The Soldier and the Democratic State: Civil-Military Relations and South Korea’s 2024 Constitutional Crisis
On June 3, 2025, Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party won the South Korean presidential elections by a landslide. He swept the governing People’s Power Party out of office—the same party whose leader, then-president Yoon Suk-yeol—had declared martial law six months earlier. With this defeat, the months of political turmoil ended, appearing to have banished the specter of authoritarian backsliding and military rule. However, fault lines persist, and the events of the 2024 martial law crisis provide lessons for the relationship between the military and a democratic state, which South Korea—and other democracies—should heed, even as the events surrounding Seoul’s crisis fade into the past.
Recalling the Events of South Korea’s Brush with Authoritarianism
On December 3, 2024, President Yoon, in an unannounced televised address, declared martial law, citing the need to protect the country from “North Korean communist forces” and “anti-state forces” and to “rebuild and protect South Korea.” This declaration, unprecedented in the current democratic era of South Korea, came as Yoon was increasingly pressured by the opposition-controlled legislature. In response to a budget reform bill that Yoon’s People’s Power Party (PPP) and the opposition Democratic Party (DP) had clashed over, Yoon sought to force the issue in dramatic fashion. He attempted to mask his plan to resolve a policy dispute with a thin veil of allegedly protecting national security.
Yoon invoked martial law, which broadly expanded the powers of his executive office. With those expanded powers, he moved swiftly and ordered the deployment of police and military units. Police vehicles barricaded the front gates of the National Assembly, South Korea’s parliament. At the same time, approximately 1500 soldiers—among them special forces units of the South Korean Army—were dispatched to the legislature, breaking windows and attempting to obstruct the opposition’s efforts to revoke martial law. Other military units were instructed to occupy the National Election Commission, and President Yoon allegedly ordered the arrest of key political figures. This crisis was a watershed moment for South Korea. For the first time in the history of the young South Korean democracy, a sitting Korean president weaponized the military against his own people.
The backlash was instantaneous and resounding. As heavily armed commandos encircled the National Assembly, countless residents of Seoul, ranging from young students to elderly citizens, flooded the streets of the nation’s capital, condemning the declaration of martial law and demanding that President Yoon restore order and stability. The swift and massive backlash led to the legislature lifting martial law after only six hours. Two weeks after the martial law crisis, DP lawmakers reconvened in the National Assembly to motion for a second impeachment vote. By a tally of 204-85, the Assembly passed the motion, and Yoon was impeached.
On April 4, 2025, South Korea’s Constitutional Court voted unanimously to uphold the impeachment of President Yoon for promoting insurrection. Moon Hyung-bae, the court’s acting chief justice, announced in his verdict that the actions of President Yoon were unconstitutional and had a grave impact on politics and South Korean society at large, warranting a removal from office. Yoon was subsequently unseated, making him only the second Korean president after Park Geun-hye to be removed from office.
The Crisis is Over But Fault Lines Remain
Despite the Constitutional Court’s verdict being a victory for democracy in South Korea, society remains polarized, and the partisan divides between the ruling party and opposition have widened. Many of Yoon’s supporters remain convinced that his martial law declaration was justified, while his opponents view it as an unambiguous assault on democratic governance.
In addition to the worsening polarization within South Korean society induced by the crisis, Yoon’s quasi-authoritarian stunt also caused aftershocks within the military. Five days after the martial law declaration, law enforcement authorities arrested Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, seeking to bring charges for his role in the crisis. In addition, leaders of the Capital Defense Command, Special Warfare Command, Counterintelligence Command, and Intelligence Command were dismissed on January 20, 2025, after being suspected of partaking in the martial law declaration’s implementation.
More concerning is the fact that some reports suggest that the crisis only ended as mildly as it did because many soldiers, particularly in lower ranks, refused to comply with their orders. Hence, if the military had acted as instructed, South Korea may have fallen back into authoritarianism. The events that unfolded in the martial law crisis reminded many South Koreans of past military crackdowns that have unfolded in the country, such as the Gwangju Uprising of 1980. This was one of Korea’s darkest chapters in which more than 100 civilians, including students, were massacred by soldiers of South Korea’s military junta. Fears that South Korea would once again face the prospect of a military dictatorship like the one that ended in 1987 have faded, but questions remain over the military’s willingness to suppress democratic processes, storm parliament, arrest lawmakers, and ultimately act against South Korea’s democratic constitution.
The Detrimental Impacts of Politicization
The martial law crisis exposed deep flaws in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea, namely the politicization of the military leadership and its willingness to act against democratic principles. The then-leadership of South Korea’s military readily accepted the orders of President Yoon and was willing to annul democratic institutions representing the will of the people—chiefly parliament and the National Election Commission.
The martial law crisis triggered an unprecedented leadership crisis in the ROK Armed Forces. Following the attempted quasi-coup d’etat, Park An-su, the Army chief, was relieved from duty due to his role as the martial law commanding officer in charge of upholding martial law and implementing the orders of President Yoon. Further, the Defense Ministry also dismissed six Army Special Warfare Command military officers from their responsibilities, due to their alleged roles in the martial law crisis. The Special Warfare Command had been instrumental in the crisis, as special forces, including the 707th Special Mission Group, were at the forefront of the military actions against democratic institutions.
