No Military Solutions in the Middle East? There Just Might Be

“There is no military solution to this conflict” is probably one of the most recognized lessons-turned-dicta in Middle East politics. And this is for good reason. Most conflicts in the region have roots that have little to do with security, and yet they are often dealt with exclusively through military and security means. As highlighted in the 2002 Arab Human Development Report and manifested in the 2011 Arab uprisings, poor governance, political oppression, and economic inequality (and often a combination of those conditions) have given birth to rebellion, violence, and terrorism.

The biggest shortcoming in the security policy of most governments in the region and the United States is their insistence on addressing the symptoms of the problem and not the cause. To be sure, a military approach to perceived security threats across the region has been necessary to neutralize immediate dangers, but it has failed to deliver lasting stability. To dispute this claim would betray any honest reading of political history in the Middle East.

The Often-Neglected Politics

Consider Hamas, for example. Until a credible substitute for Hamas emerges—be it a reformed Palestinian Authority or another Palestinian entity—the group will always find a way, as it has shown over decades, to attract followers and survive, no matter how much beating it gets from Israel. And that alternative is unlikely to ever come to life in the absence of an independent Palestinian state, which Israel has to approve. As long as Israel denies the Palestinians their statehood rights, there will always be a Hamas or some other militant group that is determined to liberate Palestinian lands.

Look at the latest war between Israel and Hamas, by far the deadliest in their history of confrontation. Israel punished Hamas like never before for its murder of more than 1,200 Israelis and abduction of 250 others on October 7, 2023. It eliminated many of the organization’s core leaders including Ismail Haniyeh, Mohammed Deif, and Yahya Sinwar, and killed anywhere from 16,000 to 18,000 of its fighters. It has destroyed much of the group’s military capabilities and part of its infamous tunnel system.

But all of these tactical accomplishments, certainly considerable and even unprecedented, could and most likely will go to waste if Israel, the United States, and Arab powers do not get the day-after politics right. That means figuring out how the almost totally ruined Gaza can be reconstructed, and who will govern it. If these matters are to be neglected and separated from the creation of an independent Palestinian state, Hamas, once again, will rise from the ashes.

The situation is not dramatically different in Lebanon. The hits Hezbollah received from Israel over the past year were equally if not more devastating. In response to the group’s Oct. 8 intervention in support of Hamas, Israel decapitated its leadership, decimated its military capabilities, and penetrated its security apparatus through technological ingenuity and old-fashioned human spying. Hezbollah today is badly wounded and dogged by problems including internal rehabilitation, post-war reconstruction of areas in which it has influence, and reconciliation with its Shi’ite support base, which bore the brunt of the war with Israel.

But like Hamas, until a Lebanese Shi’ite entity challenges Hezbollah’s popularity and influence internally, and until the Lebanese form a strong enough state and consensus to counter everything Hezbollah stands for, Israel’s blows will soon be forgotten, and the group’s wounds will heal. Those responsibilities have nothing to do with Israel—they are the Lebanese people’s alone—but the point stands: the problem of Hezbollah’s arms cannot be tackled through the use of force alone. This requires addressing the broader weaknesses of the Lebanese system, which Hezbollah has always exploited.

America’s experience in Iraq in the post-Saddam era carries similar lessons to Lebanon and Gaza. The United States methodically took apart al-Qaeda, a major threat to Iraqi security, from 2007 to 2011 but never managed to secure the country. President George W. Bush did the right thing in early 2007 by ordering a U.S. troop surge in the country (later known as “the Surge”) to provide security in Baghdad, which was experiencing intense sectarian violence, and to give the Iraqi government time to resolve its political problems. The surge’s success was short-lived because Washington failed to create a more stable Iraqi political system. 

This was not just the Americans’ fault; the Iraqis messed up, too. No one stopped Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a close friend of Tehran, from centralizing power, alienating the Sunnis, and enabling Shi’ite militancy. These measures constituted the perfect recipe for al-Qaeda to return and ultimately morph into the Islamic State. Stability in Baghdad and sectarian peace across Iraq, both inherently political processes in nature, were integral to countering Islamic militancy in both its Sunni and Shi’ite forms, and yet they were vastly overlooked by Iraqi and American officials.

Pressure First

These examples and many more in the region reinforce the hypothesis that there are hardly any military solutions to political problems. However, it would be a mistake to argue that the military instrument is useless or does more harm than good in solving conflicts in the Middle East. Supporters of such an argument suggest that if only belligerents and outside powers would spend more time and effort addressing the root causes of conflict, the guns would be silenced, and peace would be more attainable.

For example, if Israel agrees to a two-state solution, Hamas’ armed resistance rationale would collapse and so would its domestic appeal. By the same token, if political governance is fixed in Yemen, and a representative system is developed in Sanaa, the Houthis would lay down their arms as part of a political deal. In Lebanon, if the Lebanese can institute structural reforms—as mandated by the 1989 Taef Agreement, which ended the Lebanese civil war—and build a stronger state, this would make it a lot easier to challenge the oversized political influence of Hezbollah and possibly disarm it.

