kurdish Voters are Kingmakers
The other catalyst behind this initiative is Erdoğan’s likely pursuit of a third term in power, which is unlikely to happen unless he secures the necessary Kurdish votes for constitutional reform.
The Kurdish population in Turkey represents roughly 15-20% of the electorate and is concentrated in the southeastern and eastern regions such as Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, and Van. These regions hold significant electoral weight in national elections. Erdoğan’s ability to secure a portion of the Kurdish vote would significantly shift the balance of power, especially as many Kurdish voters who once supported the AKP (from the early 2000s until 2019) have moved toward the Republican People’s Party (CHP) amidst growing discontent with AKP’s alliance with nationalist parties and Erdoğan’s increasingly hardline approach to Kurdish issues. As the CHP has positioned itself as a more inclusive alternative, it now attracts more Kurdish support, particularly in western provinces, than the AKP.
Moreover, Kurds in Turkey and Turks have quite divergent birth rates. Turkey’s fertility rate in 2023 was 1.51 live births per woman, below the replacement level of 2.1. In southeastern provinces, where the Kurdish population is concentrated, fertility rates remain significantly higher than the national average. Between 1994 and 2015, the proportion of Kurdish votes in Turkey’s elections experienced a significant increase, rising from 4.1% to 13.1%. Kurdish voters are poised to play a decisive role based on their numbers. Past elections have shown the importance of Kurdish voters too. For example, although Erdoğan won the 2023 presidential vote, his opponent, Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu came quite close thanks to Kurdish support for CHP. As the Turkish political saying goes, Kurdish voters are kingmakers.
Under the current Turkish constitution, Erdoğan faces a significant legal constraint that limits his ability to seek re-election without calling for early elections. Having served as prime minister (from 2003 to 2014) and president (since 2014), Erdoğan’s political tenure spans over two decades. However, the 1982 constitution imposes a critical limit, capping the president at two terms in office. The 2017 constitutional referendum, which transitioned Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system, likewise limits the president to two terms. This means that Erdoğan is ineligible to run for a third term unless early elections are called. However, for him to continue onto a third term, it would require the parliament to call for early elections, not Erdoğan himself.
Precedent—the 2017-2018 referendum—indicates that Erdoğan would prefer to rewrite the constitution rather than call for early elections, which would be a much more politically risky option. Calling a constitutional referendum presents fewer risks, but it is challenging at the current stage. In 2018, Erdoğan’s AKP formalized an alliance with the MHP following the 2017 constitutional referendum, in which both parties campaigned for a “Yes” vote to transform Turkey into a presidential system. However, the alliance with MHP is no longer enough as Erdoğan’s popularity dwindles again. Thus, as Erdoğan has done in the past, it is time to turn to the Kurds again for help.
Despite the obvious contradictory approach, there is a logic to it. For one, it appeases the nationalist base, particularly the MHP, a key coalition partner that strongly opposes any concessions to Kurdish political aspirations. By maintaining this tough stance, Erdoğan ensures that he does not alienate his nationalist supporters—who revere a strong centralization model of governance, coupled with an orthodox conception of Turkish identity that leaves little room for heterogeneity lest there be an existential crisis—while also projecting strength and control over the Kurdish-majority regions of Turkey.
Secondly, the heavy-handedness serves to weaken Kurdish political influence and exert pressure on Kurdish political and autonomy movements. By systematically removing Kurdish politicians and replacing them with state-appointed trustees, Kurdish political representation—and thus Kurdish political power—is diminished. The government’s military retaliation and political repression send a clear message that Turkey will not tolerate Kurdish autonomy or resistance, either within its borders or in neighboring Syria and Iraq. Moreover, Turkey uses such measures to signal to their constituencies that they are taking action on the Kurdish “issue.” That Turkish foreign policy calculations reflect domestic political considerations becomes all the more obvious when one takes note of the timing of major foreign policy decisions. For instance, the timing of major military operations in Syria—such as Operation Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring—all aligned closely with significant political events, including the 2017 referendum, the 2018 parliamentary and presidential elections, and the March 2019 municipal elections.
