Remembering a Forgotten War: United States Policy Options to Resolve Sudan’s Civil War
Wars have dominated this year’s election news cycle, with the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza featuring prominently in President Biden’s 2024 State of the Union Address. In contrast, the Sudanese Civil War, which erupted just over one year ago on April 15, 2023, remains notably underreported, garnering the unfortunate moniker “the forgotten war.” Despite scant media attention, the conflict’s toll is devastating: over 15,550 lives lost, 7.7 million people displaced, and around 18 million people facing acute food insecurity.
At the heart of the conflict is a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by the de facto national leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Both of these factions have committed war crimes, including credible reports of ethnic cleansing by the RSF in Darfur.
Sudan’s civil war also presents a geopolitical challenge to the United States as Iran seeks greater influence over the SAF. After reestablishing diplomatic ties with Sudan on October 9, 2023, Iran has begun to play a larger role in the conflict, supplying Mohajer-6 drones to the SAF and attempting to negotiate the construction of a military port on the Red Sea. Although this deal failed, it raises serious concerns about Iranian influence in Sudan. These developments underscore how crucial it is for the United States to counter Iran’s influence in Sudan. Overlooking this conflict is not an option if Washington wishes to prevent Iran from establishing a base of operations in Sudan, curb regional destabilization, and protect maritime traffic in the Red Sea.
Amidst this escalating crisis, the U.S. has already begun to respond more assertively. The introduction of House Resolution 982 “[condemns] the continued violence in Sudan and call[s] on the international community to unequivocally support diplomatic efforts to achieve a cessation of hostilities, ensure the protection of civilians and secure unfettered access for humanitarian aid.” Furthermore, on February 26, 2024, the Biden Administration appointed Tom Perriello as Special Envoy for Sudan, signifying a renewed commitment to mediating a peaceful resolution.
Despite this progress, achieving peace is daunting. The odds of bringing Generals Burhan and Dagalo to the negotiating table are currently slim. However, the United States can leverage its influence to address the international factors fueling the conflict by (1) countering the SAF and RSF’s public relations and social media campaigns, (2) fostering regional cooperation to counter Sudanese gold smuggling, and (3) pressuring regional actors to enforce arms embargos on the RSF and SAF. These actions are critical to curbing Iranian influence in Sudan, which threatens not only regional stability but also the strategic interests of the United States and its allies.
Countering SAF and RSF Social Media and Public Relation Campaigns
Over the past year, the SAF and RSF have conducted numerous domestic disinformation campaigns. Social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and Youtube have been pivotal battlegrounds where both entities maintain active presences.
On X, both the SAF and RSF, along with General Dagalo himself, operate accounts with substantial followings. This is concerning, given X’s policies against hosting content from a “violent and hateful entity.” Yet these accounts remain unchecked and active to continue spreading their narratives widely. YouTube appears to have been more proactive in taking down some RSF-linked channels. Although finally removed in the past month, an official RSF channel had previously gained a substantial following, posting 163 videos, which amassed nearly half a million views since October 4, 2022. Similar to X, YouTube policies prohibit the posting of videos by “violent extremist or criminal organizations,” which the company determines based on “government and international organization designations.”
Despite clear policy violations, these platforms have faced insufficient pressure to deactivate SAF and RSF accounts. The United States should apply pressure on these social media companies to enforce their policies and thereby remove or restrict access to SAF and RSF, limiting their ability to spread disinformation.
Beyond social media, the RSF has also engaged international public relations (PR) firms to shape its global image. Notably, the Canadian PR firm Dickens & Madson–run by Ari Ben-Menashe, a former Israeli Military Intelligence Officer–signed a $6 million contract with Dagalo in 2019. The consultancy agreement shows that Ben-Menashe agreed to help Degalo “further attempt to correct unfavorable international media coverage and current misconceptions concerning Sudan and its Government.” Though this contract predates the current war, it raises questions about ongoing relationships and the broader implications of such PR efforts.
The United States should leverage its diplomatic channels to pressure PR firms that assist the SAF and RSF in propagating their narratives. By targeting these avenues of influence, in conjunction with social media companies, the U.S. can significantly curtail the disinformation capabilities of these military forces and impact their global reputation.
Preventing Gold Smuggling
Before the outbreak of the civil war, Sudan was the third largest producer of gold in Africa, making this resource a critical component of the nation’s GDP. However, even before the civil war, “between 50 and 80 percent of the gold is smuggled abroad”—a figure that has only escalated as the conflict has intensified. Gold smuggling has continued to be a critical method of financing both sides throughout the civil war.
Egypt and the UAE have been the primary destinations for smuggled Sudanese gold. Before the war, the UAE smuggling network was particularly robust and served to enrich RSF commander Degalo. With the UAE’s support for the RSF, the SAF has redirected much of its smuggled gold to Egypt. There, gold is “exchanged for local currency and also used to purchase commodities and sustain the war effort.”
