The Arctic Trilemma: Why The United States Must Compete for the Transpolar Sea Route

Maritime trade channels essential for America’s globalized economy lie in the crossfire of security threats. Examples abound: in the Middle East, Iran has seized ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz and has employed Houthi rebels as proxies in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to target commercial vessels and disrupt trade. The Suez Canal is threatened by the spillover of regional instability with the Israel-Hamas war, while the Strait of Malacca is dominated and increasingly militarized by Beijing. The common denominator is clear: global trade routes are under siege and the United States must look for feasible alternatives. 

 The United States may turn its attention to the North for alternative trade routes: The Northern Sea Route (NSR) and Northwest Passage (NWP). These trade routes are gaining strategic relevance with the ever faster recession of the Arctic ice shield. The United States is an Arctic power; its direct access to the region and national security objectives in the Arctic give the United States a say in the region’s future. However, when it comes to the NSR and NWP, passages used and administered by Russia and Canada, the U.S. is dependent on international cooperation and can only access the existing Arctic trade routes through international partnerships. While these routes are already faster than the Suez or Panama Canal, ice melt from global warming will open an even more efficient Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) by mid-century. This presents a unique geostrategic opportunity, for which many nations will compete. The United States must enter this competition and seek to capitalize on the economic potential of trans-polar trade. Russia already has a formidable military presence in the region and has a major economic and strategic interest in the TSR. Moscow continues to push military capabilities closer to the North Pole, laying claim to the TSR before it opens up ice-free for international use in the next few decades. 

The threat of Russia cutting off the United States from the TSR is an economic, strategic, and security challenge that has received too little attention in Washington, DC. If the United States does not stifle encroaching Russian influence in the region now, it might lose its freedom of commercial navigation in the TSR when it opens up in the 2040s – the current best estimate, based on the trajectory of ice melting.  

The United States can shape its engagement in the region in several ways, however each strategy will have trade-offs. Broadly speaking, the U.S. may have three objectives in the region: (1) the avoidance of conflict with, and, where possible, cooperation with Russia, (2) economic dominance of the TSR, and (3) greater military presence near the TSR. Between three possible outcomes and combinations thereof, only  two are ever attainable, with the third always becoming a casualty. The U.S. thus faces an Arctic Trilemma. ..

What is the way forward? I argue that the United States must embrace Great Power Competition and contain Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic by pursuing (2) economic dominance of and (3) military presence in the TSR. The United States must secure dominance of the TSR through military command of the sea, and restructure military plans on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to contest Russian hegemony in the Arctic.

The Current Geoeconomic Situation in the Arctic 

Trade in the region is economically existential for Russia. Currently, 30% of Russia’s GDP can be traced back to the Arctic, and thus, Russia has a vested interest in securing and developing its commercial assets in the region. However, it has not always been this way. For centuries, Indigenous settlers, European explorers, and nation-states have used two conventional Arctic routes for military, economic, and tourist activities: the NSR, which hugs the northern coast of Russia, and the NWP, which rides the North American border and weaves into the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The NSR was first used by the Soviet Union to extract resources and move military equipment from one side of the nation to the other. The fall of the Soviet Union initially diminished Russian presence in the Arctic, however Putin’s rise precipitated  renewed interest in the NSR. Trade volumes increased by 755% between 2014 and 2022, and Russia plans to further increase trade volumes tenfold by 2035. As Russia’s trade security diminishes in the Black Sea due to its war in Ukraine, the Arctic is becoming an increasingly attractive substitute. Furthermore, a ship traveling between Europe and East Asia takes roughly 30 days to complete the journey via the Suez Canal but this journey can be reduced to 18 days via the NSR. 

Canada is another, yet (much) friendlier geopolitical actor in the region with control over the NWP, which runs opposite to Russia’s NSR. Dangerous ice coverage on the NWP made passage impossible until the latter 20th century. Due to global  ice melting, induced by accelerating global warming, the summer of 2007 marked the first time the NWP could be fully utilized without the concern of icebergs  imperiling ships. While Canada grants access to the United States and its partners, it claims that the NWP lies in its territorial waters, as Russia does with the NSR. However, the United States has contested this claim since the 1980s: it posits that under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the NWP is an international strait as the nexus between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. While the United States presents the same argument against Russia’s NSR, cordial relations with Canada mean that the U.S. need not contest Canada’s claims nearly as fiercely as the Russian ones. However, if the U.S. presses Canada too hard and continues to levy demands against its Northern neighbor, the relationship between the two states may take a toll. Souring cooperation with a continental ally would cost the United States the benefits of shorter commercial trips—shaving up to 2,500 nautical miles off total travel time. The opening of the TSR will simply offer a more economically viable trade route.

The Opening of the Transpolar Sea Route

The Arctic is warmer than has been at any point over the past 2,000 years. This region is particularly vulnerable to climate change, heating nearly four times faster than the rest of the Earth since 1979. As a result, from 1979 to 2010, Arctic ice coverage has fallen by 40%, while the thickness of the ice has fallen by 70%. Disproportionate and intense warming is changing the geographical structure of the Arctic.

