Compelling Allies: How Policymakers Can Learn from the U.S. Response to Indian Extrajudicial Killings on Foreign Soil
The United States seems to have caught a particularly nasty case of ‘tail-wagging-the-dog’ syndrome. There are countless examples of U.S. allies demonstrating a high degree of autonomous action, and sometimes open defiance, inconsistent with the policy preference and national interest of their security guarantor. In Gaza, Israel has ignored the warnings of the United States, continuously escalating the conflict by invading Rafah, approving new West Bank settlements, and undermining the United States-led ceasefire negotiations. Similarly, Ukraine had often disregarded the battlefield advice of U.S. generals and lambasted Washington’s leadership—as President Zelensky audaciously attacked the Biden-Harris administration for forbidding Ukraine to attack deep into Russian territory using U.S. weapons. Most recently Kyiv has launched a daring incursion into Russia, that, it seems, was not coordinated with Washington.
While these instances of policy divergence have been challenging (and sometimes embarrassing) for the United States, American executive and legislative officials have enjoyed marked success in influencing ally behavior, most notably with India. Spearheaded by Senator Benjamin Cardin’s bold decision to freeze an ongoing weapons sale, the U.S. response to Indian extrajudicial killings provides an instructive example of compellence towards friendly nations. And perhaps most importantly, it highlights the enduring power of the individual to defy daunting historical trends and systemic constraints, reshape strategic horizons, and secure vital national interests. Current and aspiring policymakers—particularly in Congress—should therefore learn from this experience with India, and demonstrate greater mastery over the carrots and sticks with which they can realign ally behavior. This foreign policy episode can provide a deeper understanding of the theoretical tenets of both compellence and individual policy-making and a firmer grasp of coercive instruments like foreign arms sales and other processes— understandings that policymakers must develop to effectively compel other allies and partners in the future.
India’s Foray into International Assassinations
In November 2023, federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York unveiled an indictment levying charges against an Indian national, Nikhil Gupta, for his alleged involvement in an assassination plot targeting an American citizen, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun. According to the legal filings, an unnamed Indian “senior field officer,” working in intelligence, orchestrated Gupta’s involvement. This officer is also allegedly responsible for a broader covert scheme to target dissidents abroad. This scheme, as outlined in the indictment, encompassed plans to attack “so many targets” across both Canada and the United States, including Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canadian national whose assassination Ottawa had previously attributed to India. The connection to Indian intelligence suggests a concerning level of state involvement. The indictment revealed a pattern of brazen Indian actions, with New Delhi emboldened to pursue their national interest violently and at the expense of their Western allies’ sovereignty.
Unsurprisingly, these revelations drew a strong response from across the U.S. national security apparatus. The Biden-Harris administration, who knew of the plot since at least June 2023 (when it successfully directed the Czech Republic to detain Gupta as he then entered the country), condemned the scheme through the Assistant Attorney General, Matthew G. Olsen. In what National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan later termed a “carefully executed plan,” the United States sent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Bill Burns, Director of the Office of National Intelligence Avril Haines, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray to inform New Dehli of “what our expectations are in light of what we have learned,” in August, October, and November, respectively. Sullivan explained that the order in which administration officials were sent to India was deliberate, with the administration’s goal to negotiate “until we see an outcome that we think is satisfactory.”
The revelations also drew strong reactions from Congress. Senator Benjamin Cardin, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (SFAC), revealed that he had placed an informal hold on a $3 billion purchase of MQ-9 drones to the Indian Navy and Air Force because of the assassination attempt, using his authority as SFAC Chair to “effectively veto” Foreign Military Sales (FMS). While Cardin lifted the hold in February 2024, he extracted a concession, noting in a statement that he had received assurances from “the Administration that the Indian government is committed to thoroughly investigating the situation and fully cooperating with the U.S. Department of Justice.”
Considering the challenging circumstances, the national security apparatus response delivered a favorable outcome. Due to the Biden-Harris Administration’s pressure, India set up a “‘high-level’[…] investigative committee,” that found and notified the United States that “rogue operatives not authorized by the government” orchestrated the alleged plot. Whether or not that assertion is true—reporting from the Washington Post has since disputed its factualness—India seems to have understood that the United States was drawing a line in the sand. In January 2024, Gupta filed a request to India’s Supreme Court, asking for aid in securing his release. The court deferred, leaving that decision to the Indian government, which was tellingly silent as Gupta’s extradition from the Czech Republic proceeded in June 2024. Reports have also emerged that India has “withdrawn many RAW [India’s foreign intelligence agency] operatives from North America.” This demonstrates the effectiveness of the U.S. response. India’s ambitions were checked, its intelligence posture in North America diminished, and the goal of silencing dissidents (whether that was the goal of the state or ‘rogue operatives’) was not achieved. Certainly, India left the affair with a decreased will to pursue their interests at the expense of their Western allies’ sovereignty.
