Honing the Tryzub: Preparing Ukraine to Fight the Next War
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, intelligence officials predicted that Kyiv would fall in 96 hours. But the Russian sword could not break the Tryzub, Ukraine’s national trident symbol. Ukraine’s armed forces (AFU), whose emblem is the trident and shield coat of arms, stood firm and continue to resist Russian aggression. As the conflict marks its third anniversary, Ukrainian determination, Russian logistical failures, and significant U.S. and allied material and intelligence support have allowed Ukraine to remain an independent nation.
However, three years on, those efforts are on the line as the Trump administration has suspended military aid, intelligence-sharing, and satellite imagery support for Ukraine following the contentious meeting between President Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky in the Oval Office. The Trump administration has also begun negotiations with Russia on a peace deal in Ukraine—absent Ukrainian representation and despite increasing Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Whatever deal those talks may reach will not ensure long-term peace and security for Kyiv. Despite suffering nearly 800,000 casualties, Russia will likely be prepared to fight another war in six months and ready to fight a large-scale European conflict in five years. President Putin’s language has suggested that he will not be satisfied with anything less than total control of Ukraine. A post-war Ukraine must already begin to prepare for the next conflict.
To do so, Kyiv must begin bolstering its conventional deterrent capabilities and warfighting capacity as soon as a peace deal is signed. While it now appears increasingly unlikely that Ukraine will join NATO, Kyiv can still establish a strong deterrent capacity through investment in its domestic defense industrial base (DIB), applying lessons learned to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) strategy and force design, and continuing autonomous systems innovation. Given the risks that Russia poses to European and wider global security, Ukraine must not embark on this effort alone.
Expanding Ukraine’s Defense Industrial Base
Ukraine has significantly expanded its domestic DIB throughout the war to support its military. In 2024, Ukraine allocated USD four billion towards its defense industry, according to Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov. Furthermore, Ukraine’s Finance Minister Yulia Svyrydenko forecast that Ukraine’s DIB can expand by 300 percent. Ukrainian DIB components, like the state-run Ukrainian Defense Industry Joint Stock Company (formerly Ukroboronprom), expanded capacity by 62 percent between 2022 and 2023 and demonstrated the ability to domestically manufacture key 155mm artillery rounds to NATO standards in 2024.
Furthermore, the Ukrainian government’s Brave1 accelerator was estimated to bring USD 50 million in funding to hundreds of Ukrainian defense start-ups. These defense start-ups—like Piranha Tech, which focuses on electronic warfare systems—are leaders in their field and provide critical capabilities for the AFU to fight on the modern (and future) battlefield. Throughout the war with Russia, Ukraine has shown that it can rapidly expand its DIB capacity and effectively manufacture key ammunition, self-propelled artillery systems like the 2S22 Bohdana, Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) like the Lynx IFV, and Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles like the Inguar-3 MRAP. Following any Russo-Ukrainian war peace deal, Ukraine’s DIB must continue to expand as the industry has shown it can accomplish during wartime. A strong industrial base is critical for Ukraine to establish a credible conventional deterrent capability and be prepared for the next conflict.
Ukraine is unlikely to receive notable U.S. military aid in the immediate post-conflict as the Trump administration focuses on cutting government spending, including foreign aid. However, private U.S. defense companies could provide some relief. U.S. defense companies have already begun signing deals with Ukraine, including Northrop Grumman, which signed an agreement on January 10, 2025, to provide training and equipment to establish a “medium-caliber ammunition production line.” Boeing also met with a Ukrainian delegation on February 17, 2025, on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference to discuss potential ammunition and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production. Close collaboration between U.S. defense manufacturers and Ukraine could help further expand Ukraine’s DIB capacity, expanding Ukrainian munitions stockpiles and equipping the AFU with critical weapons systems to grow the scale of Ukraine’s conventional deterrence against Russia.
