Tip of the Spear: Analyzing Ukrainian Intelligence Operations Behind Russian Lines

Over the past two years, the gaze of the world has largely fixated on the stalemated nature of fighting on the ground in eastern and southern Ukraine. As successes and failures are now measured in meters and tree lines seized rather than in towns or cities, a parallel and underappreciated war rages between Russia and Ukraine – one with more striking results when operations become public. Since Russian forces first swept across the Ukrainian border on February 24, 2022, Ukraine’s intelligence services (the SBU and GUR) have feverishly worked to thwart their Russian counterparts in Ukraine and inflict damage far beyond the front lines. From deep within Russian-occupied territory in the Donbas and the Crimean Peninsula to Moscow suburbs and far eastern rail lines, Ukrainian operatives and their assets have conducted multiple operations seeking to bring the effects of the war to Russia itself. Utilizing drone strikes, sabotage, and assassinations against a litany of targets, Ukraine’s intelligence operatives strike fear behind the front lines and divert or destroy resources that would otherwise be used against Ukraine. As the frontlines further solidify, Western aid wobbles, and large-scale military breakthroughs remain elusive, Kyiv will almost certainly seek to increase the scope and frequency of these missions as an alternative source for victories against its enemies.

Ukraine has conducted numerous operations since the war’s onset, utilizing small squads of special forces and intelligence assets to achieve goals well beyond the Russian front lines where fighting is fiercest. The operations and their objectives reflect diverse target sets identified by the Ukrainian military and intelligence leadership. Over nearly two years of conflict, confirmed and purported Ukrainian targets have included high-level Russian headquarters and bases of operations, collaborators and Russian-appointed officials in Russian-controlled territory, propagandists, logistics and transportation sites, and even the Kremlin itself. This rich selection of targets demonstrates that Kyiv places importance on aspects contributing directly to the war effort, such as the Russian military, economic sites, and involved personnel – as well as those who propagate state-driven narratives about the war; all, in Kyiv’s eyes, are legitimate wartime targets. The former exploits several Russian logistical chokepoints and vulnerabilities, while the latter seeks to prove that enemies of Ukraine well beyond the frontlines are not safe.

The manner through which Ukraine executes its intelligence missions is, understandably, opaque. Very rarely has intelligence leadership disclosed the methods used to carry out strikes, with notable exceptions being the high-profile October 2022 and July 2023 explosions at the Kerch Bridge connecting Russia with the occupied Crimean peninsula. The blasts destroyed key sections of the bridge that facilitated railway transport of military equipment. Since the bridge was a key transit point for Russian forces into the south of Ukraine, Russian logistics continue to be hampered as work continues for the bridge to return to a fully operational status.

In other instances, Russian authorities “identified” probable suspects, though the veracity of these claims must be taken with the usual grain of salt. The political pressure on Russian law enforcement to track down and detain perpetrators of attacks on Russian soil is tremendous. As such, the possibility of a convenient scapegoat being offered up as the culprit cannot be disregarded. In other instances, Russian authorities appear to sincerely track down perpetrators, largely thanks to the extensive surveillance networks in Russia’s cities. When an explosion tore through a Moscow cafe on April 2, 2023, killing Russian war blogger and former militiaman Maxim Fomin (more commonly known as Vladlen Tatarsky), Russian police swiftly arrested Darya Trepova, a woman who had handed Tatarsky an explosive-laced statue that killed him. Trepova was a Russian anti-war activist and was evidently recruited by Ukrainian intelligence to carry out the hit on Tatarsky.

Other operations, conducted in Russian-controlled portions of Ukraine or elsewhere, are conducted by SBU or HUR operatives themselves, and at times in tandem with local partisan groups, which sprung up when Russia swept through southern and eastern Ukraine in February 2022. Leveraging both operatives and resistance groups in Russian-occupied territory is a vital connection that allows Ukraine’s intelligence agencies to not only collect information on Russian operations behind enemy lines but also to strike key targets when the opportunity arises. Since February 2022, both Russian-appointed occupation authorities and Ukrainian nationals who have collaborated with their occupiers have been assassinated throughout Ukraine and in Russia itself. Puppet government officials and proxies have been killed in car bombings, hit-and-run shootings [disclaimer: the image displayed in this linked article contains potentially disturbing imagery]in Moscow parks, and home invasions. Eliminating individuals who help cement Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory continues to shatter the veneer of Russia’s information campaigns claiming that the residents of occupied territories are delighted to have been “liberated” and that quality of life has inherently improved under Russian control.

Simultaneously, it perpetuates fear among Russia’s political and security apparatuses that SBU and HUR assets and recruits, Ukrainian or Russian, are embedded throughout Russia and could strike at any time, anywhere. This anxiety is relatively substantiated when one takes into account that known Ukrainian intelligence operations have taken place across an incredible swathe of territory, from the streets of Russian-controlled Donetsk city and drilling rigs off the Crimean Peninsula, to Krasnodar, Moscow, and even Siberia. This does not even begin to cover the unconfirmed reports of Ukrainian intelligence and special service operations, which according to media reporting, have involved drone strikes and a ground operation against Wagner forces in Sudan, or the mysterious Nord Stream 2 blasts (albeit the topic of intense disagreement and debate). Ukraine has no need to confirm its involvement in all its operations. While clear responsibility can benefit Ukraine at times, ambiguity, confusion, and misattribution can be equally powerful as it forces Russia to allocate time, money, and resources to efforts further and further away from the front lines.

As fighting along the nearly 600-mile frontline in Ukraine largely freezes in place, with casualties mounting, military and financial aid from Washington and Brussels in precarious conditions, and with Putin as determined as ever to see out the conflict, the onus will increasingly be on Ukraine’s intelligence services to deliver rare victories for Kyiv. Without a significant rekindling of Western political backing for Ukraine, Kyiv will need to become increasingly creative in the methods it employs to not only continue damaging Russia’s war effort but to continue signaling to its Western backers that victory is still attainable. Waging a war in the shadows is never as visible and publicly facing as a large-scale kinetic conflict, but as the war enters its third year, with no end in sight, Ukraine’s intelligence operatives will be more important than ever. With the help of Western intelligence counterparts, Ukrainian resistance fighters and partisan groups, as well as disgruntled Russian recruits in the government or the civilian populace, the SBU and HUR can reach targets in Russian-occupied territory and Russia itself further than any missile or artillery shell. From a strategic standpoint, Ukraine may need to begin relying on intelligence assets to launch strikes of their own to hamper Russia’s ability to manufacture military equipment or deter commanding troops or individuals propagating wartime narratives through violence. Doing so would provide Kyiv with important points and morale boosters needed to persuade Western allies to bolster support amid a drought in munitions, drones, and systems Ukraine desperately needs to attrite their Russian enemies. Ukraine’s ability to effectively operate in the shadows is a crucial front in this war, one not defined by trench lines or state borders, and will only grow in importance to Kyiv’s victory.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons