Global Korea: South Korea Should Double Down on a Global Role in the Era of Trump

The inauguration of President Donald Trump nearly coincided with a constitutional crisis in South Korea, formally known as the ROK. Former ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol imposed a short-lived state of martial law in December 2024 to combat “anti-state forces” that he alleged were acting in collusion with North Korea. In reality, Yoon’s reasoning likely had much to do with an opposition-led legislature, obstructing his budgetary plans. Either way, Yoon’s declaration was reminiscent of a 1980 imposition of martial law that reestablished military rule after the ROK’s brief democratic thaw. Yoon’s declaration of martial law sparked fierce resistance from lawmakers and protestors. In December 2024, the National Assembly impeached Yoon and prosecutors charged him with insurrection. If the Constitutional Court confirms Yoon’s impeachment, snap elections within sixty days may carry the liberal Democratic Party (DP) leader Lee Jae-Myung into power. However, a liberal president is likely to reorder ROK foreign policy towards unproductive spats with Japan, closer relations with the PRC, and fruitless negotiations with North Korea. Instead, the ROK’s next president should double-down on Yoon’s internationalism and prioritize the influence the ROK stands to gain as an autonomous middle power. 

The Conservatives Flounder

Since the abortive declaration of martial law, Yoon’s supporters in the conservative People Power Party (PPP) have staged an unlikely gamble for the United States’ aid. The PPP has sidelined legislators who defected and voted for his impeachment. Supporters have turned out in the streets with American flags and ‘Stop the Steal’ signs to protest Yoon’s impeachment—sometimes violently. PPP emissaries arrived at President Trump’s inauguration to enlist his support for Yoon. However, President Trump has not been receptive to PPP pleas, and the momentum in Korean politics has shifted to Lee’s Democratic Party. While he and his party gained popularity for opposing the martial law declaration, opposition leader Lee Jae-Myung is not exempt from the same corruption scandals that have dogged Yoon. An election law violation from the 2022 presidential race currently bars Lee—a former Gyeonggi province governor and human rights lawyer—from running unless the courts overturn his conviction. Whether he can reverse this conviction and run, or if another DP leader takes up the mantle remains to be seen. Nonetheless, Lee’s foreign policy stances indicate the likely contours of a liberal foreign policy. To detail how the DP’s foreign policy may diverge from Yoon’s, it is worthwhile to enumerate Yoon’s foreign policy achievements. 

Before his impeachment, Yoon adopted a mostly hardline stance on North Korea, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), forged tighter ties with Japan, and positioned the ROK as a close partner of NATO amid the Russo-Ukrainian War. He cast the ROK as a “global pivotal state” that could leverage its economic stature and alliance with the US to help defend liberal internationalism on the world stage. The DP may reverse those policies to appease the DPRK and the PRC.

Liberal Foreign Policy Precedents

Firstly, liberal ROK administrations have historically adopted a “sunshine policy” toward the DPRK, one of reconciliation rather than confrontation. Secondly, liberals are sometimes captive to historical animus against Japan. Lee himself has previously cast Japan as a “hostile nation”. The initial DP impeachment bill against Yoon even accused him of a Japan-centered foreign policy. Accordingly, Japanese pundits are already bidding farewell to the closer intergovernmental partnership Yoon forged. Although Lee has recently softened his rhetoric towards Japan, the track record of previous liberal presidents indicates that close ROK-Japan relations are in jeopardy.

The ROK’s relations with the PRC will also be up for revision. The DP views the PRC more favorably than the average South Korean and has sought to avoid choosing between the United States and the PRC. Despite the DP’s sentiment, the two countries have had diplomatic spats. Most notably, the PRC penalized the ROK’s retail, tourism, cosmetics, and entertainment industries after the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense battery to the ROK in 2016. A DP administration is predisposed to forging closer ties with the PRC and backtracking on Yoon’s bullish stance on cross-strait issues.

