East Africa’s Shadow Network: Coordinated Repression and the Fight Against Opposition
Leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa are increasingly partaking in a global authoritarian trend of using state power to curtail dissent outside their own borders, a practice known as transnational repression. This challenge is particularly acute in East Africa, where governments in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda have coordinated efforts to stifle political opposition beyond their borders. States’ growing reliance on abductions, deportations, surveillance, and harsh legal reprisals against political opposition threatens an already-shrinking civic space in Sub-Saharan Africa. Excluding dissidents from the formal political process fosters grievance among citizens, lessens state legitimacy, and risks empowering extremist factions. These consequences increase the risk of political violence and conflict as opposition groups are forced to pursue political aims through violent means rather than established and legitimate political processes.
The Golden Age of Transnational Repression
States have employed transnational repression for decades, but an increase in state capacity for transnational repression via surveillance tools, in addition to a more permissive environment amid global authoritarian backsliding, has ushered in what some experts call a “golden age” for the practice. Freedom House broadly defines transnational repression as “when states reach across borders to silence dissent from activists, journalists, and others living in exile.” There is no definitive method for transnational repression, but governments often deploy a combination of legal and extralegal tactics including kidnappings, deportations, surveillance, and abuse of extradition processes and International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) capabilities. Two of the most prominent, recent examples of transnational repression include the 2023 assassination of Sikh activist, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, in Canada at the Indian government’s order and, perhaps most notoriously, the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi Arabian operatives within the Saudi consulate in Türkiye in 2018. Although cases in East Africa have not escalated to assassination or dismemberment, activists report many of the same fundamental intimidation tactics—particularly surveillance, abuse of extradition processes, and enforced disappearances.
Old Friends, New Tactics
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda share a legacy of deep political ties, driven largely by the preeminence of liberation parties and single-party rule in the region. Many of the ruling parties have decades of experience working with each other, from early anti-colonial independence movements such as the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa, to later models of regional cooperation such as the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) seeking to facilitate free trade and movement among the twenty-one member states. In response to growing trade and market integration, regional coalitions have focused on creating joint responses to threats from transnational crime and armed groups, often via intelligence sharing and joint regional forces such as the East African Community’s Regional Force (EACRF). In 2019, Interpol launched the I-EAC project, which sought to improve integration and interoperability of Interpol’s criminal database among East African Community (EAC) member states. Although much transnational repression cooperation occurs at the bilateral level, regional intelligence-sharing measures like I-EAC can be utilized to provide legal justification and enhance coordination efforts among involved parties.
At the party level, three of the four states of concern have had the same ruling party for multiple decades: the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania, and Rwanda’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). While Kenya is an outlier in this sense— experiencing multiple transfers of power between political parties since the reintroduction of multipartyism in 1991—its politics rely on a ‘big man’ style which showcases many of the same faces and has kept its shifting political system close to neighboring ruling parties. Relations between these states are not always rosy. Recent disputes, such as the disagreement between Kenyan and Tanzanian diplomats over foreign business ownership, or threats to invade Kenya made by Muhoozi Kainerugaba, son of Uganda’s President Museveni, highlight this tension. However, despite such conflicts, these countries are adept at supporting each other’s efforts to maintain long-term control through transnational repression.
The Rwanda Model
Under Paul Kagame’s tight control, Rwanda has cultivated a domestic setting in which it is nearly impossible to publicly dissent against the government. The 1994 genocide’s legacy creates a more permissive environment for government surveillance and censorship in which security and intelligence services regularly charge pro-democracy activists and opposition figures with “genocide denial” or “intent to cause hostile international opinion” against the government. Rwanda’s suppression has accelerated beyond its borders, targeting critics who live and speak out abroad.
Freedom House has ranked Rwanda as one of the top ten origin states of transnational repression globally, and the largest perpetrator in sub-Saharan Africa. Other prominent origin states include Russia, the People’s Republic of China, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea. Out of fear for their safety, many opposition figures and activists have fled Rwanda’s borders. However, the country’s extensive use of transnational repression has made continuing their work, even in traditional safe havens like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, dangerous and difficult. A report from Human Rights Watch that interviewed Rwandan diaspora abroad found that, “many Rwandans abroad practice self-censorship, refrain from engaging in legitimate political activism, and live in fear of traveling, being attacked, or seeing their relatives in Rwanda targeted.”
Rwanda has also utilized its military effectiveness to deploy forces to neighboring governments fighting insurgencies, such as Mozambique, in exchange for permissive extradition agreements, which allow the country to detain and deport Rwandan asylum seekers in the country. In one brazen example, Rwandan authorities diverted a plane carrying human rights activist Paul Russebagina to Kigali. Russebagina’s life-saving shelter during the 1994 genocide was portrayed in the movie Hotel Rwanda, but his criticism of President Kagame led Rwandan authorities to kidnap and charge him with supporting and financing “terrorism.” Further, in 2023, unknown agents abducted Yusuf Ahmed Gasana, a prominent refugee rights activist critical of Rwanda, from his home in Nairobi, Kenya. Though not confirmed, Gasana’s family reports that he is being held in a “secret detention facility” in Rwanda.
