Protecting Antarctica: Why Latin America Matters in U.S. Polar Strategy

The current Antarctic governance lacks sufficient enforcement mechanisms to prevent violations amid growing geopolitical and economic interests on the continent. While scientific cooperation and preservation efforts once defined Antarctica, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC)  strategic expansion and hydrocarbon mining ambitions pose direct challenges to the Antarctic’s integrity. Latin America, particularly Chile and Argentina, is emerging as a pivotal arena regarding Antarctic governance. The United States must take a proactive role by strengthening its outreach to Latin America, investing in ice-breaking capabilities, and increasing multilateral inspections to deter violations and reinforce Antarctic governance. Militarization or resource exploitation would strain U.S. military and economic resources and weaken key alliances, while the PRC, lacking sufficient domestic reserves of critical resources, stands to gain the most from a collapse of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). 

The Antarctic Governance

Antarctica does not have a permanent population or sovereign government. As an uninhabited territory, it is instead governed by the ATS, a framework of international agreements that regulate human activity on the continent. Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States signed the Antarctic Treaty, the principal document of the ATS, in 1959, and it entered into force in 1961. Today, the treaty has expanded to include over 50 parties, with 29 consultative parties holding decision-making authority. 

The Antarctic Treaty prohibits military activity, new territorial claims, and resource exploitation while promoting international scientific cooperation south of 60°S latitude. It suspends sovereignty disputes, meaning no single country controls the land, and all nations can conduct scientific activities without territorial restrictions. Additional agreements, such as the Protocol on Environmental Protection (1991), reinforce conservation efforts by banning mineral exploration and mining. 

Resource Competition and Strategic Interests in Antarctica

Despite the ban on mineral resource extraction, Antarctica’s unique multilateral governance and rich resource deposits, namely hydrocarbon potential valued at over $40 trillion, mineral deposits, freshwater reserves, and fisheries, make it a potential region of contention. While  Article 7 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection prohibits “any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research,” Russian state-owned geological company ROSGEO in 2020 published results of its comprehensive geophysical research, estimating Antarctic potential hydrocarbon resources at 70 billion tons, approximately 55% more than Saudi Arabia’s hydrocarbon reserves. 

While Antarctica’s location is not as strategically important as its resources due to extreme remoteness, severe and inhospitable weather, and seasonal sea ice coverage, it nonetheless provides a key location for satellite and communications infrastructure, providing ground stations with consistent and high-quality communication with pole-orbiting satellites. The PRC currently operates five facilities in Antarctica, three of which were constructed in the last 16 years, while no other countries have built any since 2000, causing fear of their dual-use purpose under the Military-Civil Fusion Strategy. 

The current status quo in Antarctica benefits the United States by preserving peace and stability, preventing militarization, protecting the environment, and promoting scientific cooperation. Any shift toward militarization or resource exploitation risks triggering a chain reaction, intensifying territorial disputes, and fueling conflicts for control over claimed and unclaimed land. Maintaining a demilitarized and non-exploited Antarctica is in the best interest of the United States, as any conflict in the region would place unnecessary strain on U.S. military and economic resources while jeopardizing long-standing international partnerships. The United States is not reliant on the prospect of Antarctic natural resources, as it possesses abundant resource reserves within its own territory. Hence, engaging in resource competition or military escalation in Antarctica would divert attention and resources from more pressing global priorities for little foreseeable gain. Meanwhile, the primary beneficiary of a breakdown in the Antarctic Treaty System would be the PRC, which lacks sufficient domestic reserves of many critical resources and has demonstrated interest in expanding its influence in the region. 

Latin America’s Role in Antarctic Security

The ATS in its current form lacks sufficient enforcement mechanisms to deter violations in the face of growing geopolitical and economic interests on the continent. While cooperation defined the Cold War-era Antarctica, recent PRC and Russian violations of the ATS, such as Russian hydrocarbon exploration and an unapproved Chinese Antarctic base construction, put strains on the treaty system and point to the emergence of Antarctica as yet another theater of strategic competition.

Latin American countries are, in many respects, critical U.S. partners in Antarctica. Chile and Argentina are among the original signatories of the Antarctic Treaty and two of seven countries with official territorial claims on the continent, the other being the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia, France, and New Zealand. Latin America is additionally the closest continental landmass to Antarctica. Argentina and Chile have a direct access point to the continent as their southernmost territories are in the Tierra del Fuego archipelago. The Drake Passage, the body of water separating Tierra del Fuego and the Antarctic Peninsula, provides the only sea passage between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans besides the Panama Canal, thus serving as a strategic sea route despite harsh conditions and strong oceanic currents. 