Ben Cardin: Compeller-in-Chief
So, why was the United States able to successfully persuade an insubordinate ally to change its behavior? Academic scholarship on coercion may provide the answer. Cyberspace scholars Erica Borghard and Shawn Longergan offer the following definition for the term:
“Coercion involves producing a desired behavior or outcome on the part of an adversary by forcing her to confront a cost–benefit calculus, such that the adversary believes it is less costly to concede to the threatener’s preferred course of (in)action than to defy the latter’s demands.”
While much of the public discourse on coercion since the Cold War has emphasized deterrence, the Indian example demonstrates the relevance of its less popular complement: compellence. Indeed, compellence is defined as “a threat intended to make an adversary do something” or to otherwise change its behavior. While India is not an adversary of the United States and was never threatened with force, New Delhi faced punishment and the implied threat of further action (i.e., through withheld weapons sales from Congress) to persuade it to do something (i.e., investigative cooperation and a cessation of extrajudicial activities on Western soil), causing it to change its ‘cost-benefit calculus.’
Therefore, to better understand how coercion worked in this case, and to apply it to other cases in the future, it is essential to first unpack the theoretical tenets of successful compellence. To compel, an actor must first communicate sufficient consequences for not acquiescing to its demand. It must be clear to the opposing actor what it will suffer, or lose, if it fails to comply. This loss must be greater than any potential gains from continuing. And if an actor begins carrying out a sufficiently punitive action to demonstrate the credibility of its compellent threat, it needs to communicate that the action will stop if the target state complies. Second, an actor must have the capability to act on its threat in the case of non-compliance by the target state. If an actor is unable to do that which it threatens, compellence will not be credible. Third, one must have the will to act on its threat. Here, the psychological element of compellence is most apparent. If an adversary determines that an actor will not execute its threat, even if it is technically able to do so, compellence will not be successful.
Traditionally, coercion theory has assumed that states are the primary actors that can deter or compel their adversaries. However, it is important to note that states are far from monolithic. A state policy is the result of a myriad of interactions between officials, branches of government, and the bureaucracy. Even the most authoritarian regimes cannot simply conjure a policy but require collaboration and competition among individual officials to overcome the inertia of bureaucratic politics and translate plans into outcomes. And, in a democratic, pluralistic government like the United States, this process becomes further complicated due to the variety of actors who wield immense influence over the strategic instruments of the state. Even individuals like members of Congress can alter the policy process substantially. In the face of daunting systemic trends and structural constraints, individuals have proven to be far more relevant than “the oblivion to which political scientists have consigned them.” Individuals play a critical part in communicating a state’s intention. In fact, in pluralistic societies, individual lawmakers can also shape the state’s intentions with their public communication. Individuals also control the capabilities of the state. Ultimately, the willingness to employ those capabilities depends in no small part on individuals and their psychologies and interests.
The Indian example confirms the power of people to transform compellence theory into practice. Each of the three tenets of coercion theory was evident in the U.S. response to India, explaining why India decided to change its behavior. And perhaps most importantly, this successful instance demonstrated the importance of leadership by a “Compeller-in-Chief,” in this case Senator Cardin.
First, the United States, buoyed by the boldness of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Cardin, employed an effective, multi-faceted communications strategy. While National Security Advisor Sullivan praised the persistent, “respectful,” and “clear,” dialogue between India and the United States taking place “behind closed doors,” it was Senator Cardin who communicated a sufficient threat, placing a hold on MQ-9 sales to India. Instead of forcing the sale through Congress (as President Trump did in 2019 regarding a sale to Saudi Arabia), the Biden-Harris Administration instead negotiated with Cardin, somewhat legitimizing his hold. So, while it is unclear if the White House and Cardin directly coordinated such a strategy, it is important to note that Cardin’s actions animated the existing compellent stance, ratcheting up the pressure the Biden administration had already begun to exert. When Cardin eventually lifted the hold, he attributed it to being “assured by the Administration” of Indian investigative cooperation, giving Sullivan and his negotiators credibility and goodwill with their counterparts. While Indian officials were likely motivated to cooperate due to their desire to acquire such deadly weapons systems, Senator Cardin, by blocking the sale, implicitly communicated a conditionality to the overall U.S.-India security relationship.
Second, Senator Cardin could carry through on his threat. As noted earlier, the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee can “effectively veto,” a Foreign Military Sale, as it is longstanding State Department precedent to refrain from formally notifying Congress of a sale (thereby setting its final approval into motion) until those listed above have removed their holds. This gives these individual members of Congress, in conjunction with broad presidential powers to control bilateral relations, the agency and capability to deteriorate the U.S.-India relationship by their leverage over the security cooperation enterprise.
