Precision and Peril: The Strategy and Consequences of Targeted Killings
When a U.S. drone strike killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020, it propelled the practice of targeted killings into the global spotlight. Praised by some as a necessary blow against a dangerous adversary, the operation also ignited debate over its legality, morality, and ethical ramifications. In contemporary conflicts, targeted killing has become a core counterterrorism strategy. When executed with precision and governed by transparency, accountability, and adherence to international law, targeted strikes can neutralize imminent threats with minimal damage while maintaining the legitimacy of the states that use them. This analysis considers their strategic value and technological precision, examines the legal and moral controversies they provoke, and evaluates the potential unintended consequences. With robust frameworks in place, the benefits of targeted killings can outweigh their costs, ensuring a balance between security, legality, and legitimacy.
The Strategic Value
In the post-9/11 era, the United States and its allies adopted targeted strikes as a centerpiece of counterterrorism, using drones and special forces to engage leaders of groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Israel, for its part, has a long history of “decapitation” strikes against hostile militants, regularly eliminating key leaders of organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah to preempt attacks on its citizens. Proponents argue that these focused operations offer distinct tactical and strategic advantages: they can decapitate terrorist networks by removing their brain trust and disrupt planning and communications—and do so with far less bloodshed and escalation than full-scale warfare. Therefore, targeted killings are often framed as a high-precision alternative to protracted military campaigns, aligning with the modern warfare tendencies to minimize collateral damage, avoid large-scale troop deployments, and swiftly degrade enemy capabilities.
Empirical evidence from recent conflicts underscores the effectiveness of leadership targeting. U.S. special forces’ 2011 elimination of Osama bin Laden 2011 dealt al-Qaeda an enduring blow. In the years after bin Laden’s death, no figure of his stature emerged to unify the fractured jihadist movement, leaving al-Qaeda’s remnants struggling with internal discord. Declassified documents and expert analyses indicate that bin Laden’s absence led to leadership struggles and weakened coordination among al-Qaeda’s global affiliates. More recently, the U.S. drone strike that killed Ayman al-Zawahiri (bin Laden’s successor) in Kabul in 2022 removed yet another figurehead from the group, further illustrating how strikes can erode a terrorist organization’s cohesion.
Other high-profile missions similarly highlight the strategic value of targeted strikes. The U.S. drone strike on General Soleimani —while controversial— instantly eliminated the architect of Iran’s regional proxy strategy and presented a challenge to Iran’s Quds Force operations. The killing of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, and more recently of Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019, similarly removed individuals whose personal leadership drove regional insurgencies and terror campaigns. The decapitation of an organization’s leadership can also deter would-be successors or allies, who must consider the reach of state intelligence and force. Scholars such as Daniel Byman emphasize that targeted killings can gradually erode a terrorist group’s leadership and weaken its operational capacity. However, the degree of success often depends on the specific context. These cases illustrate why many military and intelligence officials consider targeted killing not only a legitimate act of self-defense but a strategically essential one for neutralizing high-level threats that might otherwise be elusive or extremely costly to eliminate.
The Precision and Technological Advancements
The increased reliance on targeted killings has been facilitated, in large part, by technological advancements that make these operations more precise and feasible than ever before. Modern militaries now possess various tools (from high-end drones to artificial intelligence) that significantly enhance their ability to identify, track, and strike individual targets with minimal collateral damage.
However, that technology is a double-edged sword. Tools that enable unprecedented precision also allow for a high tempo of strikes, which can lead to civilian harm. In the ongoing Gaza conflict, Israel’s algorithm-assisted targeting significantly accelerated the pace of strikes, prompting concerns that it contributed to higher civilian casualties. Thus, while technology can reduce collateral damage in each strike, it still requires human judgment and ethical constraints to ensure that increased capacity for violence does not translate into indiscriminate or dehumanized warfare, namely with the human in the loop. Advanced surveillance and weaponry have made targeted killing more effective and precise than ever, reinforcing the argument that targeted strikes can be an alternative to bombing or large ground offensives under the proper oversight. Failing to impose restraint risks blurring the line between a lawful precision strike and an unlawful assassination.
