Captivated by Narcotics: How Captagon Undermines Syria’s Reconstruction Efforts
On December 8, 2024, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist militant group, captured Damascus after an eleven-day offensive against the incumbent regime. Former leader Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, ending his controversial reign after decades as Syrian President and a thirteen-year civil war. The country faces a long road toward rebuilding—over 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, and 96% of civilians live on less than seven dollars per day. Ahmed al-Sharaa, HTS leader and Syria’s interim president, vowed to rebuild Syrian institutions and weed out the corruption that Assad allowed to run rampant. Notably, he has expressed plans to target Assad’s notorious Captagon industry, raising questions about the future of Syria’s illicit drug trade and its role in reconstruction efforts.
The fall of Assad’s regime signals a new chapter for the war-torn nation. However, economic turmoil, political fragmentation, disintegrated infrastructure, and a massive refugee crisis undermine reconstruction efforts. Further, Syria has endured years of international sanctions under Assad’s controversial rule, amplifying these systemic issues. In the months since the offensive, the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom have eased sanctions on Syria. While this partial relief is a promising sign for rebuilding, Syria remains gripped by the residual consequences of protracted conflict and corruption that allowed the Captagon trade to exist. Under Assad, the manufacturing and trafficking of Captagon served as a key pillar of Syria’s economy. The illicit drug industry is so entrenched in Syria that dismantling it will be crucial to addressing the country’s broader challenges. Targeting the Captagon industry will help weaken the remnants of Assad’s regime and allow for rebuilding, thereby laying the foundation for economic recovery, political stability, and long-term security.
Assad’s Drug Empire
Fenethylline, known more familiarly today by its illicit trade name, Captagon, is a synthetic drug that originated in Germany in the 1960s. It was prescribed legally for those diagnosed with conditions like attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder or narcolepsy until it was banned in the 1980s due to adverse side effects such as hallucinations, aggressive behavior, and addiction. Captagon is simple to make and requires only a basic knowledge of chemistry to produce. It is nicknamed “the poor man’s drug,” costing anywhere from $1 to $20 per pill. The Captagon market is diverse, with users spanning different economic classes, ages, and occupations. The illicit drug is predominantly used in the Middle East and Eastern Europe by working-class citizens and, historically, militant groups during conflicts. Students and elite populations in wealthy Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are also popular markets.
The Assad regime contributed to the rapid proliferation and sophistication of Captagon trafficking in the region over the last decade. Assad’s network spanned industries: the drug is linked to regime-aligned businesses, as well as Assad’s political and military entities, including the Fourth Armored Division and Hezbollah. Assad’s close family members, including his brother, often oversaw Captagon production. Local agricultural workers aided manufacturing, while state actors provided criminals in the network with weaponry, legal safeguards, and assistance passing through drug checkpoints.
Captagon was also used to control the population. Law enforcement often planted drugs on young Syrians. Officials would then force them to pay a fine or would recruit them into Captagon-related business, often as drug sellers. The regime engaged in criminal activity and embedded illicit networks in its infrastructure, much to the growing dismay of regional and international communities. The increasingly symbiotic relationship between the Captagon network and Assad’s regime signaled how deep corruption ran in Damascus. More importantly, it unveiled how Syria’s meager political, economic, and social conditions showed no signs of improvement amid the ongoing civil war.
As a result, the international community hit Syria with severe sanctions, citing Assad’s human rights violations and war crimes. The resulting economic turmoil in Syria incentivized Assad to use the Captagon industry as a vital source of financing. Around 2018, the regime focused on ramping up investments in industrial production and trafficking facilities. By 2022, the Captagon trade had become a $10 billion industry, with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Crimes naming Syria the “global epicenter of Captagon production.”
While Assad’s drug trafficking enterprise served as Syria’s financial lifeline, it prioritized the wealth of Syria’s elite at the expense of domestic recovery and regional partnerships. Despite the industry’s significant revenue, there is no evidence that it profited Syrians; instead, it created severe economic inequity. Syria’s GDP has fallen rapidly since 2011, impoverishing millions, destroying civilian health and human services, and igniting an energy crisis.
Syria’s “narco state” status, coupled with Assad’s inability to navigate a years-long civil war, solidified its diplomatic and economic isolation. It hindered normalization efforts between Damascus and the Arab League despite attempts by member countries to reengage with Syria. Assad was not invited back to the table by the League until he turned Captagon into a bargaining chip, hinging diplomatic discussions on empty promises to address production and trafficking. Assad’s bad-faith diplomacy and corrupt economic endeavors left Syria in a vulnerable position after the regime’s fall.
The Future of Captagon
U.S.-issued sanctions over the years—with some comprehensively targeting Assad’s war crimes and human rights violations, and others explicitly targeting the Captagon industry—isolated Syria from the global economy. However, the international community is cautiously willing to support the new regime. Shortly after the December offensive, the United States lifted restrictions to ease sanctions on certain transactions, including those in the energy and banking sectors. This allowed some humanitarian aid to enter the country. In May 2025, the Trump Administration announced it would lift more Assad-era sanctions, removing restrictions that barred U.S. entities from conducting financial transactions with Syrian citizens and businesses.
However, many financial relief efforts are either temporary or vulnerable to revocation, reflecting Washington’s wariness in recognizing HTS as legitimate leaders. HTS, an Islamist group with former ties to al Qaeda, has been a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization since 2018. In the United States, it is unlawful to provide material support to terrorist organizations, which creates obstacles and fear of repercussions for those seeking to engage with the new government, regardless of sanctions relief. As the United States and the European Union slowly lift restrictions against Syria, officials are tasked with ensuring the new Sharaa regime is legitimate while also finding a productive way to allow aid into Syria. Syria’s new government must salvage its reputation in Washington and across the European Union to push forward reconstruction efforts. A commitment to targeting Captagon is a promising start.
However, the Captagon industry is deeply entrenched in Syria, and dismantling it will be challenging. The infrastructure remains: manufacturing and distribution became more sophisticated over the years, with criminal actors building up illicit networks via maritime routes, underground tunnels, and drones. Even if these networks are disrupted, drug supply chains are resilient, and Captagon production and distribution can move to areas within the country that pose a lesser risk of detection. Further, while many Assad regime-linked Captagon players fled, Iran and Hezbollah controlled a portion of the manufacturing, packaging, and distribution sites. Some smaller traffickers, manufacturers, and sellers also remain in the country, including local gangs, militias, rebel groups, and other supply chain contributors. Certain anti-Assad groups within Syria even utilized drug smuggling for financing and could continue to do so. The infrastructure and many actors that fueled the Captagon industry still exist in Syria—even with the Assad regime gone, the appetite to sustain the illicit trade using existing infrastructure and networks might persist.
The Captagon problem is not just a Syrian issue, either. Gone unchecked, networks might adapt and headquarter elsewhere. Production hubs and trafficking chokepoints exist across the Middle East and Europe. Caroline Rose, a Captagon trade expert, predicts that external actors will use money laundering to conceal future Captagon trafficking, and that Captagon sites outside Syria could use trade routes to obscure drug movement and profits. Because Captagon is so versatile, experts believe it might eventually find a permanent home in markets outside the Middle East.
The idea that the Captagon industry could find a new headquarters outside Syria is not unfounded. Like all drug networks, Captagon’s survival boils down to supply and demand. Suppliers diversified manufacturing over the years, and small-scale Captagon production emerged in Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Türkyie, and parts of Europe. However, it is unlikely that a single state actor will fill the gap Assad left behind. Destabilizing events, including the Israel-Iran conflict, may incentivize countries to avoid behavior that might cost them regional partners or international aid. Additionally, the scale at which the Assad regime sponsored Captagon production was unconventional. Assad’s use of political and military affiliates to sustain 80% of global Captagon production far surpasses other “narco states’” production levels and overt government involvement.
Still, illicit drug demand is relatively stable—that is, there is a consistent market of Captagon-buyers, which could allow for smaller actors to fill the vacuum instead. One survey on substance abuse among Syrians revealed a significant increase in drug addiction post-2011. With over half the population displaced and inadequate social services to address drug problems, Captagon demand will likely persist via smaller producers and distributors. Countries with existing illicit drug industries, such as Türkyie, Iraq, and Lebanon, will become hotspots. Thus, focus should be on efforts to stifle smaller Captagon players and existing criminal networks, within and outside Syria.
