Yemen’s Anti-Houthi Coalition Crisis

Yemen is amid one of the most eventful winters it has seen in years. Territorial control of the nation swung in extremes between December 2025 and January 2026, not between the Houthis and the Yemeni government but among rival Yemeni political factions at war with the Houthi movement. In early December, the Internationally Recognized Government’s (IRG) territorial control was shrunk to near extinction by forces aligned with the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), a secessionist movement, before Saudi-aligned forces and Saudi airstrikes chased the secessionists back. As the Houthis continue to lick their wounds from the last round of U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, the latest conflict among anti-Houthi factions risks playing to the Iranian-backed group’s advantage. If the Houthi movement exploits these fissures, it could increase threats to Western maritime interests and prolong the war’s humanitarian catastrophe.

A Fractious Landscape 

The STC comprises Yemenis who favor reestablishing Yemen as two separate states, as existed before 1990. Led by former Aden Governor Aidarus al-Zoubaidi and backed by the UAE, the STC was launched with the UAE’s backing in 2017 following the Houthi takeover of the nation’s capital, Sana’a, in 2014. Following their establishment, the STC and IRG would frequently clash over territorial control. The parties reached a compromise in 2019 with the Riyadh Agreement. This eventually led to the establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in 2022, which sought to fuse the anti-Houthi factions into a cohesive governing body. Its creation included placing al-Zoubaidi as the PLC’s Vice Chairman.

This alliance of convenience proved an awkward fit. The STC knew that once the war with the Houthis concluded, the Saudi-backed IRG’s focus would shift to preventing secessionist efforts. Discontent also grew from a perceived lack of representation of southern interests during peace talks. The STC’s proposed state of “South Arabia” would include the vast majority of non-Houthi territory, resources, and population centers. If the Houthis never fully return their territory to a unified state, the remaining map could not fit both the IRG and STC’s vision for the future.

The factious nature of Yemeni politics reflects that of its competing patrons. While early in the conflict the UAE and Saudi Arabia divided their portfolios, with Saudi Arabia  managing air power and the Emirates managing the training of troops in south and central Yemen, the years since have seen a divergence in their interests. Saudi Arabia continues to seek to reunify Yemen to reduce the threat to its southern flank and minimize Iranian influence. If Riyadh stabilized Yemen and aligned it with Saudi interests, it could reassess the viability of a previously planned pipeline to the Indian Ocean through Yemen’s al-Mahra governorate. This would reduce the risk of Iran once again laying mines in the Persian Gulf or acting on its threats to block the Hormuz Strait. Riyadh’s vision of a reunified Yemen, however, clashes with Abu Dhabi’s. 

The UAE aims to diversify its economy away from fossil fuels and into areas such as maritime logistics. Securing influence along Yemen’s southern coastal ports and the strategic islands of Socotra and Zuqar would prove valuable for this goal. In addition, influence over an independent South Arabia state would also serve the UAE’s aims to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated al-Islah party in Yemen, whose UAE group threatened the Emirati monarchical system during the Arab Spring. The UAE has run an assassination campaign against the group in Yemen over the last decade.

Subnational sponsorship is a repeat playbook for the UAE, which has been accused of conducting a similar strategy in Somalia, Sudan, and Libya. To Saudi Arabia, however, this growing map of influence increasingly presents a narrative of strategic encirclement, potentially contributing to Saudi Arabia encouraging the Trump Administration to end the war in Sudan. As Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 plan moves to seize market share from UAE-dominated sectors, and the UAE continues its destabilizing regional strategy, relations between the two have grown increasingly strained. 

A Hot Yemeni Winter

The Yemeni Governorate of Hadhramaut spans from the Saudi border to the Gulf of Aden, encompassing a large portion of Yemen’s land and oil deposits. In the governorate’s expansive desert interior, UAE backed STC forces and Saudi-aligned forces divide control. In late 2025, a tribal leader, Amr bin Habreesh, led his militia to seize the Masila oil fields in Hadhramaut. STC-aligned forces moved to push out this tribal force and, after seizing it, continued advancing north and east. By claiming to secure these governorates from Al-Qaeda (AQAP), ISIS, and Houthi loyalists, they pushed government-aligned forces out of the territory through a mix of bloodless takeovers and violent clashes. Beyond the desert frontier in the interim capital of Aden, IRG leadership fled as the secessionists advanced. The departure of Saudi military forces would follow. By December 30th, reports indicated that STC-aligned forces had reached the Oman-Yemen border in al-Mahra Governorate, pushing the IRG to near irrelevance. On January 2nd, the STC announced the start of a two-year transitional phase to establish the state of South Arabia.

Beyond the Yemeni desert, the parties’ patrons in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not standing idle. Cargo vessels allegedly connected to the UAE began offloading equipment shipments for the STC in Mukalla, Hadhramaut. Saudi Arabia would respond in turn, first surging a force of 15,000 to 20,000 along the border before releasing a statement accusing the UAE of “pressuring” the STC into its military offensive. Saudi frustration peaked on December 30th when it initiated airstrikes on the UAE’s alleged equipment shipments in Mukalla. The UAE’s response was an immediate withdrawal, with Abu Dhabi announcing it would be withdrawing its remaining forces and appearing to dismantle its forward operating bases. In the UAE’s absence, the Saudi-backed offensive would begin to push south. 

As the STC rapidly retreated, an anarchic power vacuum formed in the then-unpoliced territory, with claims of mass looting of left-behind weapons and abandoned UAE bases. In fear of looted weapons crossing the border, Oman would weld at least one of its border gates shut. The STC’s leadership, recognizing their imminent collapse, agreed to join the Saudi-proposed Riyadh peace conference, but at the last minute, al-Zoubaidi did not board the plane. Saudi reports indicate that he traveled by boat to Berbera, Somaliland, then made his way to Abu Dhabi with the help of a UAE officer. Members of the STC stated on Saudi media that the group has dissolved, though others have denied this, including its vice president, who claimed that the STC members in Riyadh were under house arrest.

Outlook

Yemeni politics are notoriously deadly, once described by former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh as “dancing on the heads of snakes.” This winter has been no exception to this maxim. The PLC has removed al-Zoubaidi from its ranks and accused him of treason, raising questions about the PLC’s capacity and unity going forward. If the Houthis sense vulnerability in the PLC’s political and military structures, they could attempt to expand their territorial control beyond the current stalemate. The STC’s rout of the IRG also affects the mediation of the civil war, as it underscores the IRG’s military weakness. Houthi negotiators may now seek to extract more demands in the currently stalled peace process if they believe the IRG is coming to the table out of desperation.

Looking at the geopolitics of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the STC offensive appears to have broken Riyadh’s tolerance for Abu Dhabi’s strategy of proxies. From direct airstrikes on UAE equipment to an al-Zoubaidi wanted sign on Arab News’ front page, this failed offensive has changed the tone of the two countries’ rivalry. The UAE must now seriously consider whether it can afford its strategy of proxies, as it may now come at the cost of direct retaliation. Memories of the blockade of Qatar for its sponsorship of subnational groups are likely in the UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed’s (MBZ) considerations. While he and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) once were reported to have had a mentor-mentee relationship, events in Yemen have shown the extent to which their affection has transitioned to calculated competition.

Saudi Arabia must now reflect on the consequences the anti-Houthi coalition may face from losing a key benefactor for its forces. If the UAE finds itself cut off from formal channels of input in the coalition’s decision-making, it may decide it prefers to act as a chaos agent. By sponsoring southern insurgents, it would both entrap Saudi Arabia in a two-front quagmire and keep Riyadh’s pipeline dream out of its grasp. Stirring conflict could also reduce the chance of Yemen’s ports competing with the UAE’s Jebel Ali port. With 200,000 Yemeni fighters reportedly trained by the UAE, it is unlikely Emirati influence will fade soon. Riyadh will either need to reach a mutually acceptable understanding with Abu Dhabi or increase its prolonged presence in Yemen to sustain IRG stability. It is possible that a UAE departure could open a new, less fractious chapter in Yemeni politics with one less foreign patron, but this will hinge on how the competing GCC heavy weights move forward. 

It is ultimately in the interests of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Washington to find a more stable balance of power in Aden. If the Houthis use this turmoil to turn the civil war’s stalemate into an opportunity for territorial expansion, they could be able to position their missiles and UAVs even closer to the Bab al-Mandab maritime chokepoint and the Gulf of Aden. Doing so would increase the burden of coalition patrols trying to intercept these projectiles to protect maritime commerce. A Houthi occupation of the southern shoreline would also increase access to their weapons and drug smuggling networks. These networks include those connecting them to al-Shabab and potentially groups in Sudan, ultimately threatening the UAE’s other projects. Recent events have also potentially left AQAP with new stockpiles of ammunition, firearms, and armored vehicles looted from STC and UAE arms depots. If the PLC’s remaining factions cannot exert sufficient political and military strength to police the desert, a dangerous petri dish of militant terror plots could germinate in the STC’s absence. To fight these threats from two fronts, the PLC will need to secure buy-in from the political constituencies and militias the STC left behind and  stitch the council back together. President al-Alimi has taken positive early steps, such as appointing Mahmoud al-Subaihi to the PLC, who observers describe as being mutually respected by the north and south. However, the road towards reconciliation remains long. It will ultimately require all parties involved, both in and outside of Yemen’s borders, to act in good faith to steer the anti-Houthi coalition back on course from this crisis.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: The New Yorker