By 2040, this change will open a third maritime trade route called the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR). The route runs from the North Pacific Ocean to the North Atlantic Ocean, cutting through the North Pole. The TSR is different from the NSR and NWP because the bulk of the TSR is not covered by  exclusive economic zones or sovereign territorial waters. Furthermore, the TSR is undeniably faster. A ship that uses the TSR can travel through the Arctic one to five days faster than if it used the NSR, while a ship that normally relies on the Suez Canal could save up to 41% of its distance. Shorter travel times means a ship can make more commercial trips, use less fuel, and incur lower operating costs, thereby generating increased revenue. The TSR is the optimal trade route in the Arctic.

While the TSR is not open yet, as the Arctic continues to warm, the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) could be navigable by ice-breaking cargo ships as early as 2030. By 2045, moderate global warming models predict low enough ice levels in the CAO for standard cargo ships to conduct commercial activity during summer. The question is not if the CAO, and by extension the TSR, will open, but rather, how soon? Given the economic benefits of the TSR, the United States must take steps now to secure access for its ships before its adversaries.

The Threat Landscape

While the TSR may not fully open for another 20 years, Russia has already taken steps to cement its influence in the region. In July 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the Russian military will defend its claims to the Arctic “by all means” necessary. Putin has backed his rhetoric with substantive commitment to the area: Russia has about 33% more military bases in the Arctic Circle than NATO does. While this may be unsurprising because 53% of the Arctic coastline is under Russian control, that does not mean that the United States and NATO partners should accept a position of regional inferiority. 

Russia has more icebreakers – valuable military assets that help clear icy paths for commercial and military ships – than NATO. The U.S. only accounts for two icebreakers in NATO’s undersized fleet, lagging far behind its adversary. Icebreakers will be essential in making  use of the TSR as early as the 2030s. This may seem relatively far away. But the race begins now. Icebreakers need to be constructed. Military bases need to be built. Transit infrastructure needs to be set up. All of this takes time, and for the U.S. to be ready when the Arctic becomes accessible, it must lay the groundwork now. 

Given Russia’s military bases and icebreakers, scholars believe that the West trails 10 years behind Russia militarily in the region.  Russia has established a foothold near the CAO that will give it oversight, control and area-denial capabilities over the TSR. The U.S. must contest the aspiring Russian hegemony in order to better position the United States toward active use of the TSR.

 The potential for Sino-Russian collaboration in the region is concerning. In 2018, China claimed to be a “near-Arctic state,” signaling that it seeks to shape the political and economic future of the region. Beijing’s goal for a Polar Silk Road that connects Russia to the Belt and Road trade initiative has led to billions of dollars in foreign direct investment. Even more concerning is the aggressive rhetoric with which the Chinese military frames its regional aspirations. Beijing emphasizes that the Arctic represents a “scramble for new strategic spaces,” and thus, China “cannot rule out the possibility of using force.” This is particularly relevant to the TSR: in the summer of 2020, the Chinese icebreaker MV Xue Long 2 voyaged the TSR for the first time. It would be a mistake to think that Russia is the only adversary to U.S. economic interests in the TSR.

The Arctic Trilemma: The United States’ Way Forward 

Given the regional and strategic complexities outlined above, what should the U.S. policy be, and why? To recall, the Arctic trilemma has three legs: access to the TSR, a greater U.S. military presence in the region, and stability and cooperation vis-a-vis Russia. One may consider each side of the trilemma. First, if the U.S. wants free economic access to the TSR but wants to avoid a hostile economic environment by cooperating with Russian interests , it must sacrifice establishing a greater military presence in the region. Russia will not unconditionally cooperate and promote an uncontested peace if the U.S. military challenges their positions in the region. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine provides telling evidence: the authoritarian has asserted that he can and will respond forcefully to perceived U.S.and NATO threats to Russian sovereignty. As a result, the U.S. would have to concede to Russian oversight to ensure cooperation and economic access, a position which Washington should – and would – never accept. 

Alternatively, the U.S. can have primary access to the TSR  and advance military objectives in the region , but sacrifice cooperation with Russia and prompt Great Power Competition in the Arctic. The Russians already have an entrenched military presence in the Arctic and can leverage its assets to dominate the TSR if they are uncontested. Thus, the United States must cultivate a formidable military force in the region to ensure that U.S.companies can utilize the TSR to their maximum economic advantage. Open sea lanes would have to be secured through U.S. and Allied sea control. The competition to be the economic hegemon of the TSR makes any opportunity for joint efforts toward mutual prosperity unlikely and military steadfastness a necessity.

Lastly, the U.S. can maintain peace and project a strong military footprint  but suffer from suboptimal access to the TSR. The political climate of the Arctic would resemble a Cold War-esque gridlock due to military build-up by both nations and potentially others who wish to enter the mix. The militarization of the Arctic would sacrifice the greater economic gains both sides could have achieved through a demilitarized strait..

