The Nuclear Kingdom: Assessing Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Behavior

Nuclear proliferation is on the brink of an unfortunate renaissance. Although Iran’s nuclear threshold status has dominated headlines, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also garnered increased attention. In 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told CBS “If Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” Alongside its interest in a civilian nuclear energy program, Mohammed bin Salman’s statement seems to set the stage for Saudi Arabia’s nuclear weapons program. 

Saudi Arabia’s inching onto the proliferation scene demands a serious assessment of its motives, likely nuclear proliferation strategy, and prospects of success. Answering these three inquiries has a purpose. The United States should exploit its knowledge of the causes, strategies, and pitfalls of a prospective Saudi Arabian nuclear weapons program to ensure it does not come to fruition. A nuclear Saudi Arabia would not just be devastating to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, it would likely worsen Saudi-Iranian tensions and complicate U.S. efforts to manage the Middle East. 

Saudi Arabia’s Motive: Iran

There are three models for why states seek nuclear weapons: security, domestic politics, and norms. The security model asserts that states pursue nuclear weapons to deter the security threat posed by a nuclear-armed adversary or a conventional military threat. In the domestic political model, internal actors encourage nuclear pursuit for budgetary gains, organizational status, or to secure support from domestic constituencies that favor nuclear weaponization. Finally, the norms model infers that states seek nuclear weapons as desirable symbols of prestige. Mohammed bin Salman’s warning suggests the obvious—Saudi Arabia’s nuclear interest is driven by the threat a nuclear-armed Iran would pose.

Iran has emerged as the chief nuclear threat to Saudi Arabia since the mid-2000s. Saudi Arabia has never considered Iran’s nuclear program as purely civilian. Riyadh always assumed that Iran’s ultimate goal was nuclear armament. In 2011, Prince Turki Al-Faysal called for the Gulf states to acquire “nuclear might” as a counterweight to Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) did not assuage Saudi fears. In the 2015 agreement, Iran pledged not to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium in exchange for sanctions relief. Saudi leaders considered the deal a betrayal because it left Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons intact and the United States negotiated the JCPOA without consulting them. Fear of Iran has grown with the progress of its nuclear program. 

Saudi Arabia has repeatedly stressed the threat a nuclear Iran would pose. At the very least, Iran’s nuclear weaponization would “upset the traditional balance between the countries of the Gulf to Iran’s favor.” Saudi Arabia worries that Iran could use its nuclear arsenal to incite Saudi Shiites—a sizable minority that primarily resides in the oil-rich eastern province—to revolt without fear of Saudi reprisal against Iran. Iran could also expand its network of proxies more aggressively or close the Straits of Hormuz to Saudi oil exports. Saudi Arabia also presents numerous targets for conventional aggression waged under Iran’s prospective nuclear umbrella. Saudi Arabia worries that “the Iranian nuclear bomb has only one objective, namely that of dominance by a new Persian Empire over Asia and the Arab and Islamic worlds.” Saudi Arabia’s fear of a nuclear-armed Iran is clear, and a recent Foreign Affairs article came to the same conclusion: the main motivation for Saudi Arabia’s nuclear behavior is Iran. 

Saudi Arabia: Nuclear Hedger

Saudi Arabia has the characteristics of a nuclear hedger: a state that lays the groundwork for the active pursuit of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has stated the conditions under which it would pursue nuclear weapons. It already possesses dual-capable delivery systems and seeks reactors to produce weapons-grade uranium. Its inability to enrich nuclear material alone prevents Saudi Arabia from gaining nuclear latency that it can rapidly convert into nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia is best categorized as an insurance hedger that seeks to reduce the time needed to build a bomb. Regardless of the categorization of Saudi Arabia’s hedging, its interest in nuclear weapons has entered a new, acute stage. 

