Bartering Autocracies: What’s Next for Russo-North Korean Relations

As the West continues to isolate Russia due to its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has deepened bilateral relations with North Korea. In an unprecedented and escalatory move, North Korean forces were deployed in the Kursk Oblast and engaged in combat with Ukrainian forces, sustaining casualties. While President Zelensky has not disclosed the numbers, he confirmed the North Korean combatants’ deaths. It becomes critical to reflect on the future of Pyongyang-Moscow relations and its implications for the U.S. With North Korea exploiting Russia’s growing isolation to advance its conventional military and nuclear capabilities, the United States should strengthen its deterrence in the region, reassure the allies, and reinforce security commitments. 

Expanding Military Ties 

The deployment of North Korean troops in Ukraine was not a one-sided trade. It is a sign of expanding military ties between Moscow and Pyongyang and Russia’s support in conventional or nuclear arms build-up, which will demand strengthening U.S. deterrence in the Asia-Pacific. 

Before 2022, President Putin largely coordinated with the West on security issues of global importance, including arms control and nuclear proliferation. However, Moscow also did not fully comply with the UN sanctions imposed on Pyongyang, to the detriment of Russian businesses as they considered North Koreans highly valued workers. By the summer of 2024, relations between Kim Jong-un and Putin reached new heights. Putin visited Pyongyang for the first time in 24 years, where the two leaders reportedly discussed new cooperation in technological, economic, and military sectors. During the summit, the leaders signed a mutual defense treaty declaring mutual military assistance if any party “falls into a state of war.” Reports indicate that about 10,000 North Korean soldiers are now stationed in Kursk, which is under Ukrainian occupation. While the deployment did not constitute an invocation of mutual defense, this capability remains available, creating uncertainty about its potential future use. 

In November 2024, Moscow sent anti-aircraft missiles and other military technology to Pyongyang, a welcome reinforcement to Pyongyang’s vulnerable air defense system. Earlier this year, Moscow also vetoed a UN experts panel that assessed the implementation of sanctions imposed on North Korea. The end of the UN monitoring mandate allows Pyongyang to pursue nuclear weapons with more impunity. North Korea operates with disregard for international norms, however, the absence of the UN experts panel removes a layer of oversight and accountability. The panel reported on sanction evasion tactics and complicit entities as well as provided recommendations on further actions. For example, in the 2020 report, the panel recommended expanding sanctions adding individuals, maritime vessels, and entities identifying with assisting North Korea’s illicit activities. The UN Security Council members used these reports to address North Korea’s unlawful pursuit of nuclear power. Similarly, a lack of checks and balances enables further weapons exchanges between two countries.

North Korea’s military capabilities have undergone significant advancements in recent years despite the constraints of international sanctions and limited resources. However, there are notable shortcomings. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) lists 6,900 tanks and armored vehicles, 400 fighter aircraft, 80 light bombers, and more than 200 transport aircraft, and a missile program ranging from short-range tactical weapons to intercontinental ballistic missiles. As a nuclear-armed state, North Korea is estimated to possess a stockpile of 50 nuclear warheads. While the KPA advertises these numbers, much of its equipment is Soviet-era–and outdated. The KPA’s arsenal includes Soviet-era tanks like the T-34. Some aircraft are assessed to be up to 80 years old and are unlikely to be serviceable. While North Korea’s military faces significant limitations, potential support from Russia could shift the regional balance of military powers and reshape future strategic dynamics, prompting neighboring states and its allies to reconsider defense postures. Modernizing Pyongyang’s capabilities can enhance its competitiveness against adversaries and simultaneously prompt adjustments in U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies. 