Yet, the DP may ultimately prioritize domestic issues over foreign policy. After all, it was the cost of living issues that helped send Yoon’s popularity to record lows before the declaration of martial law. Economic stability, especially after the constitutional debacle devastated the value of the Won, will force the DP into a delicate balancing act between the PRC—a vital trading partner—and President Trump’s likely ire toward the ROK’s trade surplus with the United States. Economic tensions aside, President Trump’s policies towards Northeast Asia will play a critical role in the DP’s prospective foreign policy.

The U.S.-ROK Alliance in the Era of Trump

The Korean peninsula does not appear to rank highly among President Trump’s foreign policy priorities. In his first term, President Trump even considered withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea. President Trump recently labeled the DPRK a “nuclear power”—a break from the longstanding U.S.-ROK agreement not to do so—and has speculated that Kim Jong Un is eager to parley with him. All this indicates that President Trump will seek high-profile summitry with the DPRK whenever his attention does turn to the Korean peninsula. Doing so would align with President Trump’s peacemaking agenda, and Lee has welcomed the suggestion of renewed U.S.-DPRK negotiations. However, the Trump administration’s recent talks with Russia suggest that any outreach by Washington to the DPRK is likely to cut out Seoul. 

If a DP administration does pursue bilateral negotiations with the DPRK, it would face an uphill battle to achieve notable results. In 2024, Kim Jong Un reversed a longstanding commitment to peaceful reunification and labeled the ROK as his “primary enemy.” Russia and the DPRK also recently signed a mutual defense treaty on the back of DPRK troop commitments to the Russo-Ukrainian War. The PRC has reacted to Russia-DPRK alignment with a variety of punitive measures, but Russian oil, food, cash, and advanced military technology have given Kim a commensurate lifeline to a great power patron. Compared to President Trump’s first term, Kim now has increasingly mature nuclear capabilities and a new patron in Russia. He is unlikely to want to parlay with the ROK in earnest.

Regardless of who wins the presidency, the United States and the ROK may spar over trade and the U.S. troop presence in the ROK. President Trump has had a longstanding inclination to either withdraw those troops or demand greater compensation from the ROK for their presence. The ROK has a significant trade surplus with the United States. If President Trump’s focus on economic protectionism continues, a DP president will have to contend with the prospect of tariffs or U.S. troop withdrawals. Bending the knee on economic issues will likely not strike Lee or a DP president as desirable. However, a continued U.S. presence on the peninsula is worth making economic concessions in the name of ROK’s security.

The Case for Liberal Internationalism

Despite these challenges, the DP should continue Yoon’s efforts to look beyond its neighbors and towards a global role if it ascends to the presidency. Although the election of President Trump throws a wrench in the works of Yoon’s particular brand of alliance-enabled internationalism, the DP can still make internationalism and autonomy its calling card. There is an aggrandizing role for the ROK to play as a global provider of public goods such as trade, economic aid, and peacekeeping operations. If the DP can resist fixating on fruitless diplomatic outreach to the DPRK and unproductive acrimony with Japan, it can forge a new path forward for itself as an independent middle power. A ROK that embraces this role would serve as a neutral broker in regional and international conflicts, double down on leading in the fields of global health and nuclear security, and promote itself as a model for economic and political emulation. That role will allow the ROK to shape international outcomes in its favor and count on fellow middle powers as allies.

To succeed, the DP must embrace Lee’s watchword of pragmatism. If Lee’s conviction is reversed and he is elected as the ROK’s next president, he should live up to his reputation as a problem solver. His priority should be to preserve U.S. nuclear deterrence on the Korean peninsula and the U.S. troops on the ground that substantiate it, even if he looks beyond the Korean peninsula and its environs for an increasingly independent global role. To do so, the DP must move beyond liberals’ tendency to prioritize the pipedream of inter-Korean reconciliation. A future DP administration’s best bet is to continue Yoon’s pursuit of a global role even if it can no longer depend on the United States as an enabler of its internationalism.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: UPI