Argentina and Chile’s non-aligned status and strategic position present the PRC with an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties while expanding its influence and capabilities in the region. Argentina and Chile are the only countries with Antarctic sovereignty claims that are not NATO or Five Eyes members, as well as the only two participants in the Belt and Road Initiative out of the seven Antarctic claimants. The PRC already unsuccessfully pressured Argentina to build multipurpose ports with potential military use in Tierra del Fuego in 2009 and 2023, which would allow the PRC  to secure reliable access to Antarctica, as well as passage between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans in case of a conflict that would render the Panama Canal impassable for Chinese vessels. 

The PRC’s strategy of exercising diplomatic influence through economic engagement, as witnessed in the case of a general  Latin American shift away from a recognition of Taiwan towards favoring the PRC’s position, extends to Beijing’s Antarctic policy as well. The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, which bans mineral exploitation on the continent, allows countries to call for a review conference after 2048, requiring consent of at least three-quarters of the Consultative Parties for any modification. Six of the 29 consultative parties are Latin American countries and as such, the region holds significant influence over any potential amendments to the Treaty.

The PRC expressed a desire to “balance protection and utilization of Antarctica,” violated the ATS, and opposed attempts to expand marine protected areas. In contrast, Chile and Argentina maintain Antarctic policies that align with the ATS and prioritize the environmental protection of the continent. Their objectives include protection of their sovereignty claims, consolidation of an influential position within the ATS, protection and conservation of the Antarctic environment and development of sustainable fisheries, as well as strengthening of Antarctic research and international cooperation as the core of their Antarctic engagement.

Recent policy shifts in Chile and Argentina suggest a resistance to Chinese influence in Antarctica. In 2024, Chile’s president, Gabriel Boric, expressed opposition to any commercial exploitation of minerals on the continent in response to reports of a Russian oil discovery. Similarly, Argentina’s president Javier Milei in April 2024 announced the construction of a naval base in Tierra del Fuego with U.S. involvement, signaling a realignment away from the PRC in its Antarctic policy.

Maintaining strong diplomatic ties with both Chile and Argentina is essential to upholding the ATS. Given the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the ATS, the international response to open violations of the mineral extraction ban remains uncertain. The United States should prioritize maintaining the status quo in the region, which requires adhering to and reinforcing the principles of the ATS. 

Strengthening U.S. Leadership in Antarctic Governance

Article 7 of the Antarctic Treaty grants countries the right to conduct inspections to verify compliance with the ATS. However, PRC Antarctic facilities often go years without external oversight, with Kunlun Station never having been inspected and Taishan Station having been inspected only once since its establishment in 2014. The United States must prioritize increasing the frequency of multilateral inspections in close coordination with its allies and partners to ensure compliance with the ATS. While unilateral inspections risk provoking reciprocal measures from Beijing, a coordinated, multinational approach would strengthen enforcement while reducing the likelihood of direct geopolitical friction.

The shortage of icebreaking capacity weakens the United States’ ability to conduct these Antarctic inspections, enforce treaty provisions, and maintain a strategic presence in the region. Beyond the risk of reciprocal measures, conducting inspections in Antarctica presents significant logistical and operational challenges due to the continent’s size, extreme weather conditions, and the specialized capabilities required for such operations. A major constraint is the United States’ aging icebreaker fleet, which is essential for polar operations. Currently, the United States operates only two icebreakers, Polar Star and Healy. The Polar Star, despite being in service for nearly 50 years, well beyond its original 30-year service life, remains the country’s only heavy icebreaker capable of supporting missions in both the Arctic and Antarctic. The Healy, a medium icebreaker, is primarily dedicated to Arctic research, further limiting operational flexibility. 

The changing climate and shifting geopolitical dynamics present new challenges in the polar regions. To maintain its presence in Antarctica, the United States must invest in expanding its icebreaker fleet to support inspections and operations. These assets will be valuable not only in Antarctica but also in the Arctic, where diminishing ice coverage is opening new arenas for strategic competition. A long-term strategy must prioritize the expansion of icebreaker fleets, aerial surveillance, and autonomous monitoring systems to ensure compliance with the Antarctic Treaty System, support scientific missions, and protect U.S. interests.

Protecting Antarctica as a zone of international cooperation amid evolving global challenges will require both strengthening U.S. capabilities and deepening collaboration with Latin American partners. Only through these efforts can the United States reinforce treaty commitments, uphold international agreements, and preserve Antarctica’s status as a continent dedicated to scientific research and stability.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: U.S. Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research