The 2025 Elections in the Kurdistan Region: Eroding Legitimacy, Strategic Fragmentation, and the Salafi Shift

On November 11, 2025, Iraq concluded its sixth parliamentary elections. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have declared victory based on seat counts. However, for policymakers in Washington who view the KRI as a pillar of stability, these numbers are deceptive. Beyond the headline figures lies a reality of eroding legitimacy, the monetization of democracy, and a strategic blunder in Kirkuk city. Most concerningly, the vacuum left by the collapse of secular opposition is being filled by Turkish- and Iranian-aligned proxies alongside a reawakened Salafi-jihadi movement inspired by regional turmoil. While the ruling parties have won the parliament, they are in danger of losing the public domain, and with it, the region’s pro-Western identity.

The Legitimacy Crisis: Governing the “Minority”

The most critical takeaway from the 2025 elections is not the distribution of seats, but the magnitude of the public abstention. The KDP and PUK are effectively operating a system of “minority rule.” Despite a recovery from the record-low turnout of 2021, the data reveals a massive disconnect. Approximately 1.7 million eligible voters in the Kurdistan Region chose to stay home. When combined with the unprecedented number of invalid votes, the ruling coalition, the KDP and PUK, is governing with a mandate derived from only about 30% of the eligible population. As shown in Table 1, the “Silent Majority” is now the dominant political force in the region.

Table 1: Erosion of Legitimacy: Voter Turnout vs. Ruling Parties’ Share (2010–2025)
This table illustrates the widening gap between the ruling elite and the general public, highlighting the rise of the “Silent Majority.”

The Monetization of Votes and the “Photo Protest”

Ballot monetization severely undermined the election’s integrity . Local monitoring and widespread reports indicate that nationwide campaign spending reached an estimated $3 billion. In the KRI, direct vote-buying was rampant, with prices ranging from $50 to $200 per vote, targeting the most economically vulnerable. However, this coercion birthed a unique form of resistance. Pressured by party operatives to photograph their ballots inside the booth as proof of loyalty, thousands of voters complied with the photo, but then deliberately invalidated their votes. This explains the sharp increase from the previous year in invalid ballots, which reached nearly 289,000 (13.34%). These were not errors; they were acts of dignity. Voters took the money out of necessity, but burned the vote out of protest.

The Opposition Shift: From Civil Protest to Radical Proxies

For the United States, the most alarming trend is the transformation of the Kurdish opposition. The secular, liberal reform movement (formerly led by Gorran (Change) Movement) has collapsed. In its place, new actors have emerged who are steering the opposition away from Western values and toward alignment with Iranian regional interests. The New Generation Movement, led by Shaswar Abdulwahid, continues to play a disruptive role by leveraging anti-system populism to fracture the region’s internal political cohesion. Emerging in 2017 as a counter-nationalist project, the movement followed a trajectory that regional diplomatic reporting suggests benefited from encouragement linked to senior figures within Baghdad-based Arab paramilitary and political networks during the late 2010s. While initially effective in mobilizing protest sentiment, the movement’s confrontational posture and organizational volatility ultimately undermined its credibility as a sustainable reformist alternative, contributing to the broader collapse of secular opposition in the Kurdistan Region. 

More recently, the Halwest (National Stance Movement) has filled the opposition vacuum created by the collapse of the Gorran Movement and the recent electoral decline of New Generation. Security observers have flagged patterns of activity among senior figures within the movement. Prior to the election, regional monitoring records indicate repeated short-duration cross-border travel inconsistent with routine political engagement. Notably, this pattern appears to have continued post-election; security assessments suggest sustained regional engagement by representatives of the movement with actors aligned to Iranian strategic networks. Taken together, these patterns support assessments that the movement may be functioning as a conduit for Iranian influence aimed at fracturing Kurdish political cohesion. This perception was further reinforced by Iranian state-aligned media, which in its December 6, 2025 coverage portrayed the movement in language consistent with strategic alignment with Iranian regional interests.

This drift is further illustrated by the composition and external affiliations of figures associated with the movement. Post-election political reporting and regional security assessments indicate that pro-Iran armed factions publicly claimed influence over electoral outcomes in the Kurdistan Region, a narrative that circulated widely in political and media circles following the vote. Parallel to these claims, allegations emerged within Kurdish political networks regarding external financial backing for certain candidates from sanctioned armed entities operating within Iraq’s broader security–militia ecosystem. While such assertions remain contested, their circulation underscores growing concerns that non-state armed actors seeking political leverage are increasingly penetrating segments of the opposition , reinforcing perceptions of proxy competition and deepening fragmentation within Kurdish politics.

Table 2: The Fragmentation of Dissent: From Gorran (2014) to New Populists (2025)
This table compares the singular strength of the Gorran Movement at its peak with the fragmented nature of the new opposition lists (New Generation & Halwest) in 2025.

The Hidden Fire: Radicalization and the “Salafi Spring”

The collapse of the civil opposition has not led to apathy, but to a “hidden fire,” a radicalization of the Kurds. This trend mirrors the dynamics of 2013–2014, when the arrival of the Islamic State (ISIS) coincided with a spike in Islamist popularity. Today, however, the threat is more complex.

