Getting Up From The Kids’ Table: Why Europe Must Rediscover Realpolitik
Europe must revive its history of Realpolitik to preserve its sovereignty. Following President Donald Trump’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the case is clear. Under “America First,” the United States has paired a strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific with tariffs that erode the trade norms the European Union relied on for decades. The prudent response is clear: to avoid strategic isolation, Europe should adopt a policy of pragmatic self-interest, pursue strategic autonomy, and return to a tradition of Realpolitik.
As European leaders chart a course for the EU, they should heed the lessons from the UNGA as well as from the latest negotiations following the U.S. tariffs that have sparked fresh concerns about the erosion of global trade norms that the EU benefited from for so long. The Trump administration imposed a 15 percent tariff on European automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors, while refusing to lower the punitive 50 percent tariff on European steel and aluminum. This deal, met with widespread disappointment across Europe, stands in contrast to the more favorable agreement secured by the United Kingdom, now independent of EU trade policy following Brexit. These developments are not isolated but signify a broader shift toward a Machiavellian world order, characterized by transactional diplomacy and geopolitical power plays.
While the media spotlight frequently illuminates Donald Trump’s personality as a symbol of this trend, the strategic shift he embodies is more profound. The U.S. has tried to refocus its strategic gaze toward the Indo-Pacific, recognizing it as crucial to American economic and security interests. The region is the central chessboard of the intensifying great-power competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), sees substantial economic growth in Asian markets, and contains one of the critical linchpins of the global economy: Taiwan’s semiconductor production. Consequently, the U.S. pivot to Asia implies a reduced focus on European affairs.
In this rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, Europe’s traditional reliance on a values-based diplomacy, betting on multilateralism, international law, and norms, now risks leaving it strategically isolated. The fact that the U.S. trade deal with the UK is widely questioned on World Trade Organization (WTO) grounds shows the decline in importance of the institutions that the EU relied on for so long. In response, Europe, understood here primarily as the EU, excluding the now separate UK, must pivot from its current diplomatic posture toward one informed by pragmatic self-interest, strategic autonomy, and a revival of its historical tradition of Realpolitik.
The Bismarckian Blueprint: Realpolitik’s European Roots
Realpolitik assumed its most disciplined form in 19th-century Europe under Otto von Bismarck, who achieved German unification through deft diplomacy, calibrated coercion, and the sparing use of force. His oft-quoted insistence that the great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and majority decisions, but by blood and iron captured a governing instinct rather than an ideology. The instruments were straightforward: limited wars that created leverage, a lattice of alliances that managed risk, including the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary and the later Triple Alliance with Italy, and economic statecraft that preceded and then reinforced political consolidation, above all the Zollverein customs union. As Jonathan Steinberg observed, Bismarck’s originality lay in treating ideas as tools and power as the metric of success.
The lesson for today’s European Union is not to romanticize Bismarck, whose competitive order also helped sow later catastrophe, but to recover his methods in a rules-fraying world. A sovereign Europe must specify its interests before values can be sustained. Coalitions should be assembled issue by issue, inside the EU and with like-minded partners beyond Europe, to blunt coercion and deter opportunism. Economics must be treated as an arena of power, which implies firmer trade-defense instruments, targeted industrial policy where scale matters, and deliberate diversification of critical inputs such as energy and semiconductors. Diplomacy should remain flexible, yet anchored by clearly communicated red lines that are backed by credible capabilities, including defense production and interoperability that raise the cost of revisionism.
Elements of this approach are already visible. France, in particular, has consistently championed national sovereignty and strategic independence, a tradition revived by President Emmanuel Macron. Macron’s assertive diplomacy, from advocating European strategic autonomy to challenging U.S. leadership, reflects a contemporary resurgence of Realpolitik. Similarly, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has recently shown signs of embracing Realpolitik through assertive policies on migration and energy security, marking a significant shift from traditional EU stances.
