Best Laid Plans: A Fatal Flaw in the Marines’ Pacific Strategy
The likelihood of a Great Power war between the U.S. and the PRC has never been higher. Against the backdrop of rising tensions, the branches of the U.S. armed forces are reorienting themselves to fight in the Indo-Pacific once more. At the vanguard of this shift is the United States Marine Corps (USMC), as they are likely to serve on the front line of any potential clash with the PRC. In an attempt to address this reality, the USMC introduced Force Design 2030. Central to this strategy is the employment of small, mobile expeditionary advanced bases, some of which will inevitably end up close to population centers. However, in many cases, such as in Japan’s Okinawa Archipelago, parts of the local population remain deeply opposed to such deployments. The locals’ activities, such as protesting outside of bases or recording footage of deployments could expose the Marines to danger and may constitute an Achilles heel in the Force Design 2030 strategy. I spoke to various stakeholders, Japanese officials, local activists, and representatives from the USMC, to investigate this issue and find out how real this threat is.
Force Design 2030
In 2020, the USMC revealed an ambitious and controversial plan to restructure the Corps after almost 20 years of fighting the War on Terror in the Middle East. According to the Marines, Force Design 2030 proposes “sweeping” changes to modernize the Marine Corps, shifting its “[mission] to great power competition” and giving it “a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific region.” Central to this new strategy is the concept of “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)”. This approach foresees that in a conflict, the Marines deploy “mobile, low-signature” bases, which are to be positioned in “austere, temporary locations.” Armed with sensors and anti-ship missiles, the Marines will detect and destroy enemy vessels within the range of their weapons. As many of these EABs would be deployed all across the Indo-Pacific, the Marines would turn the combat theater into a denied zone, deadly for People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships. However, these EABs also come with distinct disadvantages. Because they are small, non-permanent, and crucially, do not contain hardened shelters, they are highly susceptible to enemy fire. Should the PLAN discover the location of these EABs, Marines may become victims of “mass indirect fires,” annihilating the base and the Marines defending it. EABO relies on secrecy and signature management (ensuring that the base is concealed and emits little electronic or other signals) to protect Marines.
However, many of these “austere” locations won’t be on barren rocks or in lush forests in the Indo-Pacific. They will be set up on inhabited islands. A likely location for EABs is Japan’s Okinawa archipelago. This, however, exposes Marines to grave risks. In the modern information era, positioning EABs near civilian populations presents a grave security challenge, as a simple social media post is enough to identify an EAB’s location to open-source intelligence. This would entail the base drawing enemy fire, spelling disaster for Marines and nearby civilians. I contacted representatives from the Okinawa Prefectural Government and members of Okinawan civic organizations to find out how likely residents are to oppose EABs in Okinawa, and hence how serious a threat they may pose to operational security.
Okinawa
For the Okinawan Prefectural Government’s (OPG) D.C. office, the answer is rather obvious. “The further increase of the base burden is unacceptable to the Okinawa Prefectural Government, and the deployment of U.S. forces on Okinawa’s remote islands is likely to face opposition from many Okinawans.” Once an independent kingdom separated from mainland Japan by miles of open ocean, Okinawa has its own unique culture, language, and identity. The site of some of the most brutal fighting in the Pacific campaign, Okinawa remains a stronghold for U.S. power in the Pacific, to the frustration of many locals. “The daily noise from aircraft, wildfires caused by live-fire exercises, and destruction of the natural environment have had a major impact on the lives of Okinawa residents who are forced to live side by side with the U.S. military bases,” said one OPG representative.
Okinawans hold diverse opinions regarding the island’s relationship with the Japanese government, the U.S. military, and its role in ongoing tensions with the PRC. However, there is a long-held consensus that Okinawa bears a disproportionate burden for hosting U.S. bases. According to the OPG, “nearly 80 years after the end of World War II, Okinawa Prefecture continues to bear an excessive base burden, with approximately 70.3% of all U.S. military’s exclusive-use facilities in Japan being concentrated in the prefecture.” The situation has built a strong, anti-base peace movement in Okinawa, with a well-established online presence and a long tradition of protesting. In its statement to the GSSR, the OPG also highlighted how Okinawan civic organizations not only demonstrated against deployments but were able to hinder elements of EABO during an exercise in October 2024. During the Keen Sword 25 joint exercise, Okinawan civic groups organized a “blocking action” to prevent the transport of Japanese troops from local ports and protested the deployment of a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) to Ishigaki Island. The No More Battle of Okinawa: Life is Treasure Association released a press statement highlighting specific details of the exercise and demanded that the “U.S. military and the Self-Defense Forces to leave Okinawa with their missiles.”