However, U.S. direct commercial military sales alone cannot substitute for broader government foreign military sales. From 2013 to 2023, private U.S. defense companies sold USD 1.6 billion in direct commercial sales to Ukraine, compared to USD 65.9 billion from U.S. foreign military sales. Therefore, U.S. defense companies should mainly support Ukraine’s DIB expansion through targeted weapons and ammunition sales to bridge technological gaps, such as anti-air capabilities, which Russia may exploit in future conflicts.
European nations and defense companies can also supplement Ukraine’s DIB capacity. A Czech-led ammunition initiative has supplied Ukraine with over 1.6 million shells, funding through April 2025, and could potentially continue providing Ukraine with shells as Ukraine’s domestic manufacturing ramps up post-conflict. Furthermore, new nations, like Norway, continue to join the Drone Coalition, which raised EUR 1.8 billion over the past year and could continue to support Ukraine in building deterrence capability. Furthermore, a UK-led international defense trade mission to Ukraine, with participation from Norway and the Netherlands, on February 14, 2025, established commitments to deepen defense cooperation. Once again, European defense cooperation that began during the war could continue to support the development of the Ukrainian DIB capacity, particularly as Ukraine would continue to play the first line of defense against Russian aggression on the European continent.
Since U.S. private defense companies, European nations, and European defense firms cannot match the scale of U.S. foreign military sales during the height of the current war, it is crucial to initiate a peacetime buildup of Ukraine’s Defense Industrial Base. In an ideal situation, Ukraine would continue to receive significant U.S. foreign military sales to rapidly restore and enhance its capabilities, the Trump administration’s suspension of Ukrainian military aid makes this scenario extraordinarily unlikely. However, a strategy that combines expanding the Ukrainian domestic DIB with U.S. and European defense sales could effectively replenish the AFU during an extended period of peace, particularly as the forces would not be consuming ammunition at wartime levels or facing significant weapon system losses.
Applying Lessons Learned to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU)
To provide a formidable conventional deterrent or ensure a highly effective fighting force if deterrence fails, the AFU must use the critical time a peace deal gives to reconstitute and apply the lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian war.
First, the AFU must consolidate and standardize its military equipment to improve its effectiveness. Despite attempts at reform from 2014 to 2022, the pre-war AFU was underequipped and primarily operated obsolete Soviet equipment. Throughout the conflict, the AFU received donated weapon systems from over 20 countries through military aid. These systems allowed the AFU to combat Russia’s attacks and even advance into Russia’s Kursk oblast.
However, the variety of weapons systems and required munitions has created serious logistical and repair issues for the AFU. To improve its fighting ability, a post-peace AFU must solve its standardization issues by utilizing peacetime to replenish ammunition stockpiles, repair vehicles, and decommission obsolete weapon systems.
While standardizing the AFU’s weapon systems is a considerable challenge due to the variety of systems currently in use, it is vital for boosting the AFU’s combat effectiveness, enabling a fast battle pace, and streamlining Ukrainian logistics. A strong and growing domestic Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base (DIB) would enhance the ability to replenish ammunition stockpiles.
Second, once peace in Ukraine is reached, the AFU will have precious time to train new units effectively. Throughout the conflict, Ukraine has quintupled the size of its military, making it the largest active one in Europe besides Russia at 980,000 strong. However, attritional combat and pressure from the manpower differential between Moscow and Kyiv have forced Ukraine to curtail recruit training periods before deployment. The scale of Ukrainian military expansion, plus the necessity of reinforcing the front lines, meant that certain units received only a few weeks of training before front-line operations in 2024.
This issue has been marginally addressed, with new Ukrainian recruits now receiving around 45 days of training. However, this still lags behind the U.S. Army, where recruits do ten weeks of basic training and additional advanced individual training. Furthermore, Ukrainian commanders have also voiced concerns over limited 6-week EU training on combined-arms maneuvers, which the majority of Ukrainian officers have not had the opportunity to take.