Nuclear Strategies: Pathways To the Bomb

There are three strategies Saudi Arabia could adopt if it did seek the bomb: sheltered pursuit, sprinting, and hiding. The strategy of sheltered pursuit describes a pathway to nuclear weapons that depends on the support of a major power. In this strategy, a major power protects the nuclear aspirant from rivals’ efforts to interfere with its nuclear pursuit. In this case, Riyadh would rely on the United States to provide shelter and deter Iran. It is likely Saudi Arabia’s preferred pathway because it enables nuclear aspirants to pursue nuclear weapons more efficiently and openly. Major power patronage can prevent military, economic, and diplomatic counterproliferation actions. However, it is unlikely that the United States would support Saudi Arabia’s nuclear pursuit. The United States prefers for its allies not to have nuclear weapons so that escalation and nuclear use remain entirely within Washington’s purview. Further, Saudi Arabia would need reactors and gas centrifuges to build nuclear weapons and there has been opposition from Congress and Israel to a U.S.-Saudi nuclear energy deal. It is unlikely Congress would approve of a deal without stringent proliferation safeguards. Moreover, if the United States did grant Saudi Arabia those facilities and technologies without a prohibition on enrichment, it would set a precedent for other allies to demand similar privileges. 

The “sprinting” strategy describes an active, rapid, and open pursuit of nuclear weapons. Sprinting has historically been successful with France, India, the PRC, the USSR, and the United States all employing it. However, sprinting often requires immunity from military and economic preventive action, such as sanctions or strikes on nuclear facilities. Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to both Iranian military countermeasures and a U.S. arms embargo. It also lacks the reactors and equipment needed to sprint to the bomb.

Although there are countries that could provide Saudi Arabia with these technologies—the PRC, United States, France, Russia, and South Korea among them—a lack of uranium enrichment capabilities is currently the chief obstacle to a Saudi sprint to the bomb. U.S. allies South Korea and France are unlikely to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear reactors without a strict nonproliferation agreement. Sanctions against Russia render it an unattractive partner for Saudi Arabia. The PRC has close economic and military ties to Iran and even designed an Iranian uranium-conversion facility. However, the PRC has partnered with Saudi Arabia on uranium prospecting, brokered an effort at Saudi-Iranian rapprochement in 2023, and supplied Saudi Arabia with dual-capable ballistic missiles. Although the PRC might eventually balk at providing Saudi Arabia with nuclear reactors that can produce weapons-grade nuclear material, it covets Saudi Arabian oil and has a track record of nuclear partnership with the kingdom. Either way, Saudi Arabia considers the PRC its best bet to secure nuclear reactors if the United States declines to do so.

The strategy of ‘hiding’ differs from sprinting in that it privileges secrecy over rapidity. Saudi Arabia is a good candidate for a hiding strategy. The international community knows little about nuclear activity within the kingdom. Its secretive decision-making and secluded desert areas that could house underground nuclear facilities would also aid a hiding strategy. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia still cannot enrich uranium to weapons grade. Efforts to enlist outside help could alert others to its nuclear weapons program. If Iran builds nuclear weapons first, Mohammed bin Salman’s prior statement would direct international scrutiny toward Saudi Arabia’s nuclear activities.  

Obstacles To The Bomb

Even if Saudi Arabia adopted an active pursuit strategy, it would take years before it built a finished nuclear weapon. Saudi Arabia lacks the dual-use technology needed to build weapons-grade nuclear material, and nuclear warheads are difficult to construct. A Saudi Arabian nuclear weapons program could also elicit reprisals from Iran. In 2019, the Islamic Republic used its missile and drone capabilities to cripple a Saudi oil processing facility. It could launch similar assaults on Saudi Arabia’s nuclear infrastructure. Furthermore, the United States might levy sanctions on the Kingdom or offer Saudi Arabia its long sought after formal defense relationship. Lengthy time frames and a need to secure enrichment capabilities from abroad provide the United States with the opportunity to preempt Saudi Arabia before it is too late. 

Why The United States Should Stop Saudi Arabia 

There are three compelling reasons for the United States to stop Saudi Arabia: the instability-stability paradox modeled by India and Pakistan, the preservation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and the loss of U.S. leverage over an emboldened, nuclear Saudi Arabia. The possibility of a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race triggered by Iran has also been widely discussed, and Saudi Arabia’s building a nuclear bomb raises similar concerns. The United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Türkiye are the most likely candidates to catch the nuclear contagion, though there are credible reasons to question whether these states would develop nuclear weapons; Türkiye already enjoys a credible nuclear deterrent as a NATO member; Egypt has a dilapidated nuclear infrastructure; the United Arab Emirates has signed a stringent 123 Agreement. This gold standard of nonproliferation agreements indicates that the UAE is willing to put the nuclear option aside, at least for now. 

