The Global Security Initiative in Action: Beijing’s Military Footprint in Central Asia

Central Asia’s strategic importance—with its abundant energy resources and geographic position between major powers—has long made it a focal point for geopolitical competition. The U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan created a security vacuum that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has moved to fill, transitioning from primarily economic engagement to a multifaceted security relationship. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been quietly but systematically expanding its engagement across all five Central Asian republics. These military activities in Central Asia represent the operational manifestation of its Global Security Initiative, with profound implications for U.S. interests and regional stability. The United States risks ceding a strategically vital region if the national security enterprise fails to recognize this pattern of the PLA’s military engagement.

An Ideological Diplomacy

The CCP’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), formally announced by President Xi Jinping in April 2022 at the Boao Forum for Asia, is Beijing’s articulation of an alternative vision for global security governance. The GSI advances six core principles: commitment to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security; respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; abiding by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter; taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously; peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation; and maintaining security in both traditional and nontraditional domains. 

While ostensibly promoting cooperation, the GSI effectively provides an ideological justification for the CCP’s growing military assertiveness abroad. The GSI also serves as a frame to criticize  U.S.-led security arrangements that the CCP portrays as destabilizing “bloc politics.” Unlike the better-known Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which focuses on economic engagement, the GSI prioritizes security cooperation—reframing the PRC as not merely an economic power but a provider of security and stability. In Central Asia, the GSI serves as the conceptual framework underpinning the PLA’s expanded military presence, justifying deeper military integration with regional states as a natural extension of the CCP’s security interests.

Justifying Military Expansion–and Strategic Ambitions

For example, the Chinese military facility in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan region serves the CCP’s broader Eurasian ambitions, going beyond its stated counterterrorism purpose. Located near the Wakhan Corridor, the narrow strip of Afghan territory that borders the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this installation provides the PRC with a permanent military presence in the former Soviet republic. The Washington Post first reported in 2019 the existence of this PLA military outpost, discovering troops in PLA uniforms patrolling the area. Despite the CCP’s reluctance to acknowledge it publicly, satellite imagery and investigative reporting have confirmed that the facility includes barracks, defensive positions, and surveillance equipment that extend the PLA’s monitoring capabilities in the region. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets forward-deployed at this outpost extend the PRC’s intelligence collection capabilities well beyond its western border. This represents a significant milestone: the first confirmed PLA facility in a former Soviet republic, established without any public acknowledgment or formal treaty. The base’s strategic location near the Wakhan Corridor—historically significant as a buffer zone during the “Great Game” between the British and Russian empires—indicates the PRC’s deep appreciation of the region’s geostrategic importance.

The contrast between the CCP’s public narrative of counterterrorism cooperation and the reality of a permanent military installation beyond the PRC’s borders illustrates how the GSI provides diplomatic cover for strategic expansion. This approach directly embodies key GSI principles of “indivisibility of security” and respect for the security concerns of all countries, as opposed to the U.S. approach defined by “exclusive security” and “bloc confrontation.” Through this framing, the CCP justifies its military expansion as necessary for its own security while establishing precedent for similar facilities elsewhere.

In addition, the PLA has systematically increased military equipment transfers to Central Asian states, creating technological dependencies that serve both economic and strategic objectives. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have received advanced Chinese drone systems, Turkmenistan has acquired missile defense technology, and Kyrgyzstan now operates Chinese counter-stealth radar systems. These transfers create long-term path dependencies through maintenance requirements, training needs, and spare parts supply chains that gradually bind these nations’ security architectures to the PLA’s systems. Complementing these equipment transfers, the CCP has dramatically increased military exercises under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) framework. Since its inception in 2005, these “Peace Mission” exercises have evolved into joint operations, with scenarios increasingly focused on conventional warfare rather than counterterrorism and featuring ground forces, armor, and aviation elements—far beyond what would be required for counterterrorism operations.

Through these activities, the CCP aims to systematically displace Russia’s traditional security influence on the Central Asian states. Russia has largely acquiesced to the CCP’s growing presence in its ‘Near Abroad’ and prioritized its strategic partnership with the PRC over regional hegemony concerns. Russia’s dependence on the PRC deepened following Western sanctions against Moscow, and has further altered the balance of power between the two states in the PRC’s favor. The CCP also works to ensure shared interests with Russia in preventing Western security partnerships from taking root in Central Asia. This approach aligns with the GSI principles of “cooperative security” and “common security,” offering regional security solutions with characteristics favored by the PRC—excluding any potential Western security arrangements.

Implications for U.S. Policy in Central Asia

The United States should be more concerned about the PLA’s military expansion in Central Asia for several reasons. First, the PLA’s presence provides the CCP with monitoring capabilities and strategic depth that could significantly complicate U.S. operations across the region, including potential contingencies involving Iran, Afghanistan, or the Indo-Pacific. The PLA could monitor, report on, and potentially disrupt U.S. military responses to Iranian nuclear program escalation, maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf, or multinational efforts to counter Iranian proxy forces—or even share intelligence with other adversaries. The increased presence may also complicate U.S. counterterrorism operations against resurgent extremist groups in Afghanistan, or emergency evacuations of U.S. personnel or allies as control of the borders weakens and economic conditions devolve. Lastly, while there is considerable geographic distance to the Taiwan Strait, Central Asia may nonetheless become an important focal point in a potential confrontation between the PRC and Taiwan. Central Asia may serve as a staging ground, or allow the PRC to maintain supply lines for critical inputs, which could be cut off via a U.S. naval blockade. This may force the U.S. to divide resources and divert attention, further complicating the strategic calculus. 

Second, PLA facilities and Chinese-supplied equipment enable surveillance of U.S. activities and partners throughout the South and Central Asia region. As these nations’ military systems become increasingly integrated with PRC technology, the risk of intelligence compromise grows accordingly; for example, Kyrgyzstan implemented a PRC-built “Safe City” surveillance system in Bishkek, ostensibly for crime prevention but utilizing technologies similar to those deployed in Xinjiang for population monitoring. This integration also progressively closes opportunities for U.S. military-to-military engagement, as compatibility issues and the PRC’s influence make Western partnerships less attractive and secure.

Third, the PLA’s growing military foothold provides potential force projection capabilities toward the Middle East and South Asia in any future conflict. Control of key transportation corridors and infrastructure—originally developed under the BRI but now increasingly secured through military presence—allows for rapid deployment of PLA forces beyond their traditional operating areas. While the effectiveness of the GSI as an alternative security framework remains uncertain, its existence undermines the United States’ ability to shape regional security outcomes. The CCP is determined to reshape the security architecture in Central Asia in line with its interests. This pattern of engagement directly challenges U.S. interests and merits far greater scrutiny from the national security enterprise than it has received to date. The Central Asia Strategy 2019-2025 recognized the need to “expand and maintain support for sovereignty and independence” of the Central Asian states, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s emphasis on the C5+1 diplomatic platform indicates recognition of the region’s importance, but concrete partnerships remain limited. If the United States hopes to nip the CCP’s vision of a PRC-dominated Eurasia in the bud, it must not treat the Central Asian nations as peripheral interests and instead must develop comprehensive and viable diplomatic, economic, and security alternatives—before its strategic position is irreparably compromised.

Views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of GSSR, Georgetown University, or any other entity. Image Credit: RFERL