The Legal and Ethical Controversies
Despite their strategic appeal, targeted killings reside in a thorny legal and ethical gray zone. At the heart of the controversy is a fundamental question: Are targeted killings a legitimate act of war or an illegal form of extrajudicial execution?
The case of Anwar al-Awlaki starkly illustrates the legal dilemma. A CIA drone strike killed Awlaki, a U.S.-born cleric and citizen who had never been indicted in court. Critics argue that killing Awlaki without a trial violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process since the decision to target him concentrated the roles of judge, jury, and executioner in a single branch of government. Typically, the Constitution’s protections do not simply vanish when a citizen is overseas. The lack of transparency about the intelligence that put Awlaki on the “kill list” only heightened these concerns.
Officials defending the Awlaki strike (and others like it), however, argue that wartime realities justified the action. Awlaki had aligned himself with an enemy force (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and was operationally involved in planning plots— he had become an enemy combatant. Under these conditions, supporters contend that the President acted within his authority to protect the nation from an imminent threat, consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress following the 9/11 attacks. They further argue that due process in such cases is satisfied not by judicial procedures but by thorough internal executive branch vetting of the target’s threat level. Still, even many who accept this rationale acknowledge the troubling precedent of intentionally killing a citizen without judicial involvement, and have called for clearer legal frameworks.
A major legal controversy involves state sovereignty and the use of force abroad. Targeted killings often occur outside declared war zones and without host nation consent, raising international law issues that prohibit force on another country’s territory unless in self-defense or with U.N. approval. The U.S. strike on General Soleimani, on Iraqi soil without Iraq’s approval, exemplifies this dilemma. Iraqi officials condemned the strike as a breach of sovereignty, and the parliament voted to expel U.S. forces, citing the violation of the U.S.–Iraq security agreement.
International legal experts debate whether an extraterritorial targeted killing is lawful self-defense or an “extrajudicial execution.” Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a country can use force in self-defense if an armed attack is underway or imminent. The U.S. and Israel often invoke this principle to justify targeted strikes on terrorists plotting attacks, even in foreign havens, effectively framing them as preemptive strikes against imminent threats rather than assassinations.
Israel’s official policy is that it is at war with groups like Hamas, their leaders are combatants and legitimate targets wherever found— a stance the Israeli Supreme Court affirmed in a 2006 landmark ruling, with caveats that each strike must meet strict criteria of military necessity and proportionality. The United States similarly argues that it remains in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces worldwide, thus allowing it to target members of those groups under the laws of war.
Because these operations rely on sensitive intelligence and are often conducted by covert agencies or the military in distant theaters, details are rarely disclosed publicly. Governments typically classify the strike footage, the intelligence that justified the killing, and even the legal memoranda underpinning the decision. This opacity makes independent oversight extremely difficult, leading to an accountability gap that troubles human rights advocates and many legislators.
The Consequences and Strategic Risks
Even when a targeted killing is successful in military terms – the target is eliminated with minimal immediate collateral damage – it can produce unintended consequences that complicate its strategic value. These operations do not occur in a vacuum; they impact enemy organizations, local populations, and geopolitical dynamics in ways that must be carefully considered and assessed. A clear-eyed assessment of targeted killings must therefore weigh not just the tactical victory of a strike, but also the potential for strategic blowback.
One of the most immediate risks is the potential for retaliation. Removing a high-profile leader can yield a violent response from the group or its allies, potentially sparking a broader conflict. After Soleimani’s killing, Iran unleashed a barrage of ballistic missiles at U.S. bases in Iraq – mercifully causing no deaths, but marking a sharp escalation in U.S.–Iran hostilities. As one security analysis succinctly noted, the targeted killing of a leader often leads to a “cycle of violence” – a retaliatory chain that can negate the security gains of the initial strike. States must anticipate this risk; sometimes they judge that the long-term benefit of removing the leader outweighs the short-term surge in violence, but that calculation can be debatable. Thus, decision-makers must weigh whether a strike will neutralize a threat or simply agitate the hornet’s nest – and if the latter, whether they are prepared to handle the fallout.