Türkyie, in particular, is a key player in the future of Captagon trafficking in the Middle East. Türkyie’s geographical links and vested economic interests in Syria make it a vital stakeholder in Syrian reconstruction. As a popular trafficking corridor and destination hub in the Captagon network, Türkyie’s cooperation is essential to securing borders against illicit drug flows. Further, Turkish officials have fostered open communication with the new regime, traveling across Syria to assess rebuilding efforts. Economic incentives, including renewed trade between the countries, are prompting Ankara to aid Syria’s reconstruction, which may also encourage counternarcotics cooperation between the two countries. Türkyie also represents hope for future regional partnerships. While Ankara once disavowed HTS as a terrorist organization, the group’s more recent efforts against the Islamic State allowed for cooperation between the two.
There are positive outlooks for other Middle Eastern nations vulnerable to drug networks. A meeting of the Arab Ministerial Contact Committee on Syria signals the states’ cautious willingness to support a politically and socially inclusive transition, recognizing that “the security and stability of Syria are foundational to the security and stability of the region.” This support is a critical factor in Syrian reconstruction and the future of Captagon. Cooperation from the new regime could help rebuild a vital regional partnership among Arab nations and facilitate efforts to curb Captagon production and trafficking across the Middle East.
Dismantling a Narco State
Systemic illicit markets and widespread drug issues perpetuate instability and corruption; as such, leaders cannot uncouple the Captagon issue from Syrian reconstruction efforts. Dismantling the Captagon industry must be a priority as the international community aids the new government, both to help Syrian recovery and to stop the spread of Captagon to new areas.
While the Sharaa regime is still in its infancy, there are positive outlooks for its success. HTS has governed Syria’s Idlib province since 2017 and is known for being intolerant of drugs. Before they captured Damascus, HTS worked along drug trafficking routes to stifle regime-linked Captagon trade. Since the December offensive, HTS members have been publicly burning massive amounts of Captagon found across Syria and accumulating tangible evidence, such as pressing machines and electronic transactions, against individuals associated with the Captagon industry. The de facto government’s behavior signals its intentions to dismantle remnants of Assad’s drug empire, which can help build goodwill with international partners. Continuing to foster trust with potential economic sponsors will allow for crucial aid to flow into Syria to begin to compensate for the massive loss of Assad’s Captagon-driven economy. It is up to the international community to ensure the Sharaa regime has distanced itself from its extremist roots. Monitoring the new regime to ensure sanction removals are done under a solid human rights record is critical. Aid must reach Syrians directly—this will help rebuild the economy while reducing the market for Captagon.
Furthermore, a regional forum that addresses Captagon trafficking and drug usage would help boost joint counternarcotics efforts and revive weakened diplomatic relations. This venture would help ensure the Captagon industry does not proliferate or continue to feed off lucrative Middle Eastern markets. Security and military efforts will involve identifying and securing illicit maritime and mainland trade routes, a feat that will require regional cooperation. Bolstering law enforcement efforts in Syria will help root out those with a stake in the Captagon industry and help prevent criminal networks from adapting.
Drug addiction sustained by the Captagon industry is a public health issue. Addressing only the political and criminal facets of Captagon trafficking will be ineffective without also addressing its impact on civilians. Drug addiction is rampant in Syria, and the Assad regime was ineffective in combating this epidemic. A 2022 study by MedGlobal shed light on past efforts within Syria to combat drug use using “awareness campaigns,” which failed due to a lack of support and continuity, but nevertheless fostered trust between civilians and government bodies. Long-term stability in Syria could allow for the renewal of similar campaigns and more targeted addiction services. The new regime must consider the persistent demand for Captagon in addition to cutting off the supply.
The Captagon threat transcends Syria and the fall of Damascus, and the notion that it will dissipate with the fall of Assad’s regime is misguided. Captagon will remain a threat as long as demand persists and suppliers can find lucrative markets. Focusing on places where demand is high and where addiction issues exist will help uncover new Captagon trafficking and production hubs while addressing public health concerns. Further, stoking regional cooperation and renewing trust among international partners will encourage the aid and assistance needed to dismantle Assad’s “narco state” while promoting reconstruction efforts. Curbing the lingering threat of Captagon in Syria will be an arduous task, but one inherently linked to the country’s rebuilding.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: The New Arab