Within this trilemma, the U.S. must secure access to the TSR and establish a strong military presence in the Arctic, embracing great power competition. Given Putin’s militarism and completely shattered relations with the West post-February 2022, Washington should not  pursue cooperation. To secure U.S.economic interests in the TSR in the 2040s is to ensure no adversary will threaten U.S. ships. Naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that securing access to the high seas for trade and commerce is crucial for a nation. Sea lines like the TSR are the economic arteries of Great Powers. They sustain economic life. And they are too important to be left under adversarial control. The U.S. must command the Arctic sea, like it has commanded the Pacific and other oceans for the better part of half a century. 

Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Restructuring

To achieve its foreign policy objectives in and around the TSR, the United States must restructure its approach on the strategic, operational, and tactical level. To frame this section, I will define the strategic level of military planning in the region as how the United States employs its differentiated instruments of power to achieve its objectives in the Arctic. Furthermore, the tactical level deals with the precise arrangement of military forces in the Arctic, while the operational level of military planning is the impetus, holding these asset placements to the standard of the Arctic strategy. 

At the strategic level, the United States must construct new air and naval bases, modernize existing ones, or leverage relationships with partners for joint-access in order to close the base race with Russia. Access to the region will be important for air and naval policing missions from a vantage point near the North Pole. In June 2022, the United States was granted unrestrained access to Evenes Air Station and Ramsund Naval Base in Norway, while in February 2024, the United States gained access to eight Norwegian military facilities including Andøya and Bardufoss Air Stations. The United States should continue working with its Norwegian and British allies to develop Evenes, Andøya, and Bardufoss as P-8 surveillance aircraft bases and F-35 hubs for surveillance runs in the Arctic. P-8s are maritime patrol aircraft that can engage in anti-submarine/anti-surface warfare and simultaneously collect intelligence, while F-35s are stealth fighter aircraft that can fly up to supersonic speeds. These two military assets are technological powerhouses that will bolster U.S. military presence in the region if they can be stationed there permanently. The U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet should also move to be co-located at Ramsund Naval Base, which is used as a major logistics hub for NATO ships and can serve as headquarters for U.S. naval operations in the Arctic. To oversee the other side of the Greenland-Svalbard-Norway (GSN) gap in the TSR, the United States should seek a defense agreement granting the U.S. Air Force permission to utilize the air base in Alert, Canada. 

At the operational level, the United States should consolidate military leadership of the Arctic under one Combatant Command: U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). While base expansion and development provides an overall framework for the military in the region, directing the instruments of power at play relies on operational leadership. USEUCOM should assume the military management role of the Arctic by being in charge of coordinating tactical forces to meet the strategic goals. The current problem is that the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), U.S. European Command, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) have joint responsibilities in the region, and thus, must coordinate force movements. This partitioning of the operational theater makes synchronization difficult and relatively slow. By bringing the Arctic under USEUCOM, which Iceland, Norway, Russia, and half of Greenland are already a part of, the United States can make the region a greater operational priority. This also involves shifting the jurisdiction of Alaska and Canada’s northern islands to USEUCOM. USEUCOM would then monitor the bases developed under the new Arctic strategy, while coordinating force movements between these bases, connecting the tactical and strategic levels of this redesign of Arctic military plans.

On the tactical level, once authority is granted to USEUCOM to carry out a base development strategy, the Secretary of Defense should reassign two Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) from USNORTHCOM to USEUCOM: the USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3), which is currently located in Norfolk, Virginia, and the USS Miguel Keith (ESB 5) in San Diego. ESBs are mobile landing platforms that can serve as forward floating bases of maritime security. ESBs 3 and 5 should be relocated and permanently stationed in the Greenland-Svalbard-Norway (GSN) gap, with each one on either side of Svalbard Island. While there are recent talks of Greenland seceding from Denmark, Greenland premier Kim Kielson asserts that the United States-Greenland relationship is “constructive” and experiencing “increased cooperation.” The United States. can expect Greenland to support ESBs in their waters regardless of its relationship to Denmark. These bases are not as aggressive as warships but project power through oversight of the two TSR entrances from the European side of the Arctic sea. 

Conclusions

U.S. dominance of the TSR is valuable for economic reasons because it reduces trade time and cost. Yet, in a Mahanian fashion, TSR economic gains are contingent on United States and Russian military competition in the Arctic Circle. Confronted with a trilemma, the United States must pursue two of three policy goals: economic access to the TSR and greater military presence around the route. Cooperation with Russia will only lead to feeble U.S. economic and defense posture in the region. Russia has a clear economic interest in accessing a faster trade route in the TSR and its clear military buildup of the Arctic has forced the U.S. hand to match it with its own military might. The U.S. military can do this by making changes on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels by expanding its number of Arctic bases, shifting jurisdiction of the Arctic to USEUCOM, and placing ESBs in the GSN Gap. The United States. must establish itself as a regional power in the Arctic to realize TSR’s economic potential before it opens in the 2040s.

This article is part of a special Undergraduate Edition of the Georgetown Security Studies Review. Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Canva Images