Beyond direct retaliation, escalation of conflict is a broader concern. If one side begins decapitating the other’s leadership, the adversary may intensify its tactics in desperation or anger. As a result, a targeted killing can elevate a martyr and create a surge of popularity with recruits. This dynamic was seen in Pakistan and Yemen, where U.S. drone campaigns, despite eliminating numerous al-Qaeda figures, also fueled anti-American sentiment among local communities. The net effect is that targeted killings, if not paired with a hearts-and-minds strategy, can undermine broader counterterrorism goals by alienating the very communities whose cooperation is needed to root out extremism.
Another consequence can be the creation of power vacuums and destabilizing succession struggles. Killing a leader does not erase the organization; it can set off a dangerous scramble as either the next tier of leadership vies for power or, in some cases, even more radical splinter groups emerge. Removing a relatively pragmatic or restraining leader might clear the way for a more extremist figure to take charge. For example, some analysts argue that decapitating certain insurgent leadership in Iraq in the 2000s led to more hardline elements rising. Instability at the top can also lead an organization to carry out spectacular attacks to prove it’s still relevant – a phenomenon that counterterrorism scholars have documented in various groups following the death or capture of a charismatic leader. Thus, while leadership decapitation is a strategy to weaken adversaries, it can sometimes trigger short-term chaos that increases violence.
All these risks and second-order effects do not mean targeted killings are strategically futile; instead, they highlight that such killings are not a silver bullet. Targeted strikes should be considered as one tool in a broader strategy, rather than a standalone solution. Used in isolation or without a comprehensive approach to manage their aftermath, they can even worsen the threats they aim to neutralize. However, when embedded into a comprehensive strategy (one that includes diplomatic efforts, efforts to address underlying grievances, and clear communication of red lines), targeted killings can contribute to degrading dangerous groups while containing the fallout. The key from a policy perspective is prudence and planning. Before pulling the trigger on a high-profile kill, leaders must ask “And then what?” and have an answer.
The Upholding of Principle in the Precision Strike Era
To ensure targeted killings remain a viable and principled instrument, the international community and individual states must take proactive steps to institutionalize accountability. First and foremost, clear guidelines must be established to govern when and how targeted strikes are authorized. They should require high-level scrutiny of intelligence (to minimize errors) and interagency or even judicial review where appropriate. The United States, after years of criticism over drone secrecy, has updated its policies to impose more discipline on strikes. In 2022, President Biden issued new directives mandating “the highest standards of precision and rigor” for any lethal action outside active war zones and requiring presidential approval of targets in those cases.
Secondly, there must be transparency and oversight mechanisms to the greatest extent possible. While some operational details must remain classified, governments can still provide post hoc accountability. Independent panels or legislative committees (with clearance to review classified operations) should audit targeted killing decisions to ensure compliance with law and policy. An idea worth exploring is the creation of a global oversight body or a special rapporteur system that monitors targeted strikes worldwide and reports on patterns and concerns.
Crucially, states employing targeted killings should also be honest in acknowledging mistakes. This accountability not only serves justice but also strengthens the strategic case for targeted killings by showing that democracies hold themselves responsible, undermining enemy propaganda that portrays these strikes as indiscriminate.
Finally, an appeal must be made to leadership and values. The responsible use of targeted killing requires a constant balance of effectiveness with restraint. Political and military leaders must resist the allure of viewing every problem as a nail just because they have a hammer-drone. Each strike should be weighed against alternatives, considering its long-term implications. This culture of caution must be ingrained from the top down. It is encouraging that, in some cases, leaders have shown restraint – for example, reportedly aborting strikes when a target was with family or when intelligence was doubtful – but such stories are rarely made public.
In conclusion, targeted killings will likely remain a fixture of modern conflict, given the individuals and networks that continue to threaten states around the world. Rather than banishing this tool, policymakers must improve it with oversight by developing a robust framework that governs targeted killings and is applicable internationally.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Canva Images