However, there appears to be an added layer of complexity: much like Yoon deceived the South Korean population by invoking the threat of North Korean saboteurs, the soldiers of the 707th were also not told the true purpose of their mission. The special forces teams were informed that “the situation regarding North Korea is serious,” even though there were no observed North Korean troop movements. Thus, the military leadership appears to have misused the armed forces in pursuit of the political goals of Yoon Suk-yeol. The armed forces were diverted from their core purpose of national defense and external security and instead employed to further the ulterior ends of a singular politician—undermining trust of the soldiery in their commanders, combat readiness, and more generally the trust of South Korean society in its military.
Ahn Byung-seok, former Deputy Commander of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, echoes this loss of trust, raising questions about how the military could be so readily mobilized to support unconstitutional actions or why senior officers failed to resist their unlawful orders. Ahn felt “deeply pained by these questions,” and he expressed that he and other senior military officials “bear a heavy sense of responsibility.”
However, not all soldiers share Ahn’s perspective. Observers have long criticized that parts of the ROK Armed Forces appear to have discarded the political neutrality necessary for a democratic military, and have instead readily sided with conservative political forces in South Korea. This embrace likely contributed to and enabled the events of the martial law crisis, highlighting a further problematic facet of military politicization. Politicization not only occurs from the top down, when state leaders instrumentalize the military, but also from the bottom up, when military culture is allowed to become politically partial.
Beyond the concerning anti-democratic effects of politicization, which culminated in the martial law crisis, this distortion of military neutrality also has tangible effects on South Korea’s security situation. South Korea finds itself in a strategically perilous security situation. The Republic of Korea has to contend with a nuclear-armed northern neighbor and an increasingly assertive People’s Republic of China (PRC). The proximity of Russia’s naval base in Vladivostok and the presence of Moscow’s Pacific Fleet do not subtract from Seoul’s overall security concerns. A military distracted by internal quarrel, riddled with distrust and partisanship among its ranks, and not supported by society writ large is less likely to adequately meet the myriad security challenges South Korea faces. Hence, to both bolster South Korea’s national defense capabilities and protect democracy in the country, civil-military relations must be mended and politicization among the ROK military must be curbed.
A More Democratic Military: Lessons for South Korea and Other Democracies
The martial law crisis, while triggered by a politician seeking to use the military to ensure his political survival, also exposed concerning autocratic tendencies within the ROK Armed Forces. Thus, to mitigate the risk of such an episode being repeated in South Korea, it must heed the lessons of the martial law crisis. First, centralization of command without effective civilian oversight is susceptible to abuse of power. Second, and perhaps more importantly, South Korea must bolster objective control of its military and work towards a more apolitical soldiery that serves not the currently ruling president but the South Korean people. Indeed, as Ahn Byung-Seok also remarked in his reflections on the martial law crisis, a key challenge for the armed forces is to uphold their identity as a “people’s military,” prioritizing the safety of citizens and the protection of the Constitution and its democratic values.
To achieve this, South Korea must move beyond the politicization of its military and strive to reshape its armed forces in such a way that their own culture makes them less susceptible to any civilian leadership’s attempt to abuse them for ulterior purposes. As Samuel Huntington wrote in The Soldier and the State, “civilian control in the objective sense is the maximizing of military professionalism. The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism.” Huntington’s theory highlights the absolute necessity to keep the military out of politics and instill it with a sense of duty, not towards any individual civilian leader, but towards the state and its constitution. Such a culture shift is easier said than done, and it may take years or even decades. However, the martial law crisis may provide the impetus South Korea needs to take on this challenge.
Such a culture shift in the ROK Armed Forces is also necessary to mend its ties with South Korean society—and international allies. To regain trust, much of which was lost after the martial law crisis, South Korea’s military must take concrete steps to strengthen objective control within its ranks. As this is an extraordinarily challenging endeavor, the armed forces may consider setting up a dedicated “Martial Law Crisis” Commission, composed of members of the military, government representatives, lawmakers, and members of civil society. Such a commission would not only constitute a powerful signal that the armed forces are willing to assume responsibility and strengthen their service to the constitution, it could also lead to legislative improvements such as a stronger separation of power and less direct control by the presidency over the military.
South Korea’s martial law crisis is a stark warning for all democracies: while the military is the ultimate guarantor of democratic rights and the state’s integrity, it is not immune to politicization and abuse of power. To push back against tendencies of politicization is of paramount importance for any democracy, and it is a continuous process. However, it is necessary to protect the force readiness of the military, to ensure preparedness to meet national security threats, to maintain trust between the civilian polity and the military, and ultimately to prevent the ROK Armed Forces from becoming tools used against the state.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: “War Memorial of Korea – Honor Guard Ceremony and Museum Exhibits – Seoul, South Korea – Yongsan – USFK” by Morning Calm Weekly Newspaper Installation Management Command, U.S. Army, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0