Erdoğan’s strategy may alienate hardline Kurds but has the potential to secure support from other Kurdish voters, as he has achieved in the past. Notably, in 2014, Erdoğan leveraged Öcalan’s influence when the imprisoned PKK leader issued a statement endorsing Erdoğan’s reconciliation efforts, urging the Kurdish population to support him. In the earlier years of his leadership, Erdoğan also courted Kurdish support by reversing restrictions on the Kurdish language and granting them greater rights as part of the Kürt Açılımı (Kurdish Opening). However, over the last decade, many Kurds have left the AKP and brought their support to the CHP or bolstered the DEM’s power base. Especially since 2019, the DEM has grown in political power, becoming the third-largest party in parliament, behind the AKP and CHP. As he has in the past, Erdoğan’s strategy for constitutional reform will likely involve dividing opposition coalitions and co-opting Kurdish votes—particularly conservative Kurdish voters in southeastern Anatolia, which has traditionally been a stronghold for Erdoğan’s party.
Concluding Thoughts and Implications for the U.S.
The Turkish government has employed its current strategies and tactics in the past in one form or another; none of them is particularly unique or innovative. The difference this time is that the strategic calculations and environment appear to be more favorable for such initiatives, as the region is occupied with the broader threat of escalation between Israel and Iran, and the weakening state of the PKK. Erdoğan faces a difficult calculus where he must figure out how to decisively put an end to the “Kurdish Question” in such a way that is palpable to an increasingly polarized Turkish society while ensuring he secures the necessary votes to run for a third term.
If this new round of peace talks falters—especially if the past mistakes of the 2013–15 process are not rectified, such as giving the MHP a larger role without involving parliament or not broadening representatives of the Kurdish movement—the violence between the Turkish state and the PKK could easily flare up again. The past has shown this to be the case: the deadliest period of the conflict followed the 2015 collapse of negotiations in which more than 6,500 people have died since 2015.
Domestically, such a failure would deepen the alienation of Kurdish voters, eroding Erdogan’s political leverage and complicating his pursuit of constitutional reforms, potentially undermining his already tenuous grip on power. This could embolden Erdogan’s political rivals, who would seize on his inability to resolve the Kurdish issue as evidence of his failure to unite the country, potentially leading to greater opposition mobilization and a more polarized political environment.
Moreover, the inability to reach an agreement may lead Kurdish populations in both Iraq and Syria to perceive Turkey’s actions as further proof of its reluctance to support Kurdish rights, potentially fueling their independence movements and forging new alliances that could challenge Turkey’s regional influence and stability.
For the United States, which has supported Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria since 2003 and 2014 respectively, the failure of the peace initiative could complicate its relationships in the region. The United States’ close relationship with Kurdish groups places Washington in a delicate position. Indeed, U.S. support for the SDF-YPG has been a sore point in the bilateral relationship since the beginning of the Syrian civil war. A failure could further strain U.S.-Turkey relations, making it harder for the United States to balance its regional alliances.
If Turkey escalates operations against Kurdish groups in Syria and the United States doubles down on its support for the Kurds, Ankara may intensify efforts to pressure Washington into reducing support. Failure to do so could lead Turkey to reconsider its alliance or, at minimum, adopt a less cooperative stance within NATO as it has done in the past. Amidst a potential regional war, Turkey’s role as a critical NATO member—given its geographic location between the Middle East and Europe, its control of the Black Sea (which NATO has been able to leverage against Russia), and its hosting of NATO forces in İncirlik Air Base—makes its cooperation essential for achieving military and diplomatic objectives.
As Turkey’s strategic importance to NATO continues to grow, the United States might feel compelled to prioritize its relationship with Ankara over its Kurdish allies. The United States would have to grapple with the difficult trade-off between preserving ties with an unpredictable NATO ally and maintaining its credibility with the Kurds, whose cooperation remains critical in fighting ISIS and countering Iranian influence.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Almayadeen