Elections on the Horizon
Citizens in East Africa have witnessed an alarming upswing in acts of transnational repression by their governments ahead of critical election cycles slated for Tanzania in 2025, Uganda in 2026, and Kenya in 2027. For incumbents, these tactics serve the dual purpose of neutralizing political threats while sending a powerful sign of deterrence to potential challengers. This uptick coincides with an increasing level of frustration from African voters over ruling parties’ performance. In a 2023 Afrobarometer survey covering thirty-nine African countries, 66% of citizens reported feeling their country was headed in the wrong direction. In more democratic political systems, such as Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, voters largely rejected the continued dominance of liberation parties. Ahead of their own elections, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda are facing major signs of discontent among youths, many of whom feel frustrated with government performance and alienated from liberation narratives. Widespread months-long ‘Gen Z’ protests in Kenya this past year, in particular, have reportedly spooked Tanzanian and Ugandan officials who fear protest contagion across the region.
These states’ transnational repression techniques stand out for their clear state-to-state cooperation. Recent high-profile incidents include the abduction of Ugandan opposition figure Kizza Besigye who, while attending a book launch in Nairobi, “disappeared,” only to reemerge in custody at a military prison in Uganda. Despite initial denials of any involvement, in May 2025, Kenya’s Foreign Affairs Secretary confirmed cooperation with Ugandan authorities in the kidnapping. Similarly, Martha Karua, a former Justice Minister in Kenya, was detained by Tanzanian authorities upon arrival to observe the treason trial of opposition leader Tundu Lissu. Two members of an accompanying delegation from Kenya and Uganda were also held in a Tanzanian facility without due process, and reported facing torture before being abandoned at the land borders of their respective countries. In the Tanzania cases, no state has admitted to explicit cooperation. However, Martha Karua—considered a potential opponent to President Ruto in Kenya’s 2027 election—claims the Kenyan government colluded with Tanzania in her detention. Additionally, despite Ugandan activist Agather Atuhaire claiming human rights violations and sexual violence while detained, Uganda’s High Commissioner to Tanzania wrote only on X that Atuhaire “safely returned home.”
Just days ago, reports emerged that two Kenyan human rights defenders, Bob Njagi and Nicholas Oyoo, were abducted in Kampala, Uganda by masked, uniformed men. Both remain missing, but they are suspected to be held in a Ugandan military detention facility. Human rights groups and the activists’ family members demanded action from the Kenyan government, but officials offered little more than addressing the issue through “official channels.” By coordinating efforts (or failing to intervene on behalf of their citizens), regimes create a cross-border climate of fear that restricts knowledge-sharing among activists and proactively cripples opposition before it can build momentum in an electoral campaign.
When Dissent Becomes a Threat
These synchronized crackdowns raise the risk of political violence as activists and opposition parties—labeled as enemies of the state, subjected to charges of terrorism and treason, and restricted from peaceful political activity—are illegitimately elevated to national security threats. Shrinking and weak opposition further enables democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation, which experts warn is difficult to reverse when civil society is targeted by transnational repression. Several political violence studies have also found that when states restrict opportunities for nonviolent means to express political dissatisfaction, more violent and armed groups are empowered to champion citizen grievance. For Kenya and Tanzania, two states that have implemented efforts to curtail election-related violence, increased crackdowns and securitization of political opposition may reverse the progress they have made to prevent destructive outbreaks of political violence.
Few Avenues for Response
Addressing transnational repression is a difficult task; the concept is poorly understood by the international community and law enforcement bodies, and governments often frame repressive behavior as necessary to protect a state’s national security. The abuse of legal mechanisms, such as Interpol red notices or extradition treaties, adds to the complexity of countering these actions. The Biden administration had shown a willingness to define and punish acts of transnational repression within U.S. borders and the international community. In contrast, the Trump administration actively facilitates transnational repression by deporting asylees claiming political persecution back to Russia and Iran. Perpetrator states Uganda and Rwanda have also agreed to accept deportees from the United States, which will likely spare them from formal condemnation or sanctions by the U.S. government in for future acts of transnational repression.
Multilateral institutions may offer important avenues to strengthen legal protections and oversee cross-border abuses. The African Union (AU) could call all member states to reaffirm their commitment to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which explicitly prohibits inhumane treatment, torture, and arbitrary detention. The AU could also adopt policies similar to international partners like the European Union, which has already advocated for reforms in the extradition process and increased security on Interpol notices to enhance protections for asylees and human rights defenders. Victims of transnational repression and civil society coalitions have called on regional groupings (some that may have facilitated the acts themselves) to seek justice. For example, in June 2025, Martha Karua and others arbitrarily detained in Tanzania filed a case in the East African Court of Justice demanding a public apology from Tanzania’s government— potentially setting a regional judicial precedent to counter future acts of transnational repression. Amid declining global commitment to combating this emerging illiberal norm, transnational repression will likely continue to silence activists and threaten democratic space across borders. Nevertheless, civil society and targets of these campaigns have persistently countered with innovative responses to build resilience and combat repression.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: ABBC.