• The Turkish Axis: The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), heavily influenced by the Turkish Muslim Brotherhood, has seen significant growth. It is the only Islamist faction operating within the system that is expanding, benefiting from Ankara’s soft power.
• The Iranian/Salafi Axis: Conversely, the Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal) saw its votes drop. This is not a loss of popularity, but a strategic withdrawal. Its base, deeply rooted in ” Salafi-jihadist” and close to Iran, largely boycotted the vote at the behest of Salafi leaders who reject the secular process.
• The Tactical Convergence: This trend toward Islamization was formalized on December 7, 2025. In a significant strategic maneuver in Erbil, the Halwest Movement joined forces with the KIU and Komal to announce a unified parliamentary effort in Baghdad. While the announcement tactically omitted references to the Kurdistan Region to avoid provoking the ruling duopoly, the implications are clear: the so-called “non-Islamist” opposition (Halwest) has fully aligned with organized political Islam. This alliance fuses Halwest’s admiration for Turkey’s AKP model and its opaque Iranian channels with the traditional Islamist base, confirming that the region’s opposition landscape is shedding its liberal pretense and coalescing into a unified Islamist front.
• The Jihadi Waiting Game: Most dangerously, the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK), the region’s oldest jihadi party, established in 1987 with Iranian support, did not participate directly. Now strategically aligned with Turkey and inspired by the success of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, the IMK is playing a long game. Security reporting indicates that the IMK leadership believes the current political order in the KRI is unsustainable. Recent intelligence from high-level internal meetings indicates that the group has signaled a strategic shift away from electoral participation toward long-term organizational and territorial consolidation. Influenced by the “Salafi Spring” narratives following the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, they are positioning themselves to consolidate their influence in the rugged border areas between Iraq and Iran, specifically in Halabja. They view this province as a strategic incubator, a calculation bolstered by the 2025 election results which vividly demonstrated that Halabja’s ideological landscape is dominated by political Islam. Consequently, they are positioning themselves for post-state influence should central authority weaken.

Kirkuk: A Strategic Blunder

The intra-Kurdish rivalry has resulted in a catastrophic strategic blunder in Kirkuk. For the first time in two decades, Kurds have lost their majority status, securing only five  seats, parity with the Arab bloc. Consequently, the Kurds have effectively been demoted from their former status as the ‘landlords’ of Kirkuk to merely equal ‘partners.’ This loss of political dominance opens corridors for Iranian influence in Syria, Turkish hegemony, and ISIS resurgence. By prioritizing partisan competition over national interest, Kurdish leaders have endangered the region’s strategic depth and future energy control.

Table 3: Strategic Decline: Ethnic Seat Distribution in Kirkuk (2005–2025)
This table of Kurdish institute for election highlights the geopolitical loss of Kurdish dominance in the disputed territories, shifting from hegemony to parity with Arab blocs.

The KDP’s Hubris vs. Regional Stability

The KDP emerged from this election with a numerical lead, but translating this into a policy of exclusion would be a fatal error. Post-election rhetoric suggests the KDP may attempt to form a government based solely on seat counts, bypassing the PUK.This “arithmetic governance” ignores reality. The PUK’s power is not just in ballot boxes; it lies in its history, its military control of the “Green Zone” (Sulaimani/Halabja), and its geopolitical weight. Attempting to marginalize the PUK threatens to fracture the KRI’s administration. Stability requires consensus, not domination.

A Call for Internal Renewal and U.S. Engagement

The 2025 elections were not merely a democratic exercise; they were a warning sign. The United States must re-engage, not just with political elites, but with the system itself. To do so, Washington should leverage specific instruments of power: conditioning Department of Defense stipends to the Peshmerga on concrete unification benchmarks to prevent fragmentation; identifying and disrupting financial linkages between political actors and sanctioned armed networks; and redirecting USAID stabilization funds toward border areas to address the socioeconomic grievances fueling Salafi-jihadist resurgence. Washington must help build a governance model that represents the silent majority, checks the influence of both Iranian and Turkish proxies within the opposition, and monitors the accelerating growth of Salafi-jihadist currents preparing for a post-state scenario.

Ultimately, the Kurdish political leadership must interpret these results as a warning bell, a potential tsunami of silent social discontent that is drifting toward isolation and radical solutions. To survive this shift, a comprehensive strategy is required. Domestically, they must use the rule of law to block the “Trojan horses” of neighboring states from infiltrating the governance structure, while recommitting to universal human rights, specifically the freedom of will, by ending coercive electoral practices. Socially and politically, respecting plurality and revitalizing civil society is crucial to act as a buffer against the unchecked growth of movement-based Salafism (Salafism-Haraki). Furthermore, governance must prioritize the equitable provision of public services, particularly education and healthcare, to bridge the inequality gap. Crucially, the KDP must not mistake a numerical lead at the ballot box for a license to ignore the de facto balance of power and geopolitical  realities. Finally, regarding Kirkuk and the disputed territories, a national alliance must immediately replace partisan rivalry to avert further strategic losses.

Only by taking these steps can the leadership transform this perilous moment into an opportunity for a genuine new beginning, ensuring the KRI remains a strategic asset rather than becoming a fractured liability.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Al-Monitor