How the U.S., Russia, and PRC Aim to Fight the First Space War: Analyzing Kinetic Counterspace Systems

Today, three nations dominate the counterspace environment: the United States, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), all in a prolonged great power conflict that threatens their use daily. Fielding weapons untested in combat, but potentially more devastating than almost any existing systems, can upset the delicate balance of power in space. These weapons range from futuristic space lasers to missiles aimed at satellites, with the shared goal is to deny an adversary’s access to the space domain for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); communications; positioning and navigation (PNT, such as GPS and GLONASS); missile warning; and other critical national security uses. Space has come to dominate the underpinnings of the nations’ military and economic capabilities worldwide, and the hidden proliferation of counterspace weapons threatens this integral part of the global system. 

The Counterspace Environment

Four key issues dominate the counterspace environment: the offensive-dominant environment that incentivizes first-movers; the fragility of space systems to debris and attack; the dual-use nature of space that blurs the line between weapon and non-weapon; and the lack of international regulation due to the difficulty of defining what a space weapon is. Each issue makes counterspace capabilities appealing to nations seeking to dominate space or deny an adversary’s access to it—most notably, the United States, Russia, and the PRC. 

International regulation of counterspace weapons remains limited, applying only to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction—a term undefined in the Outer Space Treaty—and unilateral action like the U.S.’s direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) weapon testing ban. All three major powers have proposed their own international regulatory frameworks: the U.S.’s Artemis Accords, which only focuses on civil space activities; and Russia and the PRC with the proposed Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The latter has failed to gain international approval due to definitional deficiencies and enforcement concerns. The lack of regulation engenders unilateral action and encourages states to pursue independent counterspace policies, causing a more tenuous space environment.

In the absence of effective regulation, the United States, Russia, and the PRC have each independently tested and used counterspace systems for ISR and offensive operations. However, the classified nature of these programs and the sheer expanse of space complicate open-source analyses of their utility. Currently, only non-destructive counterspace capabilities are actively used in military and intelligence contexts. The United States and Russia are testing such systems in military exercises, and Russia has conducted conflict-based cyberattacks on satellite systems—targeting the satellite communications (SATCOM) capabilities of U.S. firms Viasat and Starlink to degrade Ukraine’s military SATCOM capabilities. The PRC has developed similar capabilities but has not used any within military operations.

Earth-To-Space Kinetic Counterspace Weapons

All three nations have tested anti-satellite weapons in recent years, spreading space debris and threatening each other’s space capabilities. The United States last tested its DA-ASAT capability in 2008. However, the United States lacks an acknowledged, operational DA-ASAT program and appears to have discontinued efforts following its unilateral testing ban. However, the U.S.’s Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program can be retrofitted in a DA-ASAT role—as demonstrated in its 2008 DA-ASAT test—given similarities in weapon configuration, posing questions of the true extent of the U.S. ASAT capabilities in the era of Golden Dome. Unconstrained by a testing ban, Russia has developed its own DA-ASAT systems—the ground-based 14A042 Nudol and air-launched 78M6 Kontakt—and operates an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, the S-500, which could be similarly configured in a DA-ASAT role. Although this is untested, unlike the U.S.’s Aegis system. The PRC has developed its own robust DA-ASAT capability based on its mobile ballistic missile system for low Earth orbit (LEO) and is testing a suspected geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) capability. Such capability threatens even the furthest systems, like the United States’ GPS or early missile warning systems, demonstrating that no system is out of range of kinetic counterspace action today.

In a head-to-head race, Russia is far and away the leader in DA-ASAT capabilities, testing the most systems and currently fielding viable DA-ASAT systems. However, the PRC is very quickly rising and developing capabilities to specifically target critical U.S. satellite infrastructure. The United States is rather weak in its DA-ASAT capabilities, given its ban on testing, with no existing system or R&D program, but it has a nascent capability with its BMD systems that can be reconfigured into DA-ASAT weapons. However, the development of proliferated satellite constellations of hundreds or more satellites could reduce the viability of DA-ASAT systems by building in redundancy and acting as a passive DA-ASAT defense.

Co-Orbital Kinetic Counterspace Operations and Satellite Maneuverability

The area with significant innovation in recent years is the co-orbital, space-to-space weapons category, where weapons and weapon systems are pre-placed in space for later operations. Dual-use systems blur the line between weapons and non-weapons, with systems ranging from in-space satellite mobility via rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs), robotic arms, space-based nuclear weapons, space planes, and space-based interceptors (SBIs). With heavy overlap in civil and commercial applications, co-orbital operations are more easily obfuscated in their true intentions. Simple systems like robotic arms can have devastating consequences, such as destroying communications antennas or moving a satellite outside its orbit, but can be disguised as repair modules on satellites, while the presence of hidden sub-satellites and projectiles is hard to determine until the decisive moment. RPOs, on the other hand, while helpful to move satellites, can also be repurposed in an ISR capability to spy on other satellites or turn a satellite into a co-orbital weapon. The unique nature of space creates conditions that allow conversion of almost any system, if operationalized in the correct direction, into a co-orbital system, increasing the difficulty of identifying and countering co-orbital counterspace threats.

