Borderlands on Fire: The Geopolitical Implications of Myanmar’s Civil War

February 2024 marked the third anniversary of Myanmar’s military coup, which threw the country’s nascent democracy into chaos and set off a geopolitical chain reaction across the region. Millions of refugees have poured out of Myanmar into surrounding countries, and nearly 2 million people remain internally displaced. It has also isolated the country from the West amidst ongoing embargoes, largely relegating Myanmar to diplomatic and military relations with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As of late May, rebel forces have continued to chip away at junta control, with fighting pushing thousands of refugees into Thailand.

Amidst this instability, Beijing seeks to impose order within its southern neighbor. In early March, the PRC brokered a deal between the military junta and Myanmar’s Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA, a rebel group comprised of factions from across the country) to ensure that its border crossings remain unharmed. Fighting had approached the Chinese border as the 3BHA captured towns in northern Myanmar. China brokered a similar deal in January in an attempt to reduce risk to its citizens near the Myanmar border. As the fighting drags on, what does the PRC hope to gain in Myanmar, and what implications does the conflict carry for U.S. Indo-Pacific policy?

What are the PRC’s Interests in Myanmar?

Why has the PRC involved itself in Myanmar’s conflict? For one, Myanmar lies on China’s southern border, connected to Yunnan Province – a key agricultural region and a popular tourist destination. The PRC hopes to link Myanmar with its broader regional aspirations via the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Myanmar offers China a solution to its ongoing dilemma of energy security. If China succeeds in building pipelines and transport routes through its southern neighbor, it no longer needs to rely on the geographically vulnerable Strait of Malacca – which the United States could blockade in a conflict – as a transport route for oil and gas. Thus, Myanmar offers not only the PRC access to the Bay of Bengal but also a greater foothold in South and Southeast Asia.

Myanmar also lies at the nexus of regional security trends that implicate Beijing simply due to proximity. The Myanmar-Thai-Laos border region – known as the “Golden Triangle” – presents an ongoing regional security threat as an epicenter of opium production and smuggling. Meanwhile, cross-border crime – specifically scamming, often carried out by Chinese nationals harbored in compounds near the border – has become an ongoing concern for Beijing. Criminal families, such as those involved in the scamming operations, have close links with Myanmar’s junta, which relies on the families to impose local order. 

In one initiative, Operation 1027, Chinese security forces recently cracked down on Myanmar-based scamming operations after the junta failed to eliminate these criminal enterprises. Recent reports reveal that Operation 1027 weakened the junta’s control, allowing rebels to reclaim territory near both the Chinese and Thai borders and the India-Bangladesh borders. Operation 1027 highlights the delicate balancing act that the PRC must play in Myanmar. Some analysts believe that, while carrying on a diplomatic relationship with the ruling junta, Beijing has still backed the 3BHA. And yet, in spite of China’s dealings with the junta and with subversive elements within Myanmar, the junta’s actions (or rather inaction) carry repercussions for its internal security.

What are the Broader Implications of the Conflict?

Myanmar lies at a strategic crossroads between the PRC in the north, Bangladesh to the West, and India, implicating all three states in its crises. For instance, Bangladesh is already contending with an inflow of Rohingya refugees, which has allowed China to act as a regional security guarantor. Bangladesh has indeed requested China’s assistance to repatriate the thousands of Rohingya refugees that have crossed the border. This request for help has provided the PRC with another opportunity to expand its influence within this key Indo-Pacific state, which has increasingly become a key nexus of great power competition. Not only is Bangladesh a Belt and Road affiliate which has received over four billion dollars worth of BRI investments, but it is also a key diplomatic partner of the United States. Amidst its “pivot” towards strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, the United States must then consider its relationship not only with the PRC but with surrounding states. As the case of Bangladesh shows, the U.S. must carefully consider the geostrategic implications of Myanmar’s ongoing civil war.  

Because Myanmar comprises a critical, and yet often-overlooked, piece of the Indo-Pacific puzzle, the U.S. strategy of isolating Myanmar diplomatically may be missing an opportunity to improve its regional standing. The U.S. should consider Myanmar’s crisis within the larger regional framework and seize the chance to further cultivate regional partnerships. For example, the U.S. should work with Bangladesh to address the ongoing Rohingya refugee crisis. Fortunately, the U.S. has already made strides in this area, contributing over $2 billion towards Rohingya relief efforts (almost $1.9 billion of which has gone to Bangladesh). As Bangladesh draws closer to the PRC – as demonstrated by the country’s recent purchase of Chinese nuclear submarines and construction of a PRC-backed naval dock – the U.S. must maintain its partnership with this critical Indo-Pacific state.

Additionally, the United States could work to address the humanitarian crisis within Myanmar itself to demonstrate to regional partners its presence and ability to respond to non-kinetic crises. This would give the United States the opportunity to use frameworks like B3W and the Blue Dot Network – long touted as alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative – to fund solutions to regional humanitarian crises and assert its soft-power presence in the region. These initiatives remain largely underdeveloped, with China standing out as the region’s primary benefactor amidst its attractive loan terms and established presence at the forefront of international development. By establishing itself as a regional economic presence and diplomatic partner, the United States can offer alternatives to Chinese investment. It can also boost political and economic alternatives to its military presence, which can become a double-edged sword for U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific and its relations with China. 

Amidst increasing calls for the adoption of irregular warfare – economic and political means in addition to military tools – in the Indo-Pacific, the United States should conceive its efforts towards Myanmar as an element of a strategic toolkit. The “pivot to the Indo-Pacific” should address not only the PRC but also the countries that surround it. Myanmar’s crisis will not resolve itself any time soon. The longer the United States lets China fill the regional security void created by the conflict in Myanmar, the more opportunities it wastes to demonstrate its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons