Côte d’Ivoire’s 2025 Election: Sacrificing Long-Term Stability for Short-Term Gains

On October 25, nearly nine million voters will head to the polls to elect the next president of Côte d’Ivoire. They are likely to choose incumbent President Alassane Ouattara, prioritizing short-term stability at the expense of long-term state legitimacy. First elected in 2011, Ouattara’s candidacy for a fourth term undermines government authority amid debates over its constitutionality. This is a serious concern, as eroding state legitimacy is presently driving disorder across West Africa. Ouattara’s exclusion of opposition candidates risks pushing Côte d’Ivoire down the same path. Given the nation’s recurring pattern of violent civil conflict, the danger is far from negligible. Yet, his strong record of governance leads many Ivoirians to accept or even endorse another term. Côte d’Ivoire has not seen a peaceful transfer of power since 1995 and, while another civil war looks unlikely, many remain braced for the worst.

A Crisis of Legitimacy 

Despite over a decade of relative peace, entrenched factionalism among Ivoirian political elites undermines democratic representation and alienates much of the public. So long as questions of state legitimacy remain unresolved, Côte d’Ivoire will be perpetually vulnerable to outbreaks of violence. Instability currently plagues West Africa as citizens, through both peaceful and violent means, resist governments they believe do not represent their interests. This problem is most acute in the Sahel, where poor governance fueled cross-border insurgencies that, in turn, triggered several military coups. Ostensibly a democracy, Niger had seen initial success in repelling the insurgency prior to 2023. However, it still suffered from weak popular legitimacy, and crowds of supporters took to the streets shortly after General Abdourahamane Tchiani, Commander of the Presidential Guard, overthrew the government. While Niger was more democratic than its neighbors, corruption, political repression, and sporadic insurgent violence prevented the development of genuine public support. Niger is not alone in facing these challenges; in June 2025, Togo faced widespread protests against constitutional changes allowing President Gnassingbé to extend his rule indefinitely. The resulting unrest bolstered insurgent operations in the country’s north. This same insurgency failed in Côte d’Ivoire because Ouattara’s government quickly nurtured a cooperative relationship with vulnerable localities. The latest election cycle raises questions about whether this status quo is sustainable, as it has aggravated deep internal political divisions. If Ivoirians feel disconnected from their government, the insurgency could regain a foothold among disaffected groups amid intensified protests and violence. 

The exclusion of prominent opposition candidates capable of contesting Ouattara’s reelection severely undercuts the state’s political legitimacy. The exclusions include former President Laurent Gbagbo, former Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, and Tidjane Thiam, the grandnephew of the nation’s founding president. They were disqualified by the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) on grounds ranging from dual citizenship to criminal convictions. Of the 60 candidates who sought presidential candidacy, only five were ultimately approved. While these exclusions are technically legal, an international court deemed the CEI biased in 2016, and only partial reforms have since been enacted. Opposition groups have long called for greater change, citing government overrepresentation on the CEI’s board. Periodic boycotts by the opposition and civil society have left the organization dominated by ruling party sympathizers. The nation’s Constitutional Council, also accused of bias by the opposition, reaffirmed these exclusions and subsequently banned protests against the decision. Besides Ouattara, the remaining four candidates each represent small or newly formed political parties. While competent, none of these challengers hold the same influence as the aforementioned disqualified figures. These exclusions mark the latest political development surrounding Côte d’Ivoire’s perennially contentious elections.

Much of Côte d’Ivoire’s internal conflict traces back to the political debate over Ivoirité, an exclusionary concept of citizenship and its associated rights. The country has a long history of migration dating to the colonial era, with arrivals gradually integrating into Ivoirian society. The most recent census indicated that 26% of the population is foreign-born. When an economic crisis struck in the late 1980s, ambiguous citizenship laws from before national independence became a major source of societal polarization. Those who promoted Ivoirité did not consider individuals with foreign ancestry, most often from neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali, as true Ivoirians and sought to restrict their rights. Among the campaign’s targets were families who had lived in Côte d’Ivoire for generations. In 1994, the parliament passed a law requiring proof of Ivoirian heritage to run for public office. Ouattara himself, a northerner whose father was Burkinabe, was consequently excluded from the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections. In 1998, parliament expanded its crusade by limiting land ownership to citizens, initiating a wave of land confiscations. The disadvantaged populations were largely Muslim, concentrated in the north, and from different ethnic groups than the predominantly Christian south. These tensions were the catalyst for bloody conflicts that continue to influence Ivoirian politics today. 

Côte d’Ivoire’s long history of violent civil conflict makes the ongoing domestic repression especially concerning. The citizenship debate, combined with an economic crisis, sparked the First Ivoirian Civil War from 2002 to 2007. Ouattara was aligned with the northern rebel faction, while presently-disqualified presidential candidate Laurent Gbagbo led the south. After a brief period of peace, the 2010 elections again pitted the two leaders against each other. Gbagbo’s subsequent refusal to accept Ouattara’s internationally recognized victory triggered a months-long crisis that left 3,000 dead and displaced hundreds of thousands. An attempted mutiny in 2017, rumored to be instigated by the presently-disqualified Guillaume Soro, threatened to plunge the nation back into conflict. This crisis was only defused when Ouattara paid off the soldiers. These recurring destabilizing events underscore the fragility of Côte d’Ivoire’s current calm. 