Finally, Senator Cardin demonstrated sufficient will to execute his threat. In this case, the Senator demonstrated such a will to deteriorate the U.S.-India relationship by revealing that he had put a hold on the weapons sales, specifically “in light of the alleged murder-for-hire plot involving Indian officials to attempt to assassinate an American citizen on U.S. soil.” He also demonstrated a will to continue, writing that he fully “intend[ed] to hold the Administration to these commitments.” This is of key importance. Cardin demonstrated not a general will to harm bilateral relations, but a will to do so over a highly specific issue, tying his will to that issue’s outcome.
It is also important to note that scholars and analysts, such as Dr. Saira Bano, writing in the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, see the United States as being “strategically paramount” to India, given ongoing border disputes with an increasingly aggressive China. Thus, the Senators’ willingness to jeopardize bilateral relations with a key ally, despite the United States and India’s shared interest in countering China, underscores the gravity with which Washington viewed this issue. Senator Cardin showed a readiness to temporarily subordinate this strategic interest, demonstrating to India the will behind the U.S. response. The effectiveness of such actions aligns with broader sanctions literature, which suggests that measures taken against allies often prove more effective than those against adversaries. This effectiveness stems from the inherent contradiction between the normal incentives for collaboration and the imposition of punitive measures, thereby lending credibility to the sanctioning state’s resolve vis-à-vis its friends.
These are the central differences that precipitated Congressional success in compelling India, but failure in compelling Israel and Ukraine. On Israel, for example, Gregory Meeks, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (giving him similar authority to delay a weapons sale), actually “publicly vowed to hold up [an] arms package” to Israel containing fighter aircraft and air-to-air missiles, unless he “received assurances,” about their safe use. Like Cardin, Meeks communicated a clear threat that he was capable of carrying out. However, he eventually relented under pressure from the Biden-Harris administration, allowing the sale to go through. Meeks, unlike Cardin, failed to tie his threat to a specific, measurable outcome, making it difficult for him to demonstrate and convince the administration of his will. By taking his stand around the general ‘safe’ use of munitions, he demonstrated a lack of credibility—something Cardin was able to avoid.
Similarly, on the issue of Ukraine, Congressional Republicans have long shown a willingness to deteriorate relations, time and time again blocking aid packages. However, they have not been doing so with a specific goal of compellence, such as changing Ukraine’s battlefield tactics, but rather hoping to permanently end American support of the war. In this case, these legislators’ will was rendered meaningless, as their threats to Ukraine were not tied to Kyiv changing a clearly-communicated policy.
Both cases demonstrate the need for threats to be carefully calibrated, and highly specific, to ensure their success. Congress has always wielded the capability to compel allies through the foreign arms sale process. Now, legislators just need to start using that capability with more precision.
Policy Recommendations
Drawing from the successful example of India and the contrasting challenges related to Israel and Ukraine, several key policy recommendations emerge for effectively applying compellence towards allies.
First, embrace the power of the individual. This article has demonstrated the power of a single, engaged, diplomatically-attune Senator to affect ally behavior. High-level legislators, specifically the Chair and Ranking members of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, have awesome institutional and normative power to affect foreign arms sales, and thus ally behavior. These individuals should be less afraid to exercise this power and more public when doing so, given its clear effectiveness. And they should be willing to work with their executive branch counterparts to maximize U.S. leverage over allies and partners, wherever possible.
Second, tie Congressional will to hyper-specific outcomes. Unlike the general, vague approaches evident in Representative Meeks’ and Congressional Republicans’ threats to Israel and Ukraine, respectively, legislators must be precise when pursuing policy objectives. This involves identifying and communicating a highly specific policy change they want to see from allies, while maintaining pressure in pursuit of this change over time, even escalating if necessary. The India example showcased the capability of even a single Senator to achieve this.
Third, foster a Congress engaged with national security. Given the punctuated power of specific legislators to impact ally behavior, party leaders should do what they can to ensure the members who ascend to the Chairman and Ranking Member positions on the Foreign Affairs Committees are as engaged as possible in foreign affairs, ideally having a strong background in its practice. Among Senator Ben Cardin, Senator Jim Risch, Representative Gregory Meeks, and Representative Michael McCaul (the ‘big four’ legislators with the power to place a hold on foreign military sales), none have an explicit internationally-focused background, with each being a domestic lawyer by trade. Given the abundance of veterans and CIA analysts now serving on the Hill, party leaders should prioritize those with explicit foreign affairs backgrounds for foreign affairs committees, as the talent to do so clearly exists. Greater national security expertise will help facilitate more successful cases like India, as experienced legislators learn to wield substantial leverage per their understanding of vital U.S. national interests.
By implementing these recommendations, U.S policymakers can more effectively apply the principles of compellence to allies, achieving desired policy outcomes while maintaining the overall strength and cohesion of strategic partnerships. This approach, grounded in the successful example of India and informed by the challenges faced concerning other allies, offers a blueprint for navigating the complex landscape of 21st-century alliance management.
This article is part of a special Undergraduate Edition of the Georgetown Security Studies Review. Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: ZNetwork