One area Moscow is especially well-equipped to support is the technical modernization of nuclear warheads. The Russian SS-N-30A land-attack cruise missiles, which Moscow deploys in Ukraine, are a valuable commodity that North Korea could utilize, should Russia choose to provide them. With Russian cruise missile technology, Pyongyang, in theory, can double the range of its missiles—SS-N-30A has a range of 4,000 kilometers. The SS-N-30A could potentially reach Guam, a key U.S. territory in the Pacific.  Moreover, Moscow could also supply expertise in miniaturized warheads, a technology North Korea has yet to develop. Doing so would enhance Pyongyang’s tactical flexibility, allowing for deployment on a wider range of delivery systems, including precision-guided missiles. Better military capabilities and self-sustained partnership with Russia can transform Kim’s regime into a more capable and assertive nation, which will demand strengthening U.S. deterrence in the Asia Pacific.

Space Technology

In 2024 North Korea launched its first successful satellite. Not much is known about Pyongyang’s satellite functions or durability, but the country has attempted and failed multiple satellite launches. Its failures include the Kwangmyongsong-2 in 2009, Kwangmyongsong-3 in 2012, and Malligyong-1 in 2023. Pyongyang views space technology, particularly reconnaissance satellites, as crucial to the regime’s national defense strategy. Kim made his interests transparent by making the Cosmodrome spaceport his first stop on his September 2023 Russia trip. While there has been no direct proof of Moscow’s assistance in satellite technology, North Korea’s previous unsuccessful attempts suggest that this ‘sudden’ successful launch was not a coincidence. The trend will most likely continue at a rapid pace with Russia providing engineering guidance, rocket technology, and dual-use components that are essential for satellite deployment, but also valuable for ballistic missile systems. Given that Moscow launched 60 satellites last year, it has invaluable expertise on key deficiencies in North Korea’s space program, including payload design, miniaturization of imaging systems, and stabilization mechanisms essential for maintaining functionality in orbit. 

If this trend of cooperation continues, Russia could dramatically accelerate North Korea’s space program, enabling Pyongyang to deploy reconnaissance constellations or develop space-based anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Moscow has already demonstrated expertise in counter-space technologies, reportedly launching a satellite with ASAT capabilities, and has now paired that with a willingness to export to rogue states. Enhanced counter-space capabilities could allow North Korea to disrupt critical U.S. satellites, undermining operational effectiveness across domains, impinging on communication across the joint force, and negating key strategic advantages in a conflict.

Implications for the United States

The relationship between Russia and North Korea may be a marriage of convenience, driven by Russia’s need for Pyongyang in the context of the invasion of Ukraine. However, with the Russo-Ukrainian war showing no clear end in sight, even a temporary strengthening of ties can bolster North Korea’s nuclear, conventional military, and space capabilities. This will create challenges for U.S. deterrence in East Asia.

The military and technological partnership between Russia and North Korea poses significant implications for the West, particularly in terms of regional security and strategic stability. As Pyongyang’s military capabilities advance with Moscow’s support, the West may face a more capable North Korea with enhanced missile and space technologies, complicating U.S. deterrence efforts. This would lead to destabilization in North East Asia and heighten the risk of nuclear arms races. South Korea, a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, possesses no nuclear weapons and benefits from the United State’s pledge to use its nuclear arsenal in Seoul’s defense if such need arises. While the United States reaffirms its commitment to protecting South Korea, North Korea’s nuclear program quietly raises questions about the extent to which U.S. deterrence can address all security concerns, leading to ongoing discussions in South Korea about enhancing its defense capabilities. A nuclear arms race could lead to major security concerns in the region—heightening tensions and perpetuating a dangerous cycle of escalation. 

If this partnership materializes, North Korea and Russia will likely seek to establish a new security architecture, one that challenges existing frameworks and shifts regional power dynamics in their favor. In response, Western nations must strengthen their defense postures and reassess their approach to deterring Russia and North Korea in the coming years. In light of the growing security challenges posed by Moscow-Pyongyang, sending nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) to South Korea could serve as a necessary and credible deterrent. An arms race in the region poses a significant risk of heightened tensions and instability, while NSNWs would reinforce U.S. security commitments and demonstrate a clear, tangible response to North Korea’s nuclear threats. The nuclear presence can reassure the allies, mainly South Korea, discourage further nuclear escalation, and maintain stability. 

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: East Asia Forum