Following the cessation of active combat, the AFU would finally have the time and resources to implement more comprehensive training programs for new recruits, current soldiers, and commanders alike. While the AFU’s expansion will likely encounter manpower challenges due to a limited hiring pool following years of intense fighting, this highlights the importance of ensuring that a post-peace AFU can compensate for its manpower limitations with a highly skilled and well-trained force. NATO countries must continue and expand training courses on combined-arms operations to support the crucial mission of increasing Ukrainian effectiveness. Relying solely on weapon systems is not enough to win a war or deter an enemy; an effective military requires highly skilled soldiers, who require a sizable time investment in their training.
Third, the AFU can use the time to institutionalize the recent wartime reform of its force structure from a brigade to a corps system. The AFU, specifically its ground forces, has operated with a brigade force structure from the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war. While this force structure grants greater maneuverability at the tactical level and a rapid reaction speed, command and control (C2) is more limited, with the AFU’s operational-strategic command (OSUV) and operational commands (OK) having to coordinate over a hundred brigades. Ukraine’s continued deployment of new undermanned brigades that lack adequate unit commanders further complicates C2.
Kyiv is beginning to address this challenge by adopting a corps system, which reportedly consists of 20 corps. Currently, OSUV and OK management structures only provide general planning to dozens of brigades spread across the entire frontline, leaving each brigade commander to establish the logistics, specific plans of attack, and coordination with other AFU units. In contrast, new corps commanders would only be responsible for between 3 and 7 brigades and combined logistics, located in a specific area of responsibility (AOR). This simplification of the Ukrainian force structure should enhance C2 and allow for greater coordination between large unit maneuvers, which is essential given the roughly 600-mile frontline stretching from Russia’s Kursk Oblast to Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast. However, Kyiv cannot rely on battlefield experience alone to implement this reform effectively. To ensure that the AFU can effectively adopt this new force structure, it needs to develop training manuals, drill its commanders and units in corps maneuver, and institutionalize the lessons learned from initial battlefield corps experience. Whatever peace the proposed deal affords must be well spent by Ukraine effectively training all levels of command.
Developing New Ukrainian Drone Capabilities and Capacity
Ukraine has employed drones as a force multiplier with extraordinary effect throughout the conflict (most notably destroying the Russian Navy’s Black Sea fleet flagship Moskva), becoming a world leader in the application of drones to modern military combat. On June 11, 2024, Ukraine launched the Unmanned Systems Force, becoming the first country to create a separate military branch dedicated solely to drones. Ukrainian drones also account for between 60 to 70 percent of Russian material losses. In a post-conflict Ukraine, it will be essential to maintain drone innovation and significantly increase drone production to deter Russian aggression or swiftly and extensively retaliate against Russian forces and military targets during the initial period of war, should deterrence fail.
While other countries, including Russia, are quickly adapting to this new battlefield reality, Ukraine can maintain its advantage through innovation in decreasing drone unit costs, increasing drone hit rate through AI integration, and overcoming Russian anti-drone tactical development.
To maintain its advantage in drone capabilities over Russia in the future, Ukraine must continue to support this critical industry and utilize the streamlined military acquisition process adopted in 2022. Kyiv is projected to produce between two and three million drones in 2025. This rapid growth is only achievable through public-private collaboration and continued investment in the sector. As European countries raise their defense budgets and consider spending prioritization, they should continue to bolster the defensive line with Ukraine’s battle-proven drone technology.
The prospects for a peace deal that preserves Ukrainian sovereignty and security are less optimistic than ever as the Trump administration has become more amicable towards Russia and agrees with Putin’s framing of the war. In light of this dire situation, Kyiv must begin preparations for a resumption of conflict against Russia, even before the current war has ended. Sensible time and financial investments across Ukrainian defense, including the DIB and AFU, will place the country in a better position to deter—or fight if deterrence fails—a new war waged by Moscow. The loss of funding, military aid, and intelligence from Washington means that European states must find ways to fill the funding gap and develop sustainable long-term partnerships with Kyiv, as will private industry, to a lesser extent. Combining Ukrainian resilience and a battle-hardened force with a well-supplied, effectively structured command system, and a robust industrial base will place the nation in the best position to defend its independence and counter future Russian aggression whenever it may arise.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: WikiMedia Commons