The most discussed capability is the still-in-development SBIs for the U.S.’s Golden Dome program, while aimed towards ballistic missiles, could also be repurposed for co-orbital ASAT use, like other BMD systems. While SBIs ostensibly target missiles flying through space or missiles in their pre-space boost phase, the technology of intercepting a moving object in space is likely cross-applicable to countering satellites in orbit. If enacted in full, the SBI component of Golden Dome could be the most expansive co-orbital counterspace system of any nation, given that neither Russia nor the PRC is known to be developing SBIs.

For co-orbital systems, having already reached space, maneuverability is the key metric. Such operations allow for approaching a target satellite to either launch a weapon or function as one, move the target satellite out of its orbit, block its view (for ISR satellites), or gather intelligence. All three nations have developed significant RPO capability, including operations near each other’s satellites, which raises concerns of espionage and future use of existing systems in a co-orbital counterspace capacity. Currently, most RPOs are done in an ISR context, collecting information on an adversary’s satellite system and collecting signals intelligence (SIGINT) from the system for later use, with no operationalization of RPOs in purely offensive contexts to date.

The United States has extensively used RPOs for ISR missions, against adversaries, and as part of the Global War on Terror, with a majority of current RPOs targeting Chinese space systems. Recent developments of the Space Force’s Tactical Response Space (TacRS) program—which aims to rapidly develop and launch space capabilities to meet time-specific needs—suggest a move towards rapid development and deployment of RPO capabilities, suggesting a potential counterspace application in a time of crisis. Russia has a long history of co-orbital operations, stemming back to the Soviet era, and has since engaged in RPOs for both testing and espionage on both Chinese and American space systems. Russian co-orbital space operations have increased in ferocity, from RPOs to spy on U.S. SIGINT satellites and investigate the PRC’s space activities. Testing of RPO-capable sub-satellites launched from larger Russian satellites has raised concerns over the operationalization of such technology into a co-orbital counterspace weapon. The PRC in 2010 conducted its first RPO with SJ-12 and has since showcased the use of mechanical arms to ‘grab’ satellites in 2013, in-orbit refueling in 2016, and simultaneous maneuvers and debris-collection. United States Space Force officials have characterized the PRC’s operations as ‘dogfighting’ in space, and its focus on in-orbit maneuverability and increased space situational awareness (SSA) capability indicated a significant focus on co-orbital counterspace operations.

An extension of RPOs, the United States and the PRC have developed highly secretive reusable space planes—similar to NASA’s Space Shuttle program—to test systems and launch satellites with an alleged co-orbital counterspace capability. The United States’ X-37 program, in flight since 2010, has served as a testbed for various counterspace and civil space technologies and some suggest it is used for covert satellite deployment in space, although information on exact counterspace capabilities outside ISR is not public. The PRC’s space plane, Shenlong, appears similarly well developed, first launching in 2020, and acts as a testbed for new technologies. However, little is known publicly about Shenlong outside its launch satellites in-orbit and its maneuverability through RPOs.

Russian co-orbital capabilities are the most pressing danger, with the alleged development of nuclear-capable systems a critical threat to the proliferated satellite constellations developed by the U.S. and a clear breach of international space law. Furthermore, while the United States and the PRC have not developed weapon-like co-orbital systems, instead conducting RPOs for ISR and testing, Russia is the only nation to have conducted high-velocity sub-satellite release operations in space, suggesting a nascent co-orbital counterspace capability currently unmatched in testing or reality by the United States or the PRC. While lacking direct co-orbital counterspace capabilities, NASA’s DART program—a planetary defense program aimed at deflecting asteroids via a satellite collision in deep space—suggests a potential nascent U.S. counterspace capability. However, operationalization of the mission outside of NASA—barring initial NASA-Air Force RPO testing in the program’s early days—has not occurred. The lack of proper defenses for either a co-orbital or direct-ascent operation has created a risk-heavy space environment that threatens the longevity of space and space systems should conflict arise.

Clear and Present Danger

In the fragile space environment, even light kinetic operations can have drastic consequences. While few distinctly kinetic counterspace systems exist, the U.S., Russia, and the PRC have demonstrated a tendency to develop technology that is cross-applicable towards kinetic counterspace operations, and the kinetic counterspace capability they possess is lethal. While the United States leads in co-orbital counterspace technology, the PRC is rapidly increasing its counterspace activity, despite public claims to the contrary, raising calls for much-needed investment in counterspace capabilities. On the other hand, Russia has a history of kinetic counterspace capability, with the most robust DA-ASAT capability to-date an alleged development of a nuclear-capable co-orbital counterspace capability that could have devastating consequences on the safety and security of space if deployed. While the United States has unilaterally called for ending DA-ASAT testing, it possesses a strong nascent DA-ASAT capability through its BMD system, which is likely to expand with the adoption of Golden Dome. The nature of the space environment causes first-mover advantage in nearly all kinetic counterspace contexts; therefore, each nation must be vigilant in developing its SSA capabilities to ensure long-term security of its systems in the face of a fragile space environment. The United States is currently the leader in counterspace capabilities, given its nascent DA-ASAT capabilities and strong co-orbital counterspace capability and testing. Russia and the PRC pose significant threats to its current goal of space superiority. The assumption of peaceful uses of outer space can no longer be assumed, nor can assumptions of system invulnerability in conflict. A lack of proper defense means that whoever fires first is likely to win. While no nation is currently suited to firing the first shot in a kinetic space war, testing and development have shown that space war is no longer a distant reality, but a present danger.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Defense Scoop