The Candidacy and Rule of President Ouattara

Ouattara’s current candidacy has drawn criticism, with opponents arguing it is unconstitutional and that he is unfit to lead. His ability to run for a fourth term stems from a 2016 constitutional revision, which the judiciary interpreted as resetting term limits. This reasoning rings hollow for the many supporters of disqualified candidates, who view the exclusions as calculated political acts. At 83 years old, Ouattara is also widely seen as too old to lead a country where nearly 75% of the population is under 35. Many young people see him as detached from their daily struggles. This generational gap is especially concerning at a time when “Gen Z protests” are clashing with security forces across the continent from Madagascar to Morocco. The general populace also rejects French influence; although Ouattara ordered the withdrawal of a French military mission in February, his close ties to the former colonial power remain contentious. These dynamics suggest that his fourth term would remain vulnerable to outbreaks of violence, even long after the election.

Nevertheless, many citizens tolerate Ouattara’s oppositional repression because of the real prosperity seen during his presidency. From 2012 to 2024, annual economic growth averaged 6.96%, contributing to a substantial drop in poverty. Major infrastructure investments have expanded access to electricity and improved connectivity between cities. Today, Côte d’Ivoire is the second-largest economy in West Africa, and its capital, Abidjan, is among the most business-friendly cities in Africa. Despite potential civil unrest risking foreign investment, a continuation of Ouattara’s economic policies would likely sustain this positive trajectory through a fourth term. Additionally, the government addressed insurgency and mutiny threats by ethnically diversifying the armed forces and establishing local civil-military committees to curb abuses. These efforts prioritized building public trust in the armed forces, especially in marginalized northern communities. Ouattara’s economic and political successes were evidenced in a 2024 rally that drew around 70,000 supporters. Yet, despite this progress, abuses by security forces continue, resentment among parties historically excluded from government simmers, and the economic boom’s benefits evade equal distribution. Côte d’Ivoire falls well behind several neighboring states in democratic quality, and critics argue the ongoing harm to institutional resilience outweighs the benefits of Ouattara’s continued rule.

 In addition to domestic factors, the interplay of foreign influence and regional tensions further harms electoral legitimacy in Côte d’Ivoire. Russian disinformation operations promote sovereigntist and anti-French narratives to shape public opinion and constrain Ivoirian leaders’ ability to engage with the West. These messages are amplified through sympathetic civil society organizations and bot networks. They benefit favored politicians, including presidential candidate Ahoua Don Mello, who spent over a decade in Moscow serving as a vice president of the BRICS Alliance. While these narratives have strong local support independent of foreign influence, Russia seeks to boost those that align with its interests. Regional actors similarly seek to complicate Côte d’Ivoire’s political discourse. In May, fabricated videos of a supposed military coup circulated widely online, coinciding with the disqualification of a popular presidential candidate. The videos were most likely coordinated by Burkina Faso, whose outspoken, popular, and Russia-aligned leader Ibrahim Traoré seeks to undermine Ouattara by fomenting civil unrest. Traoré’s government has previously accused Ouattara of orchestrating a coup against him. Together, these external interventions deepen domestic political polarization and weaken the public’s faith in fair elections.

Post-Election Prospects

Regardless of the outcome on October 25, post-election protests are highly likely given Côte d’Ivoire’s history and ongoing political tensions. The concentration of power in the presidency created a winner-takes-all dynamic, incentivizing post-election contests. The Ivoirian public’s response to the fabricated coup in May illustrates a public anxiety fueled by societal trauma from previous election cycles. In reality, a coup appears unlikely given Ouattara’s rapport with the military, strong economic indicators, and the widespread reluctance to risk a return to civil war. Post-election protests are more plausible given the exclusion of the opposition or, should he lose, Ouattara’s significant support base. A protest in August organized by two disqualified candidates drew thousands of participants, demonstrating their ability to mobilize the Ivoirian public to their cause. Nearly 50,000 security personnel have been deployed to monitor the election and maintain order in the days following. However, little evidence of widespread anger on social media or in the streets suggests unrest may not be long-lasting or exceptionally intense. The growing economy likely dampens public dissatisfaction. Even so, the most recent 2020 election saw protests resulting in at least 85 deaths, underscoring the risks associated with perceived illegitimate elections.

The Challenge of Lasting Stability in Côte d’Ivoire

While Ouattara’s tenure has brought significant progress to Côte d’Ivoire, lasting stability ultimately depends on strong institutions and inclusive governance, rather than a single leaders’ capabilities. Weak institutions have eroded public trust with disastrous consequences ranging from protests to full-scale insurgencies. Ouattara is expected to win decisively, but the exclusion of opposition candidates and the controversy over his candidacy undercuts the government’s long-term popular legitimacy. The nation’s economic promise may mitigate unrest, making a return to civil war unlikely—though some level of disruptive protests is almost certain. As Côte d’Ivoire heads to the polls, its challenge will be to preserve the stability gained under Ouattara while reviving the democratic values needed to safeguard it.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: International Crisis Group