More likely is the possibility of an instability-stability paradox between a nuclear-armed Iran and Saudi Arabia. The instability-stability paradox argues that nuclear weapons may produce stability at the strategic level, but can simultaneously fuel distrust and escalation at the conventional level. Iran has sparred with Israel despite its nuclear arsenal, it could do so with Saudi Arabia as well. The small, vulnerable nuclear arsenals Iran and Saudi Arabia would possess initially could also invite counterforce strategies, in which opposing nuclear states seek to destroy their adversaries’ nuclear weapons in a first strike. India has adopted a counterforce strategy against Pakistan’s 150 or so nuclear missiles, and both nations have continued to skirmish despite their nuclear arsenals. A Saudi Arabian nuclear weapons program may not produce stability between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Instead, it could deepen hostilities between the two powers. 

There is also the question of the nonproliferation regime. Saudi Arabia’s bomb-seeking behavior may shake up the global status quo as tensions rise. If East Asian affairs worsen and Saudi Arabia—a major U.S. ally—were to violate the nonproliferation norm and gain nuclear weapons it may embolden nuclear hedgers like Japan and South Korea to behave similarly. Iran’s violation of the nonproliferation norm would be one thing, but the defection of U.S.-aligned Saudi Arabia could damage the nonproliferation regime severely. This alone is a compelling reason for the United States to abstain from sheltering Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of weapons. 

The United States also has a well-established strategic logic for preventing new nuclear-armed states. Nuclear-armed allies restrict the United States’ freedom of action, are difficult to control, and nuclear weapons may embolden them to act aggressively. Proponents of a United States retrenchment from the Middle East may be less concerned about these consequences, but an untethered Saudi Arabia would ensure that the Middle East continues to distract from more pressing theaters. 

How the United States Can Prevent a Nuclear Saudi Arabia 

The United States has a series of flawed options should Saudi Arabia seriously pursue the bomb. Firstly, the United States could adopt an assurance strategy and offer Saudi Arabia a formal defense relationship that replaces the utility of a Saudi Arabian nuclear arsenal with the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Secondly, the United States could threaten Saudi Arabia with abandonment—this is a common U.S. strategy against allies that are poised to proliferate. It could promise to leave Saudi Arabia’s nuclear weapons program vulnerable to Iranian attack and vow to ban Saudi Arabia from purchasing U.S. arms. The latter would be a particularly potent threat: Saudi Arabia’s military would be effectively crippled by the cessation of U.S. military assistance. Finally, the United States could target Saudi Arabia’s efforts to solicit the PRC’s support. The United States has limited options if the PRC commits to aiding Saudi Arabia with nuclear facilities and technology. It could ‘name and shame’ the PRC and hope that the PRC values its image as a responsible member of the nonproliferation regime more than Saudi Arabian oil and undermining U.S. policy in the Middle East. The United States could also hint that it might encourage Taiwan to follow in Saudi Arabia’s footsteps. That would be extremely escalatory and the United States has no clear trump cards against a Saudi Arabia-PRC nuclear nexus. Saudi Arabia has been clear and consistent: it will develop nuclear weapons to deter Iran’s security threat as a potential nuclear state. The Kingdom hopes that the United States will shelter its pursuit of nuclear weapons if Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state. Otherwise, it will likely hide its nuclear weapons program to limit the chance of military or economic counteraction. However, there is some good news for the United States if it chooses to prevent Saudi Arabia’s active pursuit. Saudi Arabia will need time and a foreign patron for its nuclear weapons program. As a result, the United States will have a greater chance of detecting a Saudi nuclear weapons program, and the chance to cripple it by preventing China or other powers from coming to its aid. Saudi Arabia’s dependency on American arms and desire for U.S. security guarantees would add potency to U.S. opposition. There is always a chance that Saudi Arabia’s interest in a civilian nuclear energy program and threat to build nuclear weapons is an insurance policy to keep the United States engaged and underwriting the kingdom’s security. However, the United States should be alarmed that a major Middle Eastern ally could pursue nuclear weapons and act now to convey to Saudi Arabia that an effort to build nuclear weapons would jeopardize Saudi Arabia’s access to U.S. arms and the United States’ commitment to the kingdom’s security. Whatever the means employed, a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia should not be allowed to come to pass.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: Aboodi Vesakaran via Pexels