All of this is true, but only partially. There is virtually no chance that any of these outcomes could be achieved without applying some level of pressure against Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, or any other radical actor in the region that is armed, considers itself above the law, and operates with impunity. And to be effective, that pressure must incorporate military force.

The question is not whether to use military force against these ideological and destabilizing agents; it is how. And here, one must acknowledge that there has been an evolution in Israeli policy and practice.

In the past, Israel botched its wars against Hamas and Hezbollah in two ways: First, it opted for punishing Palestinian and Lebanese societies through massive and relentless bombardment, hoping they would rise up against Hamas and Hezbollah, respectively. Israel’s war with Hezbollah in 2006 and with Hamas in 2014 are two recent examples. Second, it barely dented the military capabilities of either group, instead playing into their hands by invading and occupying Palestinian and Lebanese lands to deal with the rocket and missile threats. Once it entered Palestinian and Lebanese territory, Hamas and Hezbollah gained the advantage politically, legally, and to some extent militarily.

The evolution of Israel’s response is incomplete, but it is real. The Israeli political and military leadership still relies on invasion and occupation to achieve security goals. Israel could not have destroyed military positions, manufacturing facilities, storage sites, tunnels, and communications systems without deploying infantry and special operations forces and engaging Hamas and Hezbollah in ground combat on Palestinian and Lebanese territory. There are pros to this approach including faster operational and tactical gains. However, the cons are considerable and outweigh the pros: diplomatic and reputational costs, domestic political turbulence, and regional anger toward Israel.

Israel has made important adjustments in its attempts to bolster the lethality of its military approach. Unlike in the past, this time Israel hurt Hamas and Hezbollah by going after their ability to lead, shoot, move, and communicate.

After the catastrophic intelligence failure of the October 7 attack, Israel rebounded and upgraded its intelligence capabilities in a major way. This allowed it to hunt down and eliminate one Hamas and Hezbollah leader after the other, find and destroy major weapons sites, and wreck the enemy’s communications systems. Hamas no longer exists as a coherent or organized military force, according to the Israeli military. Hezbollah may have lost more than 4,000 fighters and possibly half of its arsenal, U.S. and Israeli officials claim. 

The most shocking outcome of Israel’s enhanced intelligence capabilities is when the Mossad was able in September 2024 to blow up thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies belonging to Hezbollah personnel. The operation took years to plan, according to the Mossad, but it worked perfectly. The intent was not only to target Hezbollah’s members but to make the entire organization feel vulnerable, which it did.

Yet despite the surgical aspects of Israel’s military response, and the pinpoint accuracy of several of its attacks in Gaza and Lebanon, the overall approach was still overwhelmingly indiscriminate and deadly, leading to immense collateral damage and the loss of dozens of thousands of innocent Palestinian and Lebanese lives. Just like technology helped Israel track and kill high-level Hamas and Hezbollah officials with great precision, it also allowed the Jewish state to bomb civilian buildings, hospitals, schools, and tents with no precision at all. The Israelis relied on artificial intelligence to develop targets in the loosest way possible, according to testimony of Israeli intelligence officers. It was as remarkable as it was scary. 

The Effective Use of Force

What comes out of this complex picture of conflict in the Middle East is a truth that is hard to disprove: the use of force alone cannot solve political problems, but if used effectively, it can facilitate favorable political outcomes. 

Go back to the examples of Gaza and Lebanon. Had Hamas and Hezbollah not been severely weakened militarily by Israel, they would not have agreed to a ceasefire and made concessions that were unlikely at the beginning of the conflict. Had Hezbollah not lost much of its influence or veto power in Beirut due to the losses sustained in its fight with Israel, the Lebanese would not have been able to bring to power a reform-minded president and prime minister, former Lebanese army commander General Joseph Aoun and former Lebanese Ambassador to the United Nations Nawaf Salam respectively.

The ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon present opportunities for political change that could sustainably undermine the influence and capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah. The goal in Gaza is to reconstruct the area and institute a governance model that is led by a reformed Palestinian Authority. But the process must be tied to an Israeli commitment to a two-state solution. In Lebanon, the emphasis is to try to sideline Hezbollah politically and take advantage of this historic moment of serious reform. 

Moving forward, the challenge, and prescription, for the United States, Israel, and governments in the region having to deal with armed militias such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis is twofold: knowing how to use the military instrument, in all its aspects including intensity, scope, and duration, and how to consider the political element early on and integrate it into the overall approach to deal the knock-out blow to the adversary. Without military force, no political engineering, no matter how clever and judicious, can address a security threat on its own. And without a political strategy, no use of military force, no matter how lethal and precise, can achieve a lasting solution to conflict.

This is a guest contribution. Bilal Y. Saab is Senior Managing Director of TRENDS US, an Associate Fellow with Chatham House, and an Adjunct Professor with Georgetown University. Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: SANA