Intercepting Trouble: It’s Past Time for Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Gulf

Although Iran coordinated its June 23 attack on a U.S. base in Qatar with Qatari and U.S. officials, and no one was killed, the event underscored two old truths about America’s Gulf Arab partners: they remain vulnerable vis-à-vis the security threat of Iran, and because of that, they urgently need to integrate their air and missile defenses.

Missile Defense Is Vital

Had Israel not invested in its air and missile defense system over decades, the outcome of its 12-day war with Iran in June would have been dramatically different. Indeed, Israel would have been in a world of hurt. Iran’s unprecedented barrage of missile and drone attacks would most likely have caused much more significant infrastructure damage across Israel and far greater civilian casualties.

Iran responded to Israel’s June 12 strikes against its nuclear facilities by launching anywhere from 370 to 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 drones against Israel, complemented by cyberattacks on Israeli critical infrastructure. Israel claims that the vast majority of the aerial attacks were intercepted by its integrated and multi-layered air and missile defense system (with a 90 percent interception rate)—the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow III systems, all of which were assisted by U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries.

However, the sheer scale of the attacks—unique in Israel’s history—revealed stress points in Israel’s defensive grid. Iran’s ballistic missile attacks killed 28 people—all but one of them civilians—and wounded over 3,000. The Israeli defense grid experienced signs of fatigue. Batteries had to be rotated and reloaded at an unsustainable pace, underscoring the need for scalable and autonomous missile defense systems. 

The Gulf Arab states should learn from Israel’s latest experience with Iran. Some of these countries have done well over the years to modernize their military equipment through sales from the United States and other Western countries and pursue a measure of defense reform. But until they can tackle the critical issue of air and missile defense in their planning and readiness, they will continue to be at the mercy of Iran’s aerial threat.

Integration Is Not Easy

Why the Gulf Arab states have not come together on this is no secret. They just do not trust each other enough to share sensitive military information which would be necessary for a mutually beneficial integrated missile defense system to work. This collective mistrust dates back to the very creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. More recently, intra-GCC tensions were vividly on display in June 2017 when Egypt joined Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in imposing a land, sea, and air blockade on Qatar after accusing Doha of sponsoring terrorism and cozying up to Iran. 

The threat Iran poses to its Gulf Arab neighbors is old and real. Since 1979 and the birth of the Islamic Republic, Tehran has sought to expand its sectarian reach and political influence across the Arabian Peninsula by sponsoring militias and political parties that are opposed to the ruling Arab monarchies. Although views among Iranian officials have fluctuated over the years, the Iranian Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps generally see the Gulf Arab states as American pawns used by Washington to deny Iran’s potential and regional aspirations. 

While the idea of a Gulf NATO or military union—debated ad nauseum among Middle East security specialists—primarily to address the Iran challenge might be too much of a stretch right now (the wounds of the 2017 Gulf feud have not fully healed), better information-sharing should not be a heavy lift.

This kind of information-sharing is necessary to install a shared early warning system (SEWS) across the Gulf region, or at least parts of it. The SEWS is the most critical element of integrated air and missile defense—the first layer of defense. It provides fast and uninterrupted reporting on the location and trajectory of ballistic missile launches so countermeasures can be prepared, and civilian populations can be warned and protected.

Integrated Missile Defense Is The Best Way Forward

An integrated Gulf network is not an option; it is a must for two reasons. First, geographic distances are too short in the region. Second, as a result of these distances, response times to potential missile launches from Iran are too tight. It took roughly 12 minutes for Iran’s ballistic missiles to reach Israel (the faster hypersonic ones only needed 5-7 minutes to reach their targets). Suppose Iran fires missiles at its Gulf neighbors. In that case, that time is cut in half, as evidenced by its recent launch at Qatar and its September 2019 strikes on Saudi Arabia, which halted the kingdom’s oil production and froze about 5% of the world’s daily oil output.

If the United States were to resume strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran could choose to lash out against the more vulnerable Gulf states. Leveraging the SEWs, a participating Gulf country would detect the missile launch from Iran. By virtue of being on the same network, neighboring partners will immediately detect the incoming missile, allowing them to activate their Patriot and/or THAAD batteries based on information picked up by the hub.

The United States, which has been pushing for this concept and construct for decades over successive Democratic and Republican administrations, is key to all this, just like it is in NATO. It is a hub-and-spokes system: the United States would serve as the hub, providing data through its satellites to all the SEWS terminals with its Gulf partners, and ensuring that everybody is on the same “frequency” to deter or defend against the threat effectively.

But as Washington has learned over the years, it cannot force this issue on its Gulf Arab partners. They have always preferred bilateral cooperation with the United States over the multilateral format. This must change, which will require not just improved Gulf political ties and trust but also a cultural shift in national security thinking. Otherwise, the next Iranian attack will be far more lethal.

Gulf Arab leaders should absorb the notion that interdependence is the cornerstone of their survival and well-being. As cliché as it sounds, together they are stronger. Riyadh, for example, must realize that Qatari security is Saudi security, just as Abu Dhabi must come to terms with the fact that Qatari security is Emirati security, and so on and so forth.

Normalizing diplomatic relations with Iran, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE did in 2023, is wise. But if Tehran’s attack against Qatar last week is any indication, those easily reversible agreements are in no way sufficient to guard against Iranian aggression. There is no substitute for stronger and integrated defenses in the Gulf. It is high time the Gulf Arab states get serious about this.  

This is a guest contribution. Bilal Y. Saab is the senior managing director of TRENDS US and an associate fellow with Chatham House. He previously served in the U.S. Department of Defense as a senior advisor for security cooperation in the Middle East. Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: DoD