Peace For Okinawa
The OPG isn’t alone in its conclusion that local resistance is both likely and fierce. Of the groups I researched or communicated with, all were confident EABO would spark local opposition. “There will absolutely be protests and peace demonstrations against the deployment of U.S. troops on any inhabited Luchu (Ryukyu) Islands,” said Robert Kajiwara, founder and president of the Peace for Okinawa Coalition, an advocacy group opposing the U.S. military presence on Okinawa and demanding “the immediate restoration of Luchu (Okinawa) independence.” According to Kajiwara, local opposition would likely follow Marines even on uninhabited islands. He explained that while a “possible way to avoid demonstrations may be if the deployment[s] were somehow done on one of the uninhabited islands, but even then, some people may still take boats or kayaks out to the island, and there will also likely be demonstrations on Okinawa Island,” said Kajiwara. I spoke with additional sources who, while unwilling to go on record, confirmed Kajiwara’s assessment and emphasized local activists would likely be able to identify which uninhabited islands were hosting U.S. forces.
Unwitting (Or Willing) Spies For The PRC
The PRC is well aware of the tensions between Okinawans and the U.S. military. In June of 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping made headlines across Japan for his comments on the close, historic relationship between Okinawa and the PRC following a visit from Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki. Frequent incursions by PRC vessels into Japanese territorial waters around Okinawa have increased tensions between Japan and the PRC, as Beijing challenges Japan’s control over the nearby Senkaku Islands. Pro-independence groups like Peace for Okinawa have been accused of promoting the PRC’s regional agenda and dividing Japanese public opinion. A 2023 Axios article highlighted content from Robert Kajiwara’s X and Weibo accounts praising the Chinese government’s policies in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. It accused Kajiwara of being part of a growing number of “pro-Beijing influencers, some of whom have received undisclosed support from the Chinese state.”
Kajiwara denies these allegations stating, “The Peace for Okinawa Coalition has not received any type of funding from any government, and even if we were offered, we would turn it down since this goes against our beliefs and goals.” Kajiwara instead insists that “Luchu (Okinawa) has a long history of friendship and mutually beneficial relations with [the PRC] that date back to ancient times, which I believe reinforces the belief among Luchuans (Okinawans) that [the PRC] is not a military threat.” Even if some Okinawan activists do secretly receive support from the Chinese government, it doesn’t detract from the very real grievances felt by many in Okinawa or the risk they may pose to EABO. While most do not support independence, tensions between Okinawans and the U.S. military often boil over. In July of this year, demonstrations were held outside Kadena Air Base in Okinawa after multiple cases of sexual assault by U.S. military personnel against Okinawan women were uncovered. “As far as I know, no Luchuans are ‘Chinese spies’ or receive any funding from the Chinese government,” said Kajiwara. “Luchuans simply oppose the U.S. and Japanese military bases due to all of the numerous problems they cause.”
The USMC’s Response
The Marine Corps is aware of the potential danger civilian opposition may pose to EABO. In its Tentative Manual for EABO, the Marine Corps states: “Civil public demonstrations and violent crowds can also affect EAB security, requiring the need and use of intermediate force capabilities.” Intermediate force capabilities refer to “devices below lethal force.” Protests and riot control do not support “low-signature” EABs. Furthermore, deploying platoons of English-speaking, U.S. Marines armed with radars and missiles to small, homogenous communities within a remote archipelago are bound to draw at least some attention from the local community and Japanese press who may share the information online. Force Design 2030 has already faced criticism for its apparent disregard for the potential impacts of social media on EABO. In an article published in Proceedings, U.S. Marine Corps Captain William McGee states that when addressing the “feasibility of signature management in the information age” with retired Marine Colonel and author of the EABO Handbook Art Corbett, “he told me it was not a concern.”
A Way Forward
Force Design 2030 has been subject to unrelenting criticism since its inception. In 2022, over two dozen retired generals, including every living former Commandant and former Secretary of Defense James Mattis, came out in opposition to the initiative. In a statement to Politico, retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul Pan Riper stated, “we recognize that the Marine Corps has to make changes … what we want to see is these changes are based on thorough study and analysis, not just projections of what might be needed.” Despite its most vocal opponents, Force Design 2030 is here to stay. The Marine Corps has already divested of all its tanks, housed helicopter wings, and restructured its infantry to be smaller and more mobile.
With no immediate intentions of abandoning Force Design 2030 or EABO, the Marine Corps must determine how to best implement this strategy in the modern information era. The Marine Corps may be unable to erase its online signature, but it can limit its footprint. A careless social media post by a curious local or bored Marine is not nearly as devastating as public demonstrations, media releases, and sabotage efforts like those demonstrated during Keen Sword 25. One path forward presented by Okinawa residents is to engage directly with local leaders and civilians rather than attempt to deploy forces secretly without local support. The USMC and the U.S. military at large should do more, especially during peacetime, to solicit support from locals and ensure that the negative effects of military deployments are minimized. And indeed, Okinawa is not a monolith. Perception of the military varies by generation and throughout the prefecture. Some communities are more accepting of a U.S. military presence and concerned about the PRC’s actions in the South China Sea. The rising tensions with the PRC may provide the backdrop to explain why EABs will be necessary. While it is unlikely that an entire platoon of Marines could land on an inhabited island in total secrecy, actively seeking positive engagement with locals would allow the Marine Corps to identify locations based on public support, coordinate signature management efforts with local leaders, provide greater agency to the Okinawan people, and ultimately make EABO a more effective strategy.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: NCPR