American Realpolitiker: From Kissinger to Trump
Realpolitik has long been central to U.S. foreign policy, but was traditionally executed with greater subtlety than under the current administration. Henry Kissinger exemplified this tradition, orchestrating détente with the Soviet Union while strategically opening diplomatic channels with the PRC. His engagement with the PRC was a clear Realpolitik maneuver designed explicitly to exploit and deepen divisions between Beijing and Moscow, significantly altering Cold War geopolitics in the U.S.’s favor, no matter how one assesses the long-term consequences. Richard Nixon backed this balancing logic, easing superpower tensions to enlarge Washington’s maneuvering room. George H. W. Bush carried the tradition forward. The UN mandate for Operation Desert Storm functioned as coalition cover for a policy aimed at U.S. interests: Gulf stability, a favorable regional balance, and secure energy flows.
In stark contrast, the Trump administration shed all diplomatic subtleties, favoring overt transactionalism and economic coercion. Trump’s policymakers openly embraced outdated zero-sum economic strategies. Viewing global trade as direct competition whereby one nation’s gain guarantees another’s loss, Trumpian policymakers departed from the lens of comparative advantage, which suggests mutual gains from trade. This approach starkly diverged from prior administrations, fundamentally redefining the toolkit of U.S. foreign policy and the interests it pursues.
Rather than continuity in the pursuit of national interests, Trump’s approach represented a profound shift: U.S. interests were recast as short-term, transactional gains, rather than collective leadership or institutional stability. The U.S.-designed multilateralism is no longer a strength to leverage but a vulnerability to manage. This radical change in defining both interests and acceptable means marked a definitive break toward unapologetic Realpolitik. Moreover, Trump and his aides notably discarded Washington’s meticulously cultivated soft power, historically a significant U.S. asset distinguishing it from the PRC. The erosion of Foggy Bottom’s diplomatic credibility has already allowed the PRC opportunities to fill the resulting vacuum, evident in Beijing’s early yet increasingly successful diplomatic engagements, from the Global South to Europe itself like the BRI initiative.
Sitting at the Kid’s Table: Europe’s Crisis of Strategic Naivety
Europe’s central problem is dependence. As Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger put it, “Europe has been relegated to the kids’ table.” That description captures a broader reality: diplomatic marginalization, military reliance on the U.S., and now visible economic weakness.
Europe’s reliance on a values-driven foreign policy deepened after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The resulting peace dividend encouraged further European integration, economic prosperity, and stability under the protective U.S. security umbrella. However, it also diminished Europe’s strategic autonomy. Key enablers of autonomy, such as the defense industry, experienced decades of underinvestment. Europe did not merely lack the capability but also the ambition and political will to act independently. Comfortable within the U.S.-led order, European leaders rarely challenged the assumption that their interests were fundamentally aligned with those of Washington. The pattern of dependence has been consistent across different arenas. Militarily, Europe has relied on U.S. strategic enablers, meaning intelligence, logistics, and advanced military technology, a reliance visible in NATO operations from Kosovo to Libya. Europe struggled to intervene independently in its neighborhood, most notably in Libya in 2011 and in managing the subsequent migration crisis. The war in Ukraine has reinforced the point. On the battlefield, European support remains heavily dependent on the U.S., which provides the majority of advanced weaponry, intelligence, and a significant share of the financial assistance. Diplomatically, Europe has often been sidelined in discussions over peace or ceasefire negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, where Washington and other powers sit at the adults’ table.
Papperger’s phrase about “the kids’ table” resonates because it distills these strands into a single judgment about Europe’s diminished leverage. While provocative, this sentiment reflects a growing concern across European political and business circles regarding Europe’s declining strategic relevance both militarily and now economically. The latest trade negotiations with Washington have laid bare Europe’s lack of leverage. As the U.S. ramps up tariffs and embraces a broader strategy of economic nationalism, Europe finds itself with little choice but to acquiesce. It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to bargain effectively in a trade war against the military superpower that guarantees one’s own security. Europe’s military shortcomings are glaring: aging equipment, ammunition shortages, and underfunded armies that remain dependent on U.S. logistics and firepower. The Trump administration has now exposed Europe’s economic fragility as well. Bound by its security reliance on Washington in the Ukraine war, Europe cannot afford open dissent, and so it was compelled to accept trade terms dictated from across the Atlantic.
Getting Up from the Table, the Right Way: Toward a European Realpolitik
The EU has limited leverage today; a capable realpolitiker accepts that fact, then maximizes advantages through concrete initiatives, targeted alliances, and measurable outcomes. To reclaim relevance and move beyond a peripheral role, the EU should pursue an autonomous and pragmatic foreign policy that aligns values with power. Values remain a compass, yet influence comes from instruments, coalitions, and credibility. Beyond tariffs and policy toward Russia, there are three key near-term arenas where Europe can demonstrate a renewed Realpolitik.
Ukraine
The priority is staying power. The EU should lock in multi-year funding for budget support and reconstruction, expand joint procurement for air defense and artillery ammunition, and accelerate delivery of enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), demining, and logistics. Diplomatically, Europe should convene and lead a standing contact group with U.S. participation, rather than waiting on Washington’s calendar. Energy resilience for Ukraine requires long-term electricity interconnections with the EU grid and insurance backstops for private investment. The metric is simple: can Europe sustain Ukrainian capacity through winter cycles and maintain pressure on Russia without relying on ad hoc U.S. decisions? And leverage any pro-Ukraine shifts in Donald Trump’s posture, while keeping contingency plans for a turnabout
The PRC, India, and broader ASEAN
Risk management is the principle, diversification is the tool. The EU should deepen critical-technology screening and outbound-investment review where security is implicated, while opening alternative production and market routes. Partnerships should be named and task-based. With India, target a comprehensive trade and investment push in digital infrastructure, critical minerals, and defense industrial co-development, building on the momentum created by the EU–Indonesia free trade agreement example. Within ASEAN, prioritize partners where interests align: Philippines for maritime domain awareness and coast-guard capacity; Singapore for standards, finance, and semiconductor packaging; Malaysia and Indonesia for battery materials under strong sustainability rules; and Vietnam for manufacturing scale, together with labor and compliance upgrades. Keep engagement with Cambodia and Myanmar limited given alignment and governance concerns. Each partnership should produce specific deliverables, for example, a maritime training facility in the Philippines and a semiconductor node connected to the EU supply chain.
South America and Mercosur
As the US is building up its military presence off the coast of Venezuela, Europe needs a strategic economic anchor in the hemisphere to ensure long-term access to a region with enormous potential in resources. Thus, the EU should finalize a balanced EU–Mercosur agreement that protects sensitive European sectors while securing durable access to food, energy, and critical inputs. Pair market access with enforceable environmental and labor clauses, create green-supply corridors for sustainable agriculture and biofuels, and open joint financing for infrastructure that connects South American producers to European ports. Use the deal to reduce exposure to coercive chokepoints, attract Latin American partners into standards-setting, and diversify away from single-supplier risk.
No Easy Way Forward: Divisions in the EU
However, significant obstacles remain, notably internal EU divisions over foreign-policy priorities and institutional resistance to deeper integration. A Realpolitik turn could reduce tensions, particularly with Central and Eastern European states such as Hungary, whose objections often target values framing rather than practical alignment. A pragmatic, strategically realist Europe, less ideological and more focused on mutual interests, could also ease leadership frictions, especially in times where criticism of European leadership has sharpened from national leaders like Macron and Merz, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen facing pressure over the perceived outcome of trade talks with Trump. Unity, minilateral speed, and deliverables that compound into leverage are the practical grammar of the language of power. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell captures the imperative: “Europe must learn to speak the language of power.” Europe’s renewed embrace of Realpolitik is no longer desirable; it is essential for the continent’s geopolitical future.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Wiki; Image Edited with Canva.