However, the UAE continues to receive Sudanese gold from both sides of the conflict. A United Nations (UN) Letter identified that the RSF sold “50 kg of gold in Dubai in May 2023.” On the other side, the SAF has exported an estimated “3.7 tons of gold” to the UAE despite the Emarati support of the RSF. While official gold exports from the Sudanese state are not smuggling per se—although these exports have historically been rife with actors skimming off the top—it has the same outcome of perpetuating the conflict by funding the SAF.
The United States has taken steps to address this issue, with the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioning companies linked to the RSF and SAF’s gold operations as recently as January 2024. Yet, the primary smuggling conduits—Egypt and the UAE—remain largely unpressured to halt their involvement. Notably, high-level discussions between UAE officials and U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan in late 2023 did not yield significant policy shifts.
To address this, the United States could leverage military aid and equipment purchases to foster regional cooperation to tackle gold smuggling in both Egypt and the UAE. The United States annually earmarks “$1.3 billion in military aid…for Egypt,” making it one of the largest recipients of United States assistance. While the UAE does not receive comparable aid, it has spent $20 billion dollars on U.S. military equipment over the past decade and is currently negotiating a $23 billion deal to purchase F-35 fighter jets and MQ-9 Reaper drones. The U.S. could potentially exert more pressure on these nations by tying military aid and arms sales to their cooperation in curtailing gold smuggling. Cutting off SAF and RSF funding through these smuggling routes is essential for resolving the Sudanese conflict.
Expanding Arms Embargos
The UN arms embargo on the Darfur region of Sudan, recently extended by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) until 12 September 2024, has been insufficient in halting the flow of arms to the SAF and RSF. The embargo, originally established in 2004 following the Darfur War under Omar al-Bashir’s regime, is narrowly focused on Darfur, allowing UN member states to arm entities in other parts of Sudan.
For instance, the UN presented evidence of the UAE’s involvement in arming the RSF. While formally denied by the UAE, reporting by the New York Times and open-source flight tracking information confirm military supplies being airlifted to Am Djarass in eastern Chad, then transported overland into Sudan for RSF use. Analysts, such as Hamid Khalafallah, estimate that eliminating UAE support for the RSF could dramatically shorten the conflict.
The SAF’s most concerning supporter, meanwhile, is Iran. The attempt to build an Iranian naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast makes Iran’s intentions clear. In addition to destabilizing the Middle East and Red Sea region through its proxies like the Houthis and Hezbollah, Iran aims to leverage its support of the SAF to co-opt Sudan into its proxy network. The more reliant the SAF becomes on Iranian weaponry like the Mohajer-6 drones, the greater Iran’s influence, particularly of pro-Iranian, Islamist elements of the SAF.
These developments illustrate that the current scope of the UN arms embargo is too limited. By only applying to Darfur, the embargo has failed to prevent external powers like the UAE and Iran from supplying military aid across Sudan. The United States should, therefore, push for an expansion of the UN arms embargo on Darfur to encapsulate all of Sudan, allowing the UNSC to apply “targeted sanctions” on Iran and the UAE, placing punitive pressure on these two nations.
Unfortunately, expanding the arms embargo will likely be difficult as it was originally established in 2004 for a different conflict and has been retroactively reestablished. This ad hoc measure, as it stands, is ineffective. For instance, in a March 19, 2024, United Nations Security Council Briefing, U.S. Ambassador Robert Wood cited “blatant violations” of the embargo, with weapons consistently flowing into Darfur from eastern Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic. Realistically, however, passing a new UN resolution to expand the arms embargo will prove challenging as Russia would likely veto any new resolution. The Kremlin, unlike in 2004, now has a vested interest in maintaining the current status quo as the chaos of Sudan’s Civil War has allowed the Wagner Group to illegally gold smuggle around $2.5 billion from Sudan and other African nations to fund its war in Ukraine.
Given these difficulties, an alternative strategy for the U.S. could involve pressuring neighboring states like the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, and South Sudan—countries heavily aided by the U.S.—to strengthen border controls. The U.S. is one of the largest aid donors to these countries, providing over $1.55 billion since the onset of Sudan’s civil war. Expansion of foreign assistance to these countries could be made contingent on stricter border controls to prevent the flow of arms into Sudan. While not as direct, United States pressure on Sudanese border states is a measure that could be immediately taken without the complications and delays associated with the UN.
Conclusion
The United States must remember the “forgotten war” in Sudan. The longer the civil war in Sudan continues, the more leverage Iran will gain–from its military aid–over the SAF. This, in turn, presents the danger of Iran gaining Sudan as a client state, expanding Iran’s capabilities to disrupt Red Sea shipping and creating another potential flashpoint in an already tense regional security setting. By applying pressure to disrupt elements fueling the war–like disinformation campaigns, illicit gold smuggling, and the free flow of arms into the country–the U.S. can create conditions that may make it possible to bring the RSF and SAF to